Journal

of the

American Scientific Affiliation



Psychology and the Christian

December, 1962

Vol. 14

No. 4

The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.
Psalm 111:10

The American Scientific Affiliation

(Incorporated)

The American Scientific Affiliation was organized in 1941 by a group of Christian men of science. The purpose of the organization is to study those topics germane to the conviction that the frameworks of scientific knowledge and a conservative Christian faith are compatible. Since open discussion is encouraged, opinions and conclusions are to be considered those of the authors and not necessarily held by others in the organization.

PUBLICATIONS

The Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation is issued quarterly. Its contents include primarily subjects both directly and indirectly related to the purpose of the organization, news of current trends in science (including sociology and anthropology), and book reviews.

Modern Science and Christian Faith is a 316-page book containing ten chapters on nine fields of science, each written by a person or persons versed in that field.

Evolution and Christian Thought Today is a 221-page symposium by thirteen authors, expressing the attitudes of Christians on this subject a century after Darwin's writings.

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

The Journal of the

American Scientific Affiliation

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The Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation is published quarterly, March, June, September, and December by the American Scientific Affiliation. The publication office is located at 414 South Broad Street, Mankato, Minnesota. The subscription price is $3.00 per year. Single copies may be obtained at a price of 75c each. Copies of back issues may be obtained at the price of $2.00 per volume. Send all communications regarding editorial matters to the editor, David O. Moberg, Ph.D., Bethel College, St. Paul 1, Minnesota.

Printed in U.S.A.

Psychology and the Christian

AN EDITORIAL

DONALD C. FAIR*

Existing in the minds of many Christians is the notion that there is a widespread and fundamental conflict between the ideas and practices of psychology on the one hand, and Christian faith and practice on the other. Unfortunately this notion tends to get generalized over the whole area of relationships between psychology and Christianity so that for some Christians, psychology is suspect just because it is psychology!

It is not difficult to understand why many people gain an erroneous impression of what psychology is trying to say and do. The results of psychological study affect us in many ways, not all of them directly and to our conscious awareness. For example, probably few of us realize that the shape, size, color, shelf placement, etc. of packages of cake mix have been carefully worked out to "psychologically compel" us to buy. But we are not much ego-involved over cake mixes. How to raise children is quite a different story, and here ego-involved parents are quite apt to get a distorted view of what psychology has to say on the subject. To some a "psychological" approach is a soft and ineffective way to raise children. Parents, both Christian and non-Christian, have been heard to say that they have tried "psychology" on their children and it just didn't work, and therefore they have returned to the "tried and true" method of a little corporal punishment from time to time. And the Christian will often reinforce this by pointing out that the Bible states that sparing the rod will spoil the child! The erroneous belief is that psychologists don't believe in corporal punishment *under any circumstances.* But most child psychologists will insist that the establishment of reasonable behavioral limits is necessary for the healthy development and security of the child, and that the occasional application of physical punishment will be necessary and helpful in keeping these limits in force. What the psychologist will argue against is the use of corporal punishment by the parent as a way of expressing pent-up aggression to the obvious detriment and confusion of the child.

While it is evident that not all of psychology is in conflict with Christianity, it is equally evident that the other extreme is untenable. There are indeed areas of conflict. A fundamental philosophical difference, for example, lies in divergent views on the approach to be used in the study of man. Most "tough-minded" psychologists hold vigorously to the philosophical position of empirical determinism, the belief, as applied in psychology, that behavior follows certain natural laws, and that exceptions to these laws are more *apparent* than *real.* Irregularities in behavior are thought to reflect our present lack of complete understanding of the underlying behavioral laws. Pushed to its logical limit empirical determinism maintains that *all* of man's behavior is theoretically determinable by natural law, once one knows the basic equations and the parameters which should be plugged into this behavioral system. Insistence on this approach eliminates all religious and/or metaphysical considerations as irrelevant or inappropriate to the enterprise at hand. This approach is unacceptable to the Christian psychologist or psychiatrist who, though a determinist in the broad sense that he believes behavior is lawful, insists upon giving consideration to the nature and behavioral effects of relationships between God and man.

Articles in both this and the next issue will serve to focus attention on some aspects of the relationship between Christianity and the fields of psychology and related disciplines of psychiatry and social work. Many of these are papers given at the annual convention of the A.S.A. in St. Paul, Minnesota, in August, 1962. It is hoped that these will be seen as only introductory discussions of the topics dealt with. The reader will have certain reactions as he reads them. He is encouraged to write these reactions down in the form of a letter to the editor. Or he may wish to contribute by writing an article on a topic of relevance to Christianity and psychology not covered in the symposium of papers. All communications will be gratefully received.

This issue contains a varied group of papers. Mr. Van Eyl sets out to show that psychology is indeed a science. Undoubtedly this would be easier to demonstrate for some *branches* of psychology than for others. For example, probably few would dispute the claim of physiological psychology to being a science, but it would be very difficult to convince a "hard headed" scientist in one of the physical sciences that clinical and counseling psychology are sciences. To be sure, there are scientific elements in each, but to a large extent the practice of clinical and counseling psychology, like psychiatry, remains an art. With further developments in instrumentation and greater application of statistics to the problems of prediction, these fields will undoubtedly become more and more scientific. Whether all fields of psychology will or indeed *can* become fully scientific is an open question. Readers may like to share further observations on this matter.

Dr. Norstad draws our attention to the fairly recent development of clinical training for pastors. The getting together of the theologian and the psychologist in the development of pastoral psychology is an encouraging step in the recognition of the fact that the theologian

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does have an important contribution to make in the field of mental illness. However, this raises the interesting question of professional responsibility for the treatment and care of the mentally ill. Dr. Norstad suggests a team approach. What should be the respective roles and degree of participation of the various members of the team? No doubt this is being worked out in practice in hospitals and other institutions where pastoral counselors are functioning.

Dr. Grounds, too, sees the real potential of Christianity in the alleviation of the problem of mental illness, but he gives a timely warning that Christianity must not be seen as a panacea for curing these illnesses. His point is well taken. The Bible is not a textbook for any science, nor is it a guidebook on the cause, cure, and prevention of mental illness. Many related issues arise at this point. Often one hears the statement made that "God will solve all of your problems," or "all the answers to life's problems are found in the Bible." In what sense is this true, and to what extent do such statements possess operational usefulness? What about the problem of mental illness of the Christian? Some seem to think that it is a contradiction for a Christian to be mentally ill and a reflection of deficient faith on the part of the Christian involved. But, as Dr. Grounds points out, many evangelicals are afflicted with conflict, tension, fear, and guilt. It is also evident that many Christians are underdeveloped socially and inhibited to the point that normal social intercourse is a threatening and difficult experience. Then again, one sometimes hears it declared that it is sinful to worry or to be afraid. Is this really true? Are there no legitimate reasons for anxiety and fear? And is it not true that in non-debilitating degrees these are real motivational factors behind striving toward new goals in both religious and secular endeavors? Is the image of a relaxed, peaceful, conflict-free Christian really a desirable image? Dr. Grounds indicates that it is not. These and related questions are much in need of honest and frank answers.

Dr. Busby points out the important distinction between valid, objective, theological guilt and subjective psychological guilt-feelings. Like Dr. Norstad, he suggests a team approach might be used in dealing with problems of guilt, or the Christian psychiatrist himself may help the patient to realize the forgiveness that is available in Christ. As Dr. Busby notes, the term "guilt" means different things to different people. Unfortunately, this problem of semantics is a serious complicating factor in relations between Christianity and psychology. Though using the same language, the theologian and psychologist may find themselves talking about quite different things.

A host of other questions need to be asked and genuine attempts made to find answers for them. For example, the often neglected area of the philosophical underpinnings of psychology and their implications needs to be considered. To what extent are the philosophical presuppositions made in psychology in agreement with, or in conflict with, those made in Christianity? A basic difference in approaches to the study of man has been referred to above. What about other philosophical issues? How does the Christian psychologist resolve these issues? How can he prevent himself from going merrily on in his profession barely aware, if aware at all, that possible philosophical conflict exists? Or for that matter, how can the Christian professional in any field "decompartmentalize" so that his thinking on professional issues shades imperceptibly into that on spiritual and other matters? Papers in the March 1963 issue will deal with some of these questions.

