God's Sovereignty in Creation—A Reply to Howard Van Till

Howard Van Till has considered my proposal “Creative Providence in Biology” carefully.¹ I thank him for his response “Does God Choose Among Hidden Options?”² as well as for initiating the vigorous discussion of my paper in ASA’s online Discussion Group.³

While there is full agreement among theists that our world began with a marvelous divine creation, opinions diverge with regard to the modes of God’s continued activity in providence. Of course, a full understanding of God’s relation to his creation is beyond our ken. Yet we have some indications in both of his “books of revelation,” nature and the Bible, as to how he may be working. It is clear that the Creator is involved in all so-called “natural” processes, and Christ, through whom he created the universe, continually upholds it by his word of power (Hebrews 1:2–3).

Van Till and I agree on this general picture, but disagree on how the Creator may have implemented his providential activity in creation. Whereas Van Till opts for a concentration of the provision of all that is necessary for the entire historical development of the creation at its very beginning, I prefer to view it as distributed over time. While it may be difficult to distinguish these two options based on biblical evidence, I believe the weight of scientific evidence is on the side of a distributed gifting. In particular, the information required to specify functional biological structures and organisms appears to be neither storable in a prebiotic universe nor capable of spontaneously emerging.

Van Till does not deny the possibility of further divine miracles (like Christ’s resurrection) after an initial creative act, but emphasizes the “functional integrity” of creation from the outset. He believes that this would eliminate any need for later “interventions.” He also underlines God’s continued blessing, which acts like “persuasion”—a concept Van Till borrows from process theology, being “effective in stimulating the desired outcome without forcibly violating the object of his influence.” It is a “giving of being”—equally essential at every moment of time—an “enabling,” a “constructive presence.” However, what does this mean? What is a blessing, persuasion, stimulation, or giving of being, devoid of any supernatural intervention in an already fully equipped, gapless economy not lacking anything? How does it work, in a scientific, as opposed to theological-philosophical, language? What distinguishes this “naturalistic theism” from a deism just plainly calling (created) matter autonomous? I believe Van Till’s protestation that he has no intention of becoming a deist, but I do not understand what distinguishes his view of providence from a deistic one, although he tries to explain it with the terms mentioned.

The physical universe and its history reveal an impressive amount of fine-tuning, which allows for the formation of a home for humans. It is easy to perceive God’s blessing in this. In addition, it is quite easily conceivable that this outcome is a consequence of the set of initial laws and conditions provided at the outset, 15 billion years ago. None of the events conceived or shown to have been building blocks in the entire cosmological process looks extremely improbable. The combination of many parameter restrictions evokes wonder. In combining all known restrictions, the estimated improbability of a habitable Earth just about reaches transastronomical numbers.⁴

With life, however, the orders of magnitude change radically. Different physical laws, parameters, and entities need not even be combined to reach inconceivably small probabilities. The Earth is a simple self-organizing system, but the rotor of a bacterial flagellum is not. Virtually every one of even the smallest known functional biopolymers represents a parameter space of transastronomical magnitude, unlike anything found in nonliving things. Here, the parameter space is not the global environment, but the configurational space of a single molecular entity. Since these are coding or coded polymers, their potential information content can, in principle, be calculated. There are multiple ways of satisfying a biochemical requirement. Therefore, the informative part of this structural information, what I have called the semantic information content, is much smaller than the parameter space as a whole. It is claimed that, during the evolution of such molecules, natural selection provides the guiding principle during the otherwise random mutational walks through parameter space.

The usually silent assumptions are:
1. All intermediate stages of all required evolutionary paths are viable, and
2. A sufficient number of all combinatorial possible sequences are functionally equivalent.

If they are seen at all, these assumptions are usually justified by the “fact that we are here”—which obviously explains nothing. Although atheists do not have this choice, believers in divine creation are free to seriously consider these questions. Because of the transastronomical sizes of the relevant configuration spaces, they cannot be answered explicitly. It will always be impossible to satisfy Van Till’s demand to know “all possible formational pathways.” Nevertheless, both of the silent assumptions can be approached by experiments to arrive at partial answers. My calculation of the probability of random emergence of a minimal novel enzymatic functionality⁵ suggests feasible experiments to get at an answer for assumption (1). In addition, experiments may find tractable ratios of possible to functional sequences, thus helping to answer the question of sufficiency in assumption (2). So far, to my knowledge, very few such experiments have been published—all of them tending rather to call into question the silent assumptions. Unfortunately, it seems to be much more profitable to develop new proteins of commercial promise by systematic artificial selection experiments, which hardly give any information regarding the questions, considered here, which must be based on random natural selection only.

