of the story. In other words, it remains entirely unclear what to say with respect to God’s knowledge of the nature of what is deemed by humans as randomness. It may very well be the case that randomness does not exist for God. We just do not know. Certainly, Story has not shown us in his article that what appears to be random for humans is true of God. Of course, he makes a number of assertions about randomness and God’s sovereign control over it. But I have not seen for myself where he has shown this to be the case.

Third, Story claims that any discussion of how God works in the world must be seen in the light of scientific progress. But this begs the question, in that the claim assumes that genuine knowledge is the kind that is supported by science. We all know that every form of knowledge does not need science. For example, we do not need scientific support to know whether torturing innocent children is morally wrong. Science has nothing to do whatsoever with whether salvation is possible through Christ, 2 + 2 = 4, etc. Worse, the very claim that any discussion of God’s action in the world requires scientific support, is itself not a scientific claim. Thus, it is self-defeating to assume that it is, in that the very claim per se cannot be subjected to empirical or experimental testing. So, in light of the above three objections, Story fails to show us how randomness and divine sovereignty can coexist.

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Story Responds to Parsons and Guta

Parsons, in his critique of my article, states that I have equivocated in my definition or understanding of the term “randomness,” something I took great pains to avoid doing. In his critique, he objects most strongly to a personal observation. While my article may be viewed as one that certainly will not agree with most people’s personal observations. While my article may be viewed as “very controversial” to some, I remain hopeful that it may open the possibility (likelihood) that what might appear random to us may not be random to God (p. 230). I may legitimately be critiqued for not more explicitly stating the point that I am speaking outside my field. Yet I do not believe that being a scientist disqualifies one from discussing philosophical ideas, as long as one acknowledges this openly. I understand the difference between a scientific and a philosophical argument, and I find fault with those such as Dennett and Dawkins for failing to clearly make this distinction. Nor would I agree that because biology as a field does not study itself, biology cannot have anything to add to a philosophical discussion. I think it is important that observations about the natural world be consistent with our philosophical understandings. I would never argue, as Guta suggests, that “God’s action in the world requires scientific support.” In fact, I am not sure what he actually means by this. I am suggesting that it is important to attempt to fit our theological and philosophical beliefs, and our biblical interpretations, together with the principles of the natural world that are learned by careful scientific observation. Perhaps Guta is making a stronger claim, that the observations of science are unreliable at a fundamental level. This is his right to do so. However, I would hold that argument as weak, one that certainly will not agree with most people’s personal observations. While my article may be viewed as “very controversial” to some, I remain hopeful that it may be enlightening and thought-provoking at the same time.

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A Good Revelation about Revelation

Mary VandenBerg’s fine article on the “Two Books” concept (“What General Revelation Does and Does Not Tell Us,” PSCF 62, no. 1 [2010]: 16–24) is an important contribution. I hope it will be widely read, especially by those who expect Scripture to give us scientific truth.

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Letters