Oliver Wendell Holmes is reported to have said: "A man's mind stretched by a new idea can never go back to its original dimensions." Through the medium of this Journal let us engage in some mind-stretching! New insights and new perspectives are necessary to help us keep abreast of modern times.

*Psychology as a Science**

F. PHILLIP VAN EYL**

I suspect that there are several approaches to a subject matter that sports a title such as mine. Because of the interest and special background of my audience, my main goals will be to convince you that psychology is indeed a science and to raise some important issues concerning the future of psychology. For the sake of continuity and clarity, I have planned to discuss four subtopics: Is psychology a science? should psychology be a science? the contemporary status of psychology, and the future of psychology.

Is Psychology a Science?

Just for the record, let us first see what science proposes to be or do and then compare psychological goings-on with established scientific aims, processes, criteria, and standards. In the broad sense science can be described as one of man's attempts to discover truth about nature. In this context, truth becomes identical with human understanding and man's ability to predict future events of the universe as a whole as well as particular aspects of it. The one single question that can be asked in this respect is: What makes the universe and everything that's in it tick?

It is sometimes argued that the criterion of prediction is superfluous when genuine understanding is present.

*Paper presented at the Seventeenth Annual Convention of the American Scientific Affiliation held at St. Paul, Minnesota, August, 1962.

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The rationale behind this argument is that if we truly *understand,* prediction follows as a consequence. I, for one, should like to insist on both criteria, however. First because we have examples in science where one but not the other condition is present. Seismology, for instance, understands much of what there is to know about earthquakes, yet it is not capable of predicting where and when along a fault the next quake will take place. Seismologists, to be sure, continue to strive for more understanding so that they will eventually be able to make such predictions. However, we do not exclude their efforts from the realm of science because they have not as yet attained this power. Then in physics we see how the physicist makes good use of the law of gravity. With it he can make any number of predictions. "Gravity," however, is a concept. Physicists, have yet to fully comprehend the force it signifies. Gravity is simply referred to as an "intervening variable." Because the physicist does not completely understand gravity, we do not exclude him from among the scientists. (In our missile age to do this would almost be synonomous with committting a capital crime!)

The second objection to placing prime importance on understanding alone derives from the fact that psychology has provided numerous examples which should caution us to take human inferences with a few grains of salt, i.e., there is not always a one-to-one relationship between our perceptions and physical reality. In fact, the history of science abounds with examples of "understandings" which were hailed as truths only to be scuttled later. We know that the proof of the pudding is in the eating. Hence, if understanding fails to give a reasonable amount of predictive ability, it suggests that there is something wrong with this so-called truth. In other words, *if* we feel we need to emphasize either understanding or predictive power as supreme in the making of science, I would choose predictive power. In practice, of course, the two cannot be separated because they supplement and interact with each other. My point is, however, that too much emphasis on understanding can lead to fallacious results.

When I speak of interaction between understanding and prediction, I have specific reference to one of the main vehicles of science, namely, theory. I doubt whether science would exist were it not for human curiosity and intuition giving rise to speculations about the material world and one's experience of it. Such speculations are forms of understanding, i.e., theories. These should lead to attempts at verification, efforts to assess the validity of the theory under consideration. But the fact is that our *criterion* of validity is the measure of predictive power inherent in the theory.

Other basic scientific procedures include the use of units of analysis, technology, and experimentation. Biologists, for example, use the cell or gene as their unit of analysis, while the chemists work with atomic particles. The experimental method is, moreover, being increasingly regarded as something requiring special training on the part of the scientists. Skilled treatments of matters dealing with experimental design play the major role in obtaining support for a theory or the degree of validity that can be attached to an understanding. Technology, which is often confused with science, provides us with ways either to augment human limitations or to keep them in check.

Now let us see how psychology measures up to my brief discourse on the purpose and procedure of science. In its broadest sense, psychology is a study of human behavior. The aims of the study are (1) to understand human behavior and (2) to predict human behavior. The question is: What makes man tick? Why does he do what he does (understanding) and under what conditions does he do it? (prediction). To give you a familiar example: Why do we have mental illness? and, what things determine whether a person will develop a normal or an abnormal personality? Logically, full understanding will automatically lead to prediction, i.e., an answer to the "why" question should lead eventually to the answer of the "how" question.

Concerning units of analysis, psychology has several. This does not speak well of psychology's present maturity. We should not forget, however, that the scientific approach to psychology has barely outgrown its infancy. Moreover, while in no way minimizing either the task of natural sciences, I should like to suggest that psychology has the more difficult task both because of the greater complexity of its objects of study and its well-nigh complete dependency on inference. Perhaps more complex organisms will require more fundamental units of analysis.

The most frequently employed units in psychological analysis are drive, need, motive, habit, trait, and percept. Two of importance in an earlier day were sensation and reflex.

Experimentation is perhaps the major vehicle in bringing about the birth of psychology as a science. Even so, for many years its use was restricted to only a few areas of psychology. In fact, for decades experimental psychology was almost synonymous with the study of sensation, perception, and certain learning phenomena. Since the mid-thirties questions concerning motivation have become subject to the experimental approach also. Recently, more and more areas of psychology are being exposed to experimentation. In fact, I cannot think of any area of psychology that has not had at least a brush with experimental techniques. The trend seems to call for more and more of it.

Psychology also has its share of technological activity. With the aid of the conventional and not so conventional methods of observation and measurement it has developed testing instruments, questionnaires, the color wheel, the memory drum, and animal mazes. In addition, growing use is made of equipment such as tape recorders, computers, chronometers, EEG, and polygraphs.

To the question of psychology's scientific standing, the

answer must be in the affirmative. True, some psychologists cannot be called scientists because of their orientation toward and treatment of human activity. So also, psychology is rather primitive in its development, when compared with, let us say, physics. But its aim, orientation and methods are scientific. It seeks to understand human behavior with the ultimate goal of prediction.

Should Psychology Be a Science?

This question can be broken up into two questions: Should psychology be a science from the religious-moral point of view? Should psychology be a science from the point of view of adequacy? Let's look at the religious-moral point of view first. To simplify matters, I will speak of the religious aspect leaving the parallel moral aspect to your own analysis.

As most of you know, the roots of the word psychology come from the Greek *psyche,* meaning soul, and *logos* meaning knowledge. I bring this up because many people still assume psychology to be the study of the human soul. The word "psychology" has been in use since the days of the ancient Greeks, but the subject matter under study has changed. It became the study of the *mind.* In recent years it has been simply the study of human *behavior,* i.e., human activity like neural behavior and the way man acts upon his environment and reacts to his environment. At most, "soul" and "mind" are now inferred variables on the order of such processes as learning, motivation, and perception. It follows that how psychology is defined will determine whether the scientific approach is acceptable or not. If it is to be the study of the soul, the scientific approach is inappropriate. In my opinion, the study of the soul is the domain of the theologian or the philosopher. On the other hand, if psychology intends to be the study of human behavior, it readily fits the format of other sciences. Scientists study natural order. They can do so on the assumption of lawfulness: nature is lawful. Man is significantly part of nature (even though the Christian insists his total nature is not bounded by the natural order). Ergo: man's behavior should be lawful. The study of psychology has become an attempt to find the laws of nature as they apply to human behavior. What all this amounts to is that the psychologist attempts to study man as an aspect of *creation,* where as the theologian concerns himself with the *Creator,* and man's responsibility to Him.

I think that most of you will immediately want to raise the question of relationship between the two. In fact, you may want to argue that the two studies *cannot* ultimately be separated. Of course this is true partially, but I don't want to go back to the middle ages and profess that theology is the all-embracing and *only* way to truth. There are several approaches if not kinds of truth. The main two categories being: the truth about the Creator and His intentions, and the truth about His creation and its behavior. There are examples from all our scientific enterprises (psychology included) to suggest that one area of truth does not necessarily reveal that contained in the others. In my opinion, the main but partial interaction that occurs between religion and science lies in one's basic assumptions about man. Is he a machine, or is there a purpose of his being? Is he at the mercy of fate, or is he capable of free will? The point that I am trying to make is that notwithstanding these important and influential propositions there are principles of man's behavior that have been discovered and that hold regardless of man's relationship to his Creator and his point of view. More about this later.