Van Till is convinced that God put all information required for the “natural” production of the biosphere into the creation from the outset. It seems that, based on this theological presupposition, he sees no reason to question the silent assumptions at all. Twice in his response, he
explicitly concedes that he cannot “prove” his view of an initial functional integrity of the created universe. He suggests, however, some arguments to support it, even in the realm of biology. One is the detection of organic molecules such as glycolaldehyde in space. Apparently, astronomers did not anticipate this, although they knew of the existence of the conditions required for their formation. In retrospect, no chemist is surprised that on catalytic dust grains such compounds can form from the simple basic molecules, radicals, or ions available. It eludes me, however, what connection Van Till sees between the formational probabilities of glycolaldehyde or glycine and, say, a replicating, code-bearing biopolymer? These are worlds apart! The difficulties mainly start with code-bearing and coded polymers having huge configuration spaces of $4^N$ for DNA, or $20^N$ for proteins, where N begins to become biologically relevant at a few dozen.

In such a situation, selection is needed, but natural selection may be insufficient in many cases, due to assumptions (1) and/or (2) being violated. Now, divine selection can be applied in the invisible realm of quantum assumptions (1) and/or (2) being violated. Now, divine selection may be insufficient in many cases, due to considerations them to be rare events at particular important

Van Till’s other approach is theological. He suggests that I would have to believe that God must have deliberately designed transastronomical improbabilities into his creation, so that he would have to introduce the required information later. However, Van Till’s parody “withhold now, compensate later” begins the question. I emphasized that the hidden choices are among events of “natural,” relatively high probabilities inherent in the physical laws and parameters of the universe given in the beginning—and which are required for the universe to work properly. The low probabilities are logically inherent, not designed. So, there is no unreasonable deviousness implied. The high improbabilities arise from combinations of several or many such selections with a particular required outcome, which would have to be satisfied at once. Try to design an enzyme, even if it is one of just only minimal, barely detectable functionality, but not derived from a known enzyme, and you know of what I am talking. It would be an easy task if silent assumption (2) were true.

In a second step, Van Till compares the model of God’s “hidden options” with occasionalism that “denies true cause-effect relationships in the creaturely world.” He justifies this opinion with the claim that, in the hidden-options model, “particular outcomes are entirely determined by divine choice,” thereby replacing authentic creaturely action by a mere appearance of it, and “God becomes a divine puppeteer.” As I never specified the percentage of choices specifically affected by God, but rather considered them to be rare events at particular important

Furthermore, Van Till tries to draw the hidden-options model into the god-of-the-gaps trap. He claims to be unable to see a fundamental difference between my model and views that invoke “supernatural,” “coercive” or “form-conferring intervention” because God’s creation contained “gaps,” was not “sufficient,” or “lacked” something which God “withheld.” None of this was claimed or is implied in my model—apart from the fact that God’s introducing information, by effecting a selection of available outcomes, is supernatural by definition. So is divine blessing, providence, “persuasion,” etc., although, with this in the general, nondescriptive method of theology, no operational mechanisms are suggested that could be discussed, criticized, or possibly even tested. Making use of the hidden options envisaged definitely does not constitute “particular acts in which the continuity of the creaturely cause/effect system was interrupted and superseded by coercive divine action”—or else the options would not be hidden. However, this constitutes a proposal as to how God’s blessing and providence might work—which Van Till’s model lacks.

Van Till’s “robust formational economy principle” requires that from the beginning the creation was “fully equipped ... to actualize ... every form of living organism that has appeared.” This forces him, like the atheists and deists, to believe the two silent assumptions—without any evidence. The only possible alternative would be for God to have stored, somewhere in an abiotic cosmos, the information required for the biosphere, which remained unused for ten billion years between the big bang and the origin of life. This looks rather contrived, at best, and physically impossible, at worst.

The basic question is whether God is free to act in his creation in whatever manner he chooses, at any time he chooses. Van Till criticizes the traditional view of God as “an all-powerful, transcendent, person-like being” involving a “radical distinction between the Creator and the creation.” I hold this view to be essentially biblical and true. However, Van Till links it with the derogatory term “coercive intervention,” calling such pictures “museum pieces ... of centuries past” that can no longer be treated as adequate. He opts rather for process theology’s “intimate relationship of Creator and the creation that is envisioned by the process worldview—a processive God in God, but God in more than the world.” Admittedly, he limits divine action only by what follows “from the character of God and of the God/world relationship,” perhaps thinking of logically inherent restrictions like “God, being good, cannot do evil.” Nevertheless, the limits he does impose on the Creator in his “functional-integrity-of-creation” model are not necessarily inherent in what the Bible reveals of God. Why then this degradation of a fully sovereign God to a God inextricably bound to his creation and limited by the results of his own doing? Is it because of a perceived logical impossibility of combining divine sovereignty with creaturely freedom?—Of predetermination with free will?

