of the story. In other words, it remains entirely unclear what to say with respect to God's knowledge of the nature of what is deemed by humans as randomness. It may very well be the case that randomness does not exist for God. We just do not know. Certainly, Story has not shown us in his article that what appears to be random for humans is true of God. Of course, he makes a number of assertions about randomness and God's sovereign control over it. But I have not seen for myself where he has shown this to be the case.

Third, Story claims that any discussion of how God works in the world must be seen in the light of scientific progress. But this begs the question, in that the claim assumes that genuine knowledge is the kind that is supported by science. We all know that every form of knowledge does not need science. For example, we do not need scientific support to know whether torturing innocent children is morally wrong, science has nothing to do whatsoever with whether salvation is possible through Christ, 2 + 2 = 4, etc. Worse, the very claim that any discussion of God's action in the world requires scientific support, is itself not a scientific claim. Thus, it is self-defeating to assume that it is, in that the very claim per se cannot be subjected to empirical or experimental testing. So, in light of the above three objections, Story fails to show us how randomness and divine sovereignty can coexist.

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Story Responds to Parsons and Guta

Parsons, in his critique of my article, states that I have equivocated in my definition or understanding of the term "randomness," something I took great pains to avoid doing. In his critique, he objects most strongly to a view of randomness as "a cause." This is a curious near-personification of the term, as if randomness becomes the creator rather than God, and I can see how this view would be unsettling. I argued in the article that randomness is an essential characteristic of the kinds of systems we see in nature, and that from these systems arise purposeful things, such as antibody molecules. Where we disagree, I think, is whether the final result (useful antibody proteins, for example) actually can come about through an "unguided" process. Here is where Parsons and others who argue against the processes of evolution more generally, go wrong. The cellular events that lead to genetic variation quite clearly are the result of highly unpredictable processes (I refer to these as random, you may call it "unguided"). This is not merely an assumption of randomness; this is the heart of the argument I am making in my article. So how does something useful arise from an unguided process? Here is the answer: Subsequent to these random events, the system (antibody-secreting cell, or entire organism) is put through a very nonrandom selection filter. In my example, cells producing detrimental (anti-self) antibodies are deleted, while cells that produce useful antibodies continue to grow and persist. It may be that Parsons objects to the idea that the *antibody generating system itself* could have come about through any sort of random process.

Here is a stronger argument. I do not see why, in principle, the very same processes of variation and selection would not operate on whole organisms whose genomes are known to have mixed and mingled in complex ways over planetary time scales. I do believe it is misguided to think of God as not being involved in these processes at a very fundamental level, as I argue in the article. But I also think there are good reasons to think that God does not micromanage the minute details. I recommend a paper by Oxford University physicist Paul Ewart (*Science and Christian Belief* 21, no. 2 [2009]: 111–31), in which he argues that God can still be sovereign in a world with true randomness, if one considers God's ultimate purposes unfolding on a grander time scale.

Guta suggests in his letter that I am arguing for certain ideas that I personally do not support. For example, I do leave open the possibility (likelihood) that what might appear random to us may not be random to God (p. 230). I may legitimately be critiqued for not more explicitly stating the point that I am speaking outside my field. Yet I do not believe that being a scientist disqualifies one from discussing philosophical ideas, as long as one acknowledges this openly. I understand the difference between a scientific and a philosophical argument, and I find fault with those such as Dennett and Dawkins for failing to clearly make this distinction. Nor would I agree that because biology as a field does not study itself, biology cannot have anything to add to a philosophical discussion. I think it is important that observations about the natural world be consistent with our philosophical understandings. I would never argue, as Guta suggests, that "God's action in the world requires scientific support." In fact, I am not sure what he actually means by this. I am suggesting that it is important to attempt to fit our theological and philosophical beliefs, and our biblical interpretations, together with the principles of the natural world that are learned by careful scientific observation. Perhaps Guta is making a stronger claim, that the observations of science are unreliable at a fundamental level. This is his right to do so. However, I would hold that argument as weak, one that certainly will not agree with most people's personal observations. While my article may be viewed as "very controversial" to some, I remain hopeful that it may be enlightening and thought-provoking at the same time.

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A Good Revelation about Revelation

Mary VandenBerg's fine article on the "Two Books" concept ("What General Revelation Does [and Does Not] Tell Us," *PSCF* 62, no.1 [2010]: 16–24) is an important contribution. I hope it will be widely read, especially by those who expect Scripture to give us scientific truth.

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