For the record, another important relationship between religious and moral considerations on one hand and science on the other has to do with the products of science, i.e., the application of man's discoveries. I wonder, for instance, how atomic physicists felt about the thousands of Japanese dead as a direct result of their research on the bomb. Some must have wondered whether they were morally justified in turning over their scientific discovery to a world intent on violating God's highest commands. As psychology marches on, it will be faced with similar problems. Perhaps the picture as painted by Aldous Huxley in *Brave New World* may serve both as an illustration and a warning. Suppose we do discover the conditions which produce a given personality? Who will determine which personality is desirable and what pattern of personality development should be avoided? And on what basis? In other words, are we right in employing the scientific approach if it will ultimately lead to the destruction of man as God may have intended him to be? My answer is again a cautious affirmative *providing* that psychology and theology and the humanities do their share in preparing man for newly gained power. (The possibility of such knowledge is a powerful argument for urging able, committed Christian young people to enter the field of psychology.)

Should psychology be a science from the point of view of adequacy? Here too, we encounter skeptics. One of the arguments encountered most frequently is that man is so complex that it is arrogance or disrespect to attempt to penetrate his nature. Here again, there is a partial point with which I agree. Man is complex; but so is all of nature. Take instincts, for instance. Commonly they are thought of as simple, primitive forms of motivation. They may indeed be primitive but they are far from simple! Anyone who has studied them deeply is soon struck by how complex they are. Yet, the scientist who studies them does not give up in despair. Quite the contrary. To the true scientist, this challenging complexity is exactly the spice of life for him. It is what makes him go on and on in his research.

Another argument often heard is that science is not adequate to study man because of the many phases of his behavior that seem to defy lawfulness. More often than we would like to admit, man's behavior is not indicative of purpose, a means-end relationship or even regularity. In some instances, it is practically impossible to make inferences about motivation. That is to say, our

present understanding of drive and motive do not explain or handle *all* of man's behavior. There is no doubt that this is an undesirable state, but we should also remember that psychology (as distinct from particular psychologists) does not claim to have found all the answers yet. It does not follow from this, however, that the answers cannot be found. Here again, the true scientist finds his real incentive or challenge to continue.

Evaluation of Contemporary Psychology as a Science

It is my contention that much of the progress made in the field of psychology came about through the work of scientists and the scientific approach. Even psychoanalysis, which is far from the most sterling example of science in action, has played its role in the total scientific process; for Freud and most of his early followers were men trained in medicine. In addition to men entering psychology from the field of medicine, there were numerous contributions from physicists and mathematicians. Their introduction of experimentation, in particular, gave rise to the process of theory building. This led to more experimentation which in turn called for modifications of theory or new theory, and so on.

It is interesting and also disturbing to note how the more ambitious efforts of the early days to establish a general theory of psychology have gradually given way to the current interest in theoretical models. This seems due to the ever-increasing complexity of the subject matter as more and more data become available. Rather than grappling with *all* the questions, all at once, psychology has been forced to limit itself to dealing with certain aspects of man's behavior at a time. Generality has been sacrificed for the sake of parsimony and partial success. The reason for the perpetuation of this development appears to rise from the way in which psychology must do its research. Most psychological research is done by university teachers under constant pressure to "publish or perish." A psychologist's future often hinges on the *number* of publications, rather than the *quality* of them. Unless well established financially or professionally, few psychologists can afford to embark on thorough research, research that may see the light of publication ten or twenty years after onset. Small-model research provides far more security.

The more molecular approach to theory and research has led to another undesirable side effect. Sigmund Koch calls it the "gentle process of dehumanization." As he and others have observed, it is more than likely that we have become too objective, too rigid, too insistent on controls, and in consequence too removed from the real human. Contributing to this development is the psychologist's conscious or unconscious desire to match the accomplishments of his older brothers in the natural sciences. It is no secret that psychology and psychologists have often looked to physicists and biologists for inspirational guidance. Certain theoretical principles of the natural sciences have been adopted by the psychologist, lock, stock, and barrel; frequently without regard to the unique aspects of the psychologist's subject matter. In short, what I have reference to is the very obvious lack of relevance in many contemporary models. The tendency is to fragment behavior into specific aspects on an input-output basis, i.e., questions related to values or ultimate meaning are mostly shunned; the deliberate omission or simplification of internal factors.

The Future of Psychology

This brings up the question of the future of psychology, especially as a science. Is it possible to maintain the scientific approach and still arrive at something whole and meaningful? Are we not throwing out the baby with the bath water when we continue to insist on the scientific approach? If it is possible to continue in the scientific direction without doing violence to the whole of man, how can it or should it be done?

In my opinion, part of the problem lies in the schizophrenic nature of psychology itself. There are areas of psychology where the scientific approach has paid off and will continue to pay off handsomely. Questions about meaning or the introduction of subjectivity will only stand in the way of progress. However, in other respects (and I am thinking particularly about the realm of personality theory and its application to therapy) the reverse is true. To be an effective therapist, the psychologist must deal with questions about meaning. He must introduce subjectivity rather than strive for strict objectivity. Personality theory, the quintessence of all psychological study, seems caught in a typical avoidance—avoidance conflict. Too much science or insistence on predictive ability leaves the data too shallow for the therapist and the educator; too much subjectivity destroys a truly predictive point of view.

As I see it, the situation is not as hopeless as it may seem, however. The present schizophrenic condition exists primarily because of the temperatment of the psychologists involved. The scientific psychologist tends to be most rational and skeptical; the practitioner feels more at home in an individualist, poetic, sometimes even mystical milieu. In my opinion, man being what he is, there not only is room for both, there is necessity for both. Both sides of the street can and must learn from each other. As long as the scientific psychologist keeps pointing out the weaknesses in the therapist's methods and the therapist and the applied psychologist continue to insist on representation of all of man's aspects, eventually, some good is bound to come from it all. By analogy perhaps it serves the same purpose as the two-party arrangement of our political system.

To carry the political analogy a bit further, the opposite side of the coin can show us the disadvantage of a stalemate, a balance of power with a lack of movement. Perhaps this is the condition of psychology today. Many experimental (scientific) psychologists would not want to come within miles of anything that could be identified with the subjective approach of the humanist; and too many therapists stay at least as far away from anything scientific. The tension that exists between the demands of the scientific method and the appreciation

of the richness of human individuality is real indeed! There is no doubt in my mind that there is room—no, a necessity—for both. The problem however, is how to draw the valuable aspects from both for the sake of one common goal. How can we bring out their relatedness so that cross fertilization can take its full effect? How do we mold the kind of psychologist who has both the scientific temperament and humanistic sensitivity? An occasional specimen has appeared now and then, but how can we produce them in quantity?

To be frank with you, I don't know. So far as I know no one else does either. But we need the answer. There has been a recommendation for a so-called third force (like the third party idea), but I am not so sure what this would entail and whether this would work. I am more in favor of a fusion rather than a continuation of the present situation complicated by a would-be pacifier.

Perhaps Christianity has something to offer in this respect. At most Christian colleges it is customary to teach science as well as the humanistic and Christian philosophies. I would like to suggest that the students of our colleges be confronted with this problem on as mature and comprehensive level as possible. I have a feeling that if we present our students with this and similar problems and with respect for all points of view, eventually, an adequate synthesis would come about. Furthermore, I believe that this could become one of the real contributions of our Christian colleges. It is well known that the large universities have a tendency to avoid matters of value, particularly religion's values. The scientific approach reigns supreme. In our Christian colleges, the religious, philosophical humanistic emphasis is presented, sometimes almost as an antidote, but there is no real tie-up with the sciences. I think that because of our interest in the matter and the flexibility provided by the relatively small size of our institutions, the obvious call is being extended to us to pursue the problem with all our might. It seems to me that here is one opportunity to do some real pioneering. As a beginning, I think it is about time that we drop defenses and recognize the assets of the scientific approach. True, it is based on too much positivism and has many shortcomings, as was pointed out above. But I believe there is also much good to be said for it. The scientific method has prevented much erroneous philosophy and given us many new insights. We don't have to feel threatened by it if we inform ourselves adequately concerning the possibilities and the limitations of science. It seems to me ridiculous to think that science can ever become the single method in our desire to know man. As I see it, it is our task to continue to philosophize and theologize about man within the framework of our religious convictions and attempt to validate those aspects of our theories which lend themselves to empirical verification through scientific procedures and modify our theories accordingly. "Now we see through a glass darkly . . . now we know in part." (I Cor. 13:12)

*Pastoral Psychology and Counseling**

FREDERIC M. NORSTAD**

One of the great and stimulating experiences of this speaker's life is the frequent opportunity afforded him to participate in institutes, workshops and seminars involving psychologists, social workers, psychiatrists and medical doctors. He and his colleagues who work in the field of pastoral counseling and psychology are deeply indebted to these professions and the increasing dialogue in which it is our privilege to participate.