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possibilities? Is it a question of either completely overpow-  
ering the creature or no intervention at all?

A fully sovereign God can certainly have as intimate a 
relationship with his creation as he sees fit, but without 
binding himself to arbitrary principles like "never act 
intrusively." I agree with Van Till that God's usual way of 
acting in the creation is through "natural" processes, and I 
have come to believe this because of the human freedom 
which must necessarily be linked with the possibility of 
genuine faith and love. However, it certainly does not fol-
low that God inherently cannot introduce new information 
into his creation whenever he wants to do so. As I argued 
before, there is no reason to believe a "functional-integ-
ity" mode of creation to be more suitable or worthy for 
God than one using a continuous intimate but sovereign 
relationship using insertions of information during an 
evolving creation which didn't start out "all set" at the big 
bang. Why should anything be "lacking" in a creation God 
decided to perform not all at once? The "perfect-all-at-
once" misconception is one of the basic errors of young-
earth creationism.

No theist doubts that, according to the Bible, God 
sometimes does intervene in human affairs in response to 
prayer, good or evil acts, and other decisions of his crea-
tures endowed with free will. However, none of this needs 
to be described by Van Till's negative characterization of 
"interventions." Often, there may not even be any discern-
able "supernatural" aspect. God's action is perceived by 
faith, not science.

My proposal of God's "hidden options" is subject to 
further discussion and possible modification.

Notes

3. asa@calvin.edu; with archive at http://www.calvin.edu/cgi-bin/archive

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Response to Moorad Alexanian,
"Humans and Consciousness"

In response to Moorad Alexanian's letter (PSCF 54 [March 
2002]) regarding my communication (PSCF 53 [June 2001]),
I am quite thankful to hear from my colleague on the other 
side of the scientific spectrum. As psychology is generally 
treated as a "soft" science with physics being the hardest of 
the "hard" sciences, his comments reveal some of the 
differences between our disciplines. This is one of the 
many wonderful things about the science of human conscious-
ness: we all have something meaningful to contribute to 
the conversation. Alexanian's critique reveals that ques-
tions about human consciousness can fall into ontological 
and epistemological categories as well as theological ones. 
This further illustrates the necessity of interdisciplinary 
dialogue on this subject.

With regards to his epistemological concerns, 
Alexanian comments that "consciousness cannot be deter-
mined or measured with physical devices and so it is not 
the subject matter of science." Defining the playing field 
and rules is a necessary part of this research. However, 
what constitutes a physical device for a physicist is quite 
different for a psychologist. This is, not surprisingly, a 
matter of concern for many in my discipline. Does a psy-
chological test (i.e., IQ test, Miers-Briggs, MMPI) count as 
a physical device? Some would argue yes, some no. As a 
psychologist with a limited understanding of particle 
physics, measuring sub-atomic particles looks as curious 
as a Rorschach analysis might to a physicist. The standards 
for what qualifies as a physical device are, in many ways, 
discipline defined. Nonverbal responses and verbal self 
report have long been considered an important tool in psy-
chology's investigation of consciousness (i.e., signal detec-
tion theory). If we take a physicalist view of consciousness, 
then brain waves would certainly be considered a valid 
measure (as long as consciousness is equated with neural 
firing). But it is impossible to address the questions of 
methodology without including a discussion of the nature 
of consciousness.

To address the issue of ontology, the main points of 
the letter get to the question of substance dualism. If we main-
tain that consciousness (or soul) is of fundamentally differ-
ent "stuff," and that science is a priori disqualified from 
measuring that "stuff," then I think Alexanian's comments 
cut to the quick of any science of consciousness. It just is 
not possible. If we maintain, however, that consciousness 
is not of different stuff or that our definitions of what 
Nature is should be expanded to include the spirit-stuff as a 
pragmatic (i.e., Chalmers'), then a science of conscious-
ness is not only possible, but promising. He points out that 
"...consciousness cannot be limited to the methods of sci-
cence," but if you are not a substance dualist I would argue 
that it is not immediately disqualified. The paradigm and 
discipline specific methodologies we work from are quite 
important. The difficulty in studying consciousness has 
been that we have been too narrow in our conceptualiza-
tion and investigation. To effectively research human con-
sciousness, we must take an interdisciplinary approach to 
frame the nature of consciousness and utilize the relative 
strengths of each discipline's methodology. My position is 
not one of substance dualism, but more a modified natu-
ralism similar to Chalmers. If consciousness is included as 
a primitive to reality, then many of the problems that we 
face now may dissolve as easily as when the physicists 
began their work on electricity.

When dealing with the theological role of miracles in 
the Christian world view, I would agree that defining 
Nature is important for the questions of epistemology and 
ontology of consciousness. The scientific investigation of