But a group such as yours will readily recognize that there are frustrations involved in such conversations. We most often meet in a disparity of attitude and concept which limits the benefits and prevents us from really understanding each other. You will appreciate, then, my pleasure over the privilege of participating in your program in the conviction that here we meet most essentially as Christians—as brothers in the faith—as a fellowship of those who are in the Way together.

Most often interdisciplinary conversations center on the questions of training, techniques and method instead of the more basic essential problems rooted in Christian theology and its derived anthropology. Before all other questions comes the simple one—"What is man?". Who is this being that represents the object of our concern and effort? So we turn first of all to the anthropological assertions which must underlie any discussion of pastoral psychology and counseling.

What Is Man?

The first assertion is that *man exists by the will of God*. God, Who established the tremendous magnitudes and velocities of space, Who cancels out time in eternity, Whose feet are familiar with the paths of the light years, Who had been creating from eternity, paused in that great moment and said, "Let Us make man in Our image." Notice the pronouns. God here reveals something essential about Himself and of significance in understanding the nature and purpose of human existence. It is the Trinity speaking. The community and fellowship which was, is and shall be—the Eternal Relationship—Father, Son and Holy Spirit. They had been living from eternity in meaningful relationship and were now about to expand the family.

The most significant thing I can know about myself is simply this—God wants me! And if me, then every man. This is the most incredulous thought of all and

*Paper presented at the Seventeenth Annual Convention of the American Scientific Affiliation held at St. Paul, Minnesota, August, 1962.

**Dr. Norstad is Professor of Practical Theology, Luther Theological Seminary, St. Paul, Minn.

man in his incredulity rejects it if he can.

The second assertion: *We are persons.* "And God formed man out of the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and so man became a living soul." The life within us is from Him. We are living souls. Now the soul is not some fraction of our being. The term is not to be used in some dichotomous or trichotomous description of human being. The soul is the sum total of all that we are under and before God. It is best understood in terms of the word person.

And herein lies the image of God. He is person—three person—a personal God. And we are in His image. Even as He is person, we are person. The difference lies in the fact that He is Divine person; we are human person. We are persons for a purpose. It is on the basis of this common denominator that we have fellowship with Him. We are the Sons of God and heirs of the kingdom—the children of the family.

The third assertion is this: *As persons we are free and responsible.* These two go together. If I am but a puppet controlled by the strings of God's will, I am not responsible. He is. But as a person I have both the privilege and the fearful responsibility of choice. Nor am I but the instrument of my impulses bound in a genetic straight jacket, laced and buckled by social determinants.

It is at this point that guilt takes on its reality. It is not an illusion to be explained away. Deep down within the human psyche is a God-implanted awareness that we must love and not hate. If we violate this law of God implanted in our hearts, we experience guilt. If we repress the direct cause and effect of the guilt experience, we will express it nonetheless in substitutional or projective forms with which all psychotherapists are so familiar.

The fourth assertion: *Man has exercised his God-given "right" to do wrong and has become by nature sinful and unclean.* Freud may have misinterpreted the nature and meaning of "id" but what he observed was tragically true. The stinking cesspool of id makes its unholy demands and with each demand there comes the counter demand of conscience. And I must choose. It is at the point of my choices that I become guilty. Over id's demand I have little or no control. But I am responsible for my choices. Luther stated it this way. You cannot prevent the birds from flying over your head, but you can stop them from making nests in your hair. But can I? Yes and no. I am by nature given to at least imperfect choices. I am a member of a fallen family and have the characteristics of that family, but in another sense I am constantly recapitulating the fall in my own personal decisions. This is my dilemma! "O wretched man that I am; who shall deliver me?"

The fifth assertion: *God's love has pursued me.* He will not let me go. If I am to be free of Him I must tear myself away. It will not be by His letting.

I submit that we cannot really understand man without considering the Gospel. Most simply stated the Gospel is the amazing fact that God loves and wants us. As a result of this loving and wanting He pursues us even into the intimacy of the incarnation. "He became flesh and dwelt among us." "He who knew no sin became sin." In answering the question, "What is Man?" how can we ignore the most important fact about him. Loved by God—with such a love. By way of the atonement God has found a way to forgive my impertinent rebellion. Sin and sins are not to be explained away nor subjected to psychiatric absolution in the transference phenomenon. They are to be forgiven by God, our personal and true Father. The Holy Spirit calls, enlightens and sanctifies us to the end that we may be reconciled into the fellowship with God and His family once again.

Having made these assertions, I submit that man cannot be understood in any other light. These are the greatest facts about him. They determine the nature of his existence as well as the purpose and goals of his being. Man exists in order that he might live in meaningful relationship with God and from that dynamic draw the power for his meaningful relationship with his fellow man.

Definition of Pastoral Counseling

Against the background of the foregoing I would like to attempt a definition of pastoral counseling. But first a little history. For many decades after the advent of modern psychology the church and its ministry simply ignored or too frequently unintelligently attacked this great potential. In the twenties when the so-called modern liberalism was sweeping large segments of Protestantism particularly along the eastern seaboard, many churchmen reached out toward the new psychology as an answer to the vacuum created by the sloughing off of many traditional Christian doctrines. Empirical observation replaced revelation. Scientific proof became the ultimate norm. It was in this unhappy situation that modern pastoral counseling had its origin. The result was a considerable secularization of the ministry of pastoral care. Tragically this situation is still too often with us.

But through it all there has come an increasing awareness on the part of conservative theologians that psychology and psychiatry have important things to say. A new appreciation is developing today for the contributions which these allies make to the understanding of the human being and for the insights in dealing with sick and distressed fellows. As both psychology and theology have become more humble and less defensive they are developing the capacity to hear each other speak out of their own body of truth and are discovering that truth is not of two but one kind—Truth is of God.

Pastoral counseling is evangelical in its purpose and goals. It seeks to relate man to God in meaningfulness and from that relationship to derive the power to live in meaningful relationship with fellow man. Karl Menninger defines mental illness in terms of the loss of capacity for successful interpersonal relationship. Pastoral counseling is therefore therapeutic.

It is confession. The church has always recognized the necessity of confession. But its concept of confession has often degenerated into a recital of sins. Sins are often seen as blemishes on the surface rather than pebbles which reveal the bed rock from whence they have been chipped. At this point psychiatry has been of immense help—sometimes unwittingly so. The psychiatric concept of catharsis allows no such artificiality or superficiality. Here is real purgation—a flushing of the depths. Modern pastoral counseling seeks to make confession this deeper thing. We have learned much about method and technique from psychology and psychiatry. In the setting of fear-casting love, we seek to communicate the courage to explore self in depth!

Most people are all too willing to repudiate responsibility for sin. We use such expressions as, "I made a mistake," "I slipped," or the more modern, "I goofed." Pastoral counseling should help a person realize that his actions are the direct outgrowth of what he is—of his very nature. I believe that all men have this awareness, though it is often clouded and confused. Man is universally aware of his guiltiness. This awareness may be confused and distorted, but it is there, conscious or unconscious.

Shortly before World War II I read Frazer's major anthropological work, *The Golden Bough*. Here Frazer suggests only one exception to the ubiquity of guilt. The Papuans of New Guinea, says Frazer, practice head hunting with no signs of guilt feelings. Shortly after reading Frazer, I was sent to New Guinea by the Navy Department. When we waded ashore on that first dark night, I regretted Frazer's erudition. Sometime later it was my privilege to accompany a Papuan Christian back into the hills to his native village. The expedition was for evangelical not anthropological purposes. The native lad who was my host was concerned about his parents and particularly his aged grandfather. The old man asked some embarrassing questions. How could I criticize head hunting as killing? What about our guns and bombers? In the course of our conversation he described the head hunters' ritualistic feasts. They were not the appetite serving orgies I had imagined. They were rather religious in nature. As each part of a human body was eaten a prayer was made that the virtue of the particular organ or muscle be communicated to the person partaking. But here is the significant point. The meal concluded with a prayer to the spirit of the departed one, asking that he not hold this against them. Guilt! God has established His law within the human psyche. It is wrong to hate—right to love. However we may dull our conscious awareness of the voice of conscience, its voice still speaks out of the depths of our being.

Many Christians feel guilty simply because they do not feel guilty—at least in conscious terms. Our guilt feelings are brought into sharp and painful focus only in the awareness that we sin as sons of the Father against our brothers.

The superficial recital of real or imagined sins is not confession. Confession requires true perspective and acceptance of responsibility. This is the goal of the confessional aspect of pastoral counseling.

It is revelation. Man cannot arrive at knowledge of his identity by reason or observation. He walks in something akin to amnesia until in the light of faith his identity is revealed. Part of the tension of his existence is the presence of some intuitive awareness that he is somebody—but who?

Pastoral counseling seeks to assist an individual to come into adequate self awareness in terms of the truth of his identity. This must always be the starting point in healing. It is at this point that many pastoral counselors make their most grievous mistakes. As a counselor I find it necessary to spend far more time on the problem of identity than on the problem of guilt. When a person grasps the startling fact that he is the son of God and an heir of the kingdom other problems present themselves for more ready solution. If I conceive of myself as a "worm," I will find the redemption incredible. But if I can grasp the prior fact that I exist because God wants me in His "eternal company," then the second article is not so preposterous. I am firmly convinced that people develop more of a sense of awe when they experience the truth of the first article than they do over the consequent redemption.

It is absolution. Herein lies one of the strengths of pastoral counseling. It provides a wrapping up, a conclusion, a sealing of the experience. Here is the pronouncing of God's forgiveness and acceptance. Most of us make this proclamation first in informal terms, followed by the symbolic laying on of hands and formal absolution. Having received balm and healing, the counselee now hears in effect the admonition, "Arise and go, your faith has made you whole."

I think it is obvious that these factors in pastoral counseling do not follow in strict sequence. One cannot really hear confession without also proclaiming the revelation. Indeed, one cannot really confess without the light of the Gospel to shine in the dark places. Nor could one have the courage to confess without knowing that he was heard by a God who loves. In like manner there is a sense in which the absolution is constantly given as a part of the process.

One of the greatest discoveries of the twentieth century is the essential wholeness of the person. Total man has inseparably related needs in the areas of body, mind, emotions, spirit and social relationships. In this regard the challenge confronting our generation is to build a team approach to the health needs of man.

Human ecology is the study and treatment of the total human being as he stands in dynamic relationship to his total environment. The term human ecology, while not new, is not in common usage. In employing it to describe our program we refer to a concept of what the human being is as well as an approach to the treatment of his health and difficulties. From both theology

and modern science we derive our conviction that man is a complex inter-relationship of physical, mental, emotional, social and spiritual factors. These factors cannot be understood except in terms of their inseparable inter-action. Man influences, and is influenced by, social, physical, and spiritual forces.

Treatment of his disorders and ills calls for the fullest possible understanding by both physican and patient of these internal and external inter-relating forces. The resources of medicine, psychiatry, social work, theology, and education need to be integrated. This calls for a team approach by qualified physicians, surgeons, psychiatrists, clergymen, and medical social workers. Such a team approach must rest on inter-disciplinary cooperation, communication, understanding, and mutual respect.

The growing edge of modern medicine, both as a science and as an art, brings into sharper focus the great need for an over-all approach. As science probes more deeply into the mystery of man's nature, it reveals clearly the complex inter-relatedness of the facets of his being. It is no longer logical simply to ask the physician to heal man's body, the psychiatrist to treat his emotions, the social worker to bring him into adjustment with his environment, or the clergyman to minister to his spiritual needs. From the deeper investigations of these professional disciplines comes testimony that their lines of discovery and treatment converge on each other. They meet at the point of man's nature as an indivisible being. An unfortunate, though understandable, lag has been experienced in putting this concept to work in helping the patient. This lag can be overcome through the creation of ecologically oriented hospitals and medical schools.

Specialization in medicine has brought vast blessings to mankind. Through it great strides have been taken toward better understanding of disease and consequent improvement in treatment. The result has been longer life with less pain and suffering. But this specialization has also been accompanied by serious negatives. The person has often been lost in the process. For example, physical diagnosis may show a stomach ulcer, but the person is involved in both the cause and the effect of that ulcer. To retain fully the advantages of specialization, we must develop in our care of the sick such inter-disciplinary communication and coordination as will heal the *person* instead of merely patching up his stomach. This is the core of what we call the ecological approach.

But now we come to the proverbial "sixty-four dollar question," How can representatives of such divergent disciplines, the products of such specialized educational processes enter into effective communication and cooperation? The typical medical college may give an hour or two to a Protestant minister, a priest, and a rabbi. This time is usually spent in briefly examining some of the distinctive practices of these faith groups as they may relate to such questions as "When should the priest be called?" "Who can baptize in the case of emergency?" etc. Schools of social work do little better. For the most part religion is regarded in terms of the institutionalized church and a social phenomenon. Psychiatry has traditionally viewed religion primarily in terms of its real and imaginary destructive distortions. But perhaps the most puzzling deficiency of all is found in theological education. Even in the light of Biblical anthropology—the doctrine of man—little attention is given to the whole person and when a pastor defines his task as a spiritual ministry to the souls of men, he is probably giving evidence of a fractional concern.

But the night is not entirely dark. There are some evidences that a dawn is approaching. To be sure there have been some stars in the sky all through this dark night, exceptions to the general rules which we have been discussing. Perhaps, even a moon has been shining to remind us that there is a sun. But I am quite sure that a few streaks of light are beginning to appear in the east. A new day is approaching. God's grace has not been entirely lacking in the efforts of individual disciplines toward deeper understanding. At least it can be said that their deepest investigations have caused them to look a little bit to the side and to realize that each of the other disciplines holds some knowledge of man and of his nature which relates to their knowledge. At least one medical college has symbolized this awareness by appointing a theologian to its faculty. Social work has been increasingly in communication with medicine and particularly psychiatry, and in theological education there is some evidence that the church is becoming aware of the relationship between the spiritual on the one hand and the emotional, physical, and social on the other. Within the last decade seven Lutheran theological seminaries have put full time clinically trained professors on their faculties in order to facilitate communications with other professions and the knowledge held by other disciplines. I would like to turn now to theological education and the evidences that our seminaries are becoming concerned about the orientation of the theological student in the healing arts.

Clinical Pastoral Education

At this point it is necessary to recognize the growth over the past thirty years in what is known as Clinical Pastoral Education. Such men as Anton Boisen, Dr. Richard C. Cabot, Austin Philip Guiles and others became concerned at about the same time about these very problems. Perhaps, Pastor Boisen's main thrust was in the direction of convincing the mental hospitals of the pertinence of pastoral care. I think it can be said that Dr. Cabot's main concern was in the direction of the theological seminaries. Some of you may recall that he offered to most of the theological seminaries on the eastern seaboard a lecture entitled "A Year of Clinical Education for Theological Students." I think Dr. Cabot had rather the worst of it. To convince theological seminaries and their faculties at that time that a doctor had anything important to say to theological students was a difficult task indeed. Most of them politely rejected his offer. But conviction is a power to be

reckoned with, and the tenacity of such individuals as those named above, and an increasing number of others down through the years, has borne its fruits. The number of accredited clinical pastoral training centers numbers more than 150 in the country today. Many of these centers work in more or less direct cooperation with certain theological seminaries. A few find themselves in very direct relationship to the curriculum of one or more seminaries.

It may be best for me to speak in terms of the program with which I am best acquainted. But first let me give the general background. Out of the efforts of such men as Dr. Boisen and Dr. Cabot, working primarily in the Boston area, clinical training for theological students and pastors got its start at first with little or no recognition from theological seminaries. The felt needs of theological students and pastors found students applying for such experiences. As time proved out the effectiveness of this educational process, more and more centers were established around the country under the direction of trained chaplain-supervisors. The inevitable happened—organizations were formed. You may be acquainted with the Institute of Pastoral Care and the Council for Clinical Training. About twelve years ago clinically trained pastors within the Lutheran Church began to see that the values of this type of experience could best be promoted within the framework of our own theology and ecclesiastical structure. Lutherans felt here, as in other areas, that ecumenical approaches created almost insurmountable problems. Concomitant with this development, representatives of a Council for Clinical Training, The Institute of Pastoral Care, Protestant theological seminaries which are running programs of clinical pastoral training independent of those two organizations, and the Lutheran group began working towards commonly accepted standards. After many meetings covering a period of about three years the standards were ready and referred to each of the groups for their own ratification. These were, of course, minimal and for the most pertained to mechanics. A great deal of individuality exists in the expressions in these various groups. This is certainly understandable and is perhaps desirable. Each group made modification of the standards in terms of some additions to the minimal requirements.

In brief summary, the standards are set up on a quarter basis. Clinical pastoral training is a full time supervised experience in ministering to people in crisis situations. The center must be under the supervision of an accredited chaplain-supervisor who has had a minimum of five quarters of such training and has been found by the accrediting committee to be qualified by personality, as well as by training, for this rating. He must serve first as an acting supervisor while his course is scrutinized and evaluated before he may be given full accreditation. Courses must be structured in such a way as to allow adequate opportunity for interpersonal relationships with both patients and professional staff. The center—general hospital, mental hospital, correctional institution—must regard this program as part of its educational function and not simply view it as something to be tolerated. The standards emphasize that the main stuff of the learning process is found in the patient interviews. The accurate recording of such interviews into a case study and the presentation of these cases to the group, which includes the students, the supervisor, and resource persons from other professions, is a major activity.

I noted earlier that each of the groups engaged in clinical pastoral education maintains the prerogative of individual expression. I think that the distinctive emphasis within the Lutheran and other denominational groups is first of all in seeing clinical pastoral education as a part of theological education which is best carried out in direct relationship to one of the theological seminaries. As a result of this emphasis there is probably a greater degree of the integration of theological knowledge on the one hand with medical and psychological knowledge on the other. The preamble to the standards as presented by the National Lutheran Council states that "The Christian church in emulating Christ's concern for suffering and distressed people down through the centuries has shown its faith by its works of healing love. Pastors have brought and daily bring comfort, consolation, and God's grace and forgiveness to sin sick and suffering souls. Using the Means of Grace entrusted to them by the Lord and their *enlightened insights into the nature of man.*"

I will use the particular program in which I am personally involved as an example of at least what one school is doing in the field of clinical pastoral education. While in scope it may be of somewhat larger dimensions than is true of other theological seminaries, it does represent the direction in which many others seem to be moving.

There are two main aspects to our program. First, the academic: courses are offered under the general heading of Pastoral Counseling. A required course given in the senior year deals with common stress factors in persons as they react to their environment and how these stresses may result in emotional and physical breakdown as well as disturbance of social relationships. Included also are discussions and descriptions of the symptoms in each of these categories, and, of course, there is discussion of the role of the pastor not only in ministering to these persons but also as a part of the health team.

In addition to this required course are several seminars. For example, Case Studies, Mental Illness and Lutheran Theology, Christian versus Freudian Concepts of Anxiety, and the Meaning of Suffering (based on Job and Isaiah). In addition we also offer seminars which are essentially experiences in group therapy.

The clinical component, however, is the one most emphasized. It is our belief that pastoral counseling is a clinical subject lending itself more readily to clinical

instruction than to classroom lectures. In implementation of this program the seminary has nine fully accredited clinical pastoral training courses in as many institutions under the supervision of accredited chaplain-supervisors. Six of these centers are located in general medical and surgical hospitals. Two are in state mental hospitals and one in a state correctional institution. Each center must meet the standards referred to above. Of particular importance again are the attitude of the administration and staff toward the program, the availability of adequate clinical opportunities, the availability of adequate professional personnel as lecturers and resource persons in the discussions and the willingness of the staff to cooperate with the students in the course. The course consists basically of pastoral ministration to people in crises. From these experiences, case histories are written and presented for discussion to fellow students, supervisors, and representatives of the pertinent disciplines sitting as a group. As further foundation and background for these discussions, lectures are presented by the various professions and their sub-specialties represented in the institution.

Our goals could be stated as follows: in general we want the student to develop insights, knowledge, and experience which will enhance his ministry to people. This may be broken down into four specific goals: (1) personal growth, (2) professional growth, (3) better role definition, and (4) increased facility in interprofessional communication. In the setting of the general hospital, in addition to the content indicated above, students are introduced to the study of anatomy and physiology, the symptomotology of the various disease entities and the hows and whys of particular therapies. They serve for a time as orderlies, witness births and autopsies, attend clinical pathological conferences, etc. The counterpart of these activities is carried out also in the mental hospitals.

The program started eleven years ago with one center. The course was offered only for the summer quarter and, of course, was not required for graduation from the seminary. Eight students represented the capacity of the center. Today approximately seventy students can be accommodated for the summer quarter. In addition, two of the centers operate during additional quarters of the year. One of these accepts only men who can spend a minimum of one full year in the capacity of Resident in Pastoral Care. This center accepts six such residents, and next September will inaugurate a program of research fellowships, again on the basis of a minimal one year period. Incidentally, this hospital gives each resident a stipend of $5,000 per year and each research fellow $7,000 per year.

Conclusion

If the concept of human ecology is based on valid theological and scientific conclusions it would seem obvious that medical education should be theology-related. If we talk about serving the whole man, a question is begged, "What is man?" and further, "Why is man?" Once we start to answer those questions, we come, whether we want to admit it or not, to theology, and if we say that theology has no particular place in medical education then we have already made a theological judgment in the area of anthropology.

The need is for an institution organized in such a way as to preserve the finest in medical training in a setting of ecological resources and attitudes, adequately financed and dedicated to the treatment of man as the whole being that he is. We believe this is demanded by the most profound observations of medicine, natural sciences, behavioral sciences, and theology. This should be an institution where medical students, graduate students of theology, social workers, and psychiatrists could come together for at least a part of their training.

Perhaps, what we are talking about here is a twentieth century form of the New Testament relationship between religion and health. The time may well be full for a return from the great conceptual dispersion. Servants of God, exquisitely trained as physicians, social workers, psychiatrists and pastors, men of common faith and of common Christ-derived concern, should move together in common effort toward common goals in the service of God and the God-loved among whom we move. Perhaps, it could be said in this connection also that "What God hath joined together, let not man put asunder."

*Christian Perspectives on Mental Illness**

VERNON C. GROUNDS**

In discussing the subject which I have been assigned, let me begin by stating three positive theses. First, mental illness is a problem which ought to concern any sensitive citizen no matter what his religious orientation. Second, the problem of mental illness ought to concern Christians especially. Third, there seems to be extraordinary resources in Christianity for helping to alleviate this problem.

Extent of Mental Illness

I invite your attention, then, to my first thesis which is glaringly self-evident: mental illness is a problem which ought to concern any sensitive citizen no matter what his religious orientation.

Statistics are notoriously dull and ineffectual; as a rule they fail to dent our self-preoccupation. Sometimes, however, they are illuminating; they serve to crack

* Paper presented at the Seventeenth Annual Convention of the American Scientific Affiliation held at St. Paul, Minnesota, August, 1962.

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through our apathy, compelling us to sit up and take notice. So to quote a few statistics, how many people in the United States are mentally sick? How many? Seventeen million annually, we are authoritatively informed. May I repeat that figure? Annually seventeen million people in the United States are mentally sick. This means that every day our institutions handle some 640,000 cases of emotional maladjustment, personality-disorder, psychotic breakdown—everything from chronic alcoholism to catatonic schizophrenia. This means, furthermore, that 51 per cent of our hospital population is composed of disturbed and defeated individuals, miserable and unhappy individuals, unable any longer to function adequately in their human environment, individuals who are a burden to themselves and to our society. (5, pp. 3, 15) And these individuals, as you know, include all ages, all races, all creeds, all levels of education, wealth, and culture; for mental illness strikes with random impartiality.

These, therefore, are the cold statistics: 17 million people in our country mentally sick each year; 640,000 cases of psychic disturbance handled daily by our institutions; 51% of our hospital population composed of emotionally upset individuals.

But do not allow these statistics to run through your mind like hailstones pelting off a tin roof. Give your empathy free rein as you ponder the figures I have just quoted. Imaginatively metamorphize my figures into faces. Now gaze out on that sea of humanity, and remember that each face is the face of a person, a person who is acutely frustrated, a person who has failed in his quest for an abundant life, a person whose experience is overshadowed by tragedy—and often the real-life tragedy of mental illness is more excruciating than the make-believe tragedies of Euripides, Shakespeare, and Eugene O'Neil. Hence this is a problem which ought to be of concern to any sensitive citizen no matter what his religious orientation.

Christian Concern

Think, next, about my second thesis: mental illness ought to concern Christians especially. Why? For a single, all-sufficient reason: whatever its critics may allege to the contrary, Christianity is the one interpretation of existence which can rightly claim to be a humanism. I am aware, of course, that humanism is a term stretched to cover every imaginable philosophy from the rabid antitheism of a Jean-Paul Sartre, on the extreme left, to the Roman Catholicism of a Jacques Maritain, on the extreme right. I repeat, nevertheless, that Christianity is the one interpretation of existence which can rightly claim to be a humanism. If that claim strikes you as unfounded, listen to Eduard Thurneysen, and I am confident that you will be challenged to change your opinion. "Because Jesus Christ has become flesh, there is nothing fleshly and human, however sinful and corrupt it may be, that cannot be reached and grasped by the Word of God and translated into God's own. Since Jesus Christ was born, died, and rose again, the name of God is set over everything that is on earth." (6, p. 118.) Thurneysen, I venture to assert, is irrefutably right; and evangelical's theocentrism is indeed the truest humanism.

You see, Christianity with its doctrines of creation, incarnation, and redemption, embraces and potentially sanctifies the whole gamut of human existence: *it sets the name of God over everything that is on earth.*

Terence, the ancient Roman playwright, formulated, you remember, the enduring shibboleth of humanism, a shibboleth which naturalists like Julian Huxley delight to repeat, "I am a man; I count nothing human alien to myself." (3, p. 541) But in a sense deeper than Terence ever dreamed possible a Christian can also say, "I am a man; I count nothing human alien to myself." A Christian can say that—and indeed must say it—because that is what his Saviour and Lord said in the dramatic language of a specific human birth, a specific human life, a specific human death. A Christian in so saying is only repeating the Word uttered by God-in-the-flesh, "I am a man; I count nothing human alien to myself"—nothing, mind you, not exempting sin and mental illness.

Thus the Gospel, which does not shrink back from any sordid tangle of psyche or soul, the Gospel which affirms that God loves man as he is, may rightly claim to be a humanism. And I seriously wonder whether any rival interpretation of life has the right to make that claim. As I see it, any rival interpretation is at best a truncated humanism; it ignores either the heights or the abysses in man's nature.

Moreover, as a *bona fide* humanism, Christianity is properly humanitarian. How could it be otherwise? Our Saviour and Lord went about doing good, as the Apostle Peter tells us, healing all who were oppressed of the devil. The Gospels record some twenty-six miracles in which supernaturally Jesus cured the sick of mind as well as the sick of body. He showed that the power of God was available to faith for breaking in upon and battering down the strongholds of suffering, misery, and bondage. By word and work He emphatically taught that passive acquiescence in the face of human needs is not according to His Father's will. He had come into the world, Jesus declared, in order that man, redeemed and released, might have life and have it more abundantly. Besides all this, He commissioned His disciples to carry on a therapeutic ministry as He Himself had done. "Heal the sick," He said; "freely ye have received, freely give." Jesus laid upon His followers the responsibility of caring for the diseased, the handicapped, the burdened, those who are in distress whether spiritually or physically or mentally.

So any Christian who takes seriously the mandate of his Master must have a concern which, while humanitarian in nature, stretches a whole dimension beyond mere humanitarianism. He must be concerned about everything which shrivels human existence, everything which prevents his neighbor from enjoying freedom and fulfillment by faith, everything which hinders any fellow

creature from entering into the life and likeness of God. Today, therefore, a Christian must be concerned about racism, war, and depersonalization just as in days gone by Christians have been concerned about slavery and child labor and factory legislation. Hence a Christian must also be concerned about the life-frustrating problem of mental illness. Indeed, a Christian ought to be concerned about this problem to a degree which secular sociologists and psychologists, for all their humanitarianism, do not begin to equal. For such a concern, an evangelical concern, is simply the corollary of a directive for which a cross supplies the dynamic: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

Resources in Christianity

My third proposition reinforces, I am sure, what I have previously asserted: Christianity seems to possess extraordinary resources for helping to alleviate this problem.

An old hymn frequently sung at evangelistic services is apparently true even from a mental-health standpoint:

> Just as I am poor, wretched, blind,
> Sight, riches, healing of the mind,
> Yea, all I need in Thee to find,
> Oh, Lamb of God, I come, I come!

"Healing of the mind"—Christianity promises that and evidently makes good its promise. For what is it that the disturbed and disjunctive individual requires? What, in other words, is imperative for mental healing? Suppose I broaden the question. What is essential if mental illness is to be prevented and mental health promoted? For one thing, the authoritative literature states, as I read it, that mental health and healing demand a conviction of life's meaningfulness, a framework of orientation and devotion, to cite Erich Fromm, a philosophy which endows existence with purpose and significance. This is the antidote for that overwhelming sense of personal cosmic irrationality which furnishes the fertile seedbed of neurosis. But what philosophy meets this demand as adequately as does the Biblical faith? If meaningfulness is the antidote for neurosis-creating irrationality, Christianity, I submit, is a powerful ally of mental health.

For a second thing, the authoritative literature states, as I read it, that mental health and healing demand a source of courage which will enable a person to encounter the inescapable anxiety of life, its basic, built-in anxiety, without going to pieces. But where is the source of this anxiety-subduing courage to be discovered, a courage which will help an existing individual rise above the threats of futility, guiltiness, and non-being, particularly the never-relaxed threat of non-being? Whatever Paul Tillich may care to affirm otherwise, I for one can discover that source nowhere but in the traditional Gospel of Jesus Christ which guarantees a death-annulling resurrection. In the Gospel, it seems to me, we have the antidote for neurosis-creating anxiety.

For a third thing, the authoritative literature states, as I read it, that mental health and healing demand, on the one hand, the assurance of love, and, on the other hand, the power to love. From Freud on down through virtually every school of post-Freudian psychotherapy the need for this two-fold experience of love has been recognized either explicitly or implicitly. A human being must know that he is the object of a love which gives him both security and status; he must, in addition, function as the subject of an outgoing love. Unless this is his experience, an individual may fall victim to a self-debilitating, neighbor-destroying hate that can end in neurosis.

This is not the place for any detailed exposition of aggression and hostility, two factors which loom large in the literature of psychiatry. Suffice it to remark that a major problem for any therapist is how to siphon off hate and how to substitute *agape* for that destructiveness in human nature to which a picturesque label has been attached, the *thanatos* or death drive. Once more, I fail to see any solution for this problem apart from Christianity. What is the Gospel, after all, if not the good news that man, an utterly insignificant and valueless biped, a pinpoint of protoplasm on a pigmy planet in a measureless universe, is nevertheless the object of a cosmic love which gives him ultimate security and eternal status? What is the Gospel, after all, if not the good news that man, curved in egocentrically upon himself, secretly and often openly hating his neighbor, can become the subject of outgoing love as the Holy Spirit works within his heart? The Gospel, in my judgment, the Gospel alone, the good news of God's love in Jesus Christ, supplies the antidote for neurosis-creating hate.

I might continue in this vein for a much longer time; but charity compels me to abbreviate. The authoritative literature teaches, as I read it, that mental health and healing demand forgiveness as the antidote for guilt; they demand fellowship as the antidote for alienation; power as the antidote for impotence; and hope as the antidote for despair. So as I read the authoritative literature I keep asking myself, "Where are all these psychic *desiderata* to be found?" Conveniently they are to be found in the Gospel exclusively—or at least with an adequacy that makes the Gospel an unrivalled antidote for neurosis? Dare I say that, if mental health and healing demand self-understanding, self-identity, self-acceptance, self-release, and self-investment, if this is their demand, then the Gospel of Jesus Christ seems to possess extraordinary resources for alleviating mental illness?

This, at any rate, is why so reputable a therapist as James T. Fisher include a eulogy of the Gospel in his autobiography, *A Few Buttons Missing:*

> I could never be entirely satisfied with my role as a psychiatrist, struggling to find a safe pathway so that I might lead a few lost souls out of the wilderness of mental abnormality. What was needed, I felt sure, was some new and enlightened recipe for living a sane and satisfying life . . . I dreamed of writing a handbook that would be simple, practical, easy to understand, easy to follow. It would tell people how to live—what thoughts and attitudes and philosophies to cultivate, and what pitfalls to avoid in seeking mental health. I attended every symposium it was possible for me to attend and took notes on the wise words of my teachers and of my colleagues who were leaders in their field. And quite by accident I discovered

that such a work had already been completed! If you were to take the sum total of all authoritative articles ever written by the most qualified of psychologists and psychiatrists on the subject of mental hygiene—if you were to combine them and refine them and cleave out the excess verbage—if you were to take the whole of the meat and none of the parsley, and if you were to have these unadulterated bits of pure scientific knowledge concisely expressed by the most capable of living poets, you would have an awkward and incomplete summation of the Sermon on the Mount. And it would suffer immeasurably through comparison. For nearly two thousand years the Christian world has been holding in its hands the complete answer to its restless and fruitless yearnings. Here . . . rests the blueprint for successful human life with optimum mental health and contentment. (2, p. 273. Used by permission.)

In short, the New Testament provides a compendium of all the vital principles for keeping the mind healthy. Jesus Christ, according to Dr. Fisher, was even greater than Sigmund Freud in Freud's own chosen field. Jesus Christ was the master mental hygienist of all the ages.

For the same reasons, also, I assume, in his book *Christianity and Mental Health,* Max Leach ringingly assures us:

The principles of Christianity when applied to an individual's life are completely effective . . . The child reared in the Christian home will have the love and affection needed for future emotional stability, for these are fundamental in Christian living. Fear in its destructive aspects is conquered for the Christian. Death, the greatest fear and the greatest unknown, is wiped out. The worst that the world can have to offer is insignificant, for God is on the Christian's side. People, for the Christian, are not enemies but friends, for God is love, and is not man made in God's image? . . . The world and its people are not a threat to the Christian. The Christian does not labor under a great burden of inferiority, for he recognizes that success, attainment, and real stature in life are not a matter between him and other men but a matter between himself and his God. He knows that God does not see labels but instead sees lives. The Christian knows but may not understand how it is that there is ultimate purpose and ultimate good. And since he is a small part of all of this, then in his life too there is ultimate purpose and ultimate good. For the Christian all will be well, despite whatever problems and disappointments he may have. (4, pp. 134-135. Used by permission.)

Thus, in Leach's opinion, Christianity is a sort of blue-chip safeguard against mental illness, a guaranteed wonder-drug which will prevent neurosis.

But have Fisher and Leach permitted a commendable fervour to prejudice their case on behalf of Christianity's value in terms of mental hygiene? I am very much afraid that both of them, though definitely on the side of the angels, have failed to do what many of us have been failing to do. They have neglected to scrutinize critically this newest apologetic for the Gospel—its value in terms of mental hygiene. Quite briefly, therefore, having stated three positive theses, may I now lay down two counter-balancing propositions?

Religion and Healthy-mindedness

My fourth thesis, then, is this: as Christians concerned about the problem of mental illness, we must admit that often religion, even our own unique faith, is of little value, or minus value with respect to healthy-mindedness. Distasteful as it is to admit this fact, honesty forces us to do so; and Christianity is reduced to hypocritical nonsense when its adherents flout the practice of simple honesty. Far from serving as a panacea for psychic difficulty, religion, even our own unique faith, I repeat, often proves of little value, no value, or minus value with respect to healthy-mindedness. Honesty compels me to admit this.

Now in admitting it, I am not endorsing the strictures which some very vigorous critics have levelled against Christianity. By no means! Albert Ellis, for example, the hard-hitting exponent of rational psychotherapy, condemns our faith as the most frequent and fruitful cause of mental illness. It will be salutary for us, I think, to listen humbly while he speaks his piece in an article entitled, "There Is No Place for Sin in Psychotherapy":

Because of . . . serious disadvantages of giving individuals a serious sense of sin and because any deity-positing religion almost by necessity involves endowing those members who violate its god's laws with a distinct concept of blameworthiness or sin, I am inclined to reverse Voltaire's famous dictum and to say that, from a mental health standpoint, if there were a God it would be necessary to uninvent Him . . . I contend that giving anyone a sense of sin, guilt, or self-blame is the worst possible way to help him be an emotionally sound and adequately socialized individual . . . If, in this thoroughly objective, nonguilty manner, we can teach our patients (as well as the billions of people in the world who, for better or worse, will never become patients) that even though human beings can be held quite accountable or responsible for their misdeeds, no one is ever to blame for anything, human morality, I am sure, will be significantly improved and for the first time in human history civilized people will have a real possibility of achieving sound mental health. The concept of sin is the direct and indirect cause of virtually all neurotic disturbance. The sooner psychotherapists forthrightly begin to attack it the better their patients will be. (1, pp. 191-192. Used by permission.)

This attack, I know, levelled by Albert Ellis, a distinguished practitioner in the field of psychotherapy, has made all of us squirm uncomfortably. Ellis, as I have pointed out, charges Christianity with being perhaps the most frequent and fruitful cause of personality-disorders. "From a mental health standpoint," he roundly contends, "if there were a God, it would be necessary to uninvent him." "Giving anyone a sense of sin, guilt, or self-blame," he further contends, "is the worst possible way to help him be an emotionally sound and adequately socialized individual." And Ellis contends still further that for the first time in history civilized people will have a real possibility of achieving sound mental health if we can persuade them that no one is ever to blame for anything. Tersely he focuses his indictment: "The concept of sin is the direct and indirect cause of virtually all neurotic disturbance." Or, to restate his conclusion, Christianity is the enemy of mental health; and on that ground alone ought to be attacked root and branch by every self-respecting psychotherapist.

Now I am not going to undertake a refutation of this criticism, though a refutation is certainly called for and would not be especially difficult. All I am going to do now is urge that as convinced Christians we recognize the complexity of emotional illness and admit that often religion, sometimes even our own unique faith, proves of little value, no value, or minus value with respect to

healthy-mindedness. Yes, let us admit that. No, let us insist that spiritually and healthy-mindedness cannot be readily equated. Let us insist that the relationship between Christian faith and psychic soundness is extremely complex. A simple illustration will show, I hope, the complexity of their relationship. Take the six criteria of "the mentally healthy individual" proposed by Dr. Marie Jahoda in her monograph, *Current Concepts of Positive Mental Health:*

1. He is self-reliant, self-confident and self-accepting.
2. His degree of self-actualization is such that his motivational processes can be characterized as growth motivation rather than need motivation.
3. He can resist stress, has a unifying outlook on life, and his psychic forces are in flexible balance; that is, he shows a relatively good integration of the personality.
4. He is autonomous (rather than, in Riesman's terms, either "adjusted" on the one hand or "anomic" on the other). He maintains a stable set of internal standards for his actions, so that he is relatively independent of social influences.
5. He is able to perceive the world and other persons with relative freedom from the distortions that may originate in his own needs. Related to this perception of reality is empathy, or social sensitivity, by virtue of which he will treat the inner life of others as a matter worthy of his concern.
6. He is adapted to his environment, displaying a creative capacity for love, work, and play. (3, p. 5. Used by permission.)

These six criteria, I am sure, constitute an excellent profile of healthy-mindedness. But now in the light of these criteria evaluate many of the Christians who have been looked upon as outstandingly spiritual. Evaluate Paul or Peter or James. Evaluate Savonarola, Huss, Calvin, Fox, or Bunyan. Evaluate David Brainerd, that much-admired paragon of piety in Colonial America. Could any of these spiritual giants qualify as models of mental health in keeping with Jahoda's definition? Were they well-integrated, well-balanced, well-adjusted individuals, tranquil and relaxed, the kind of people who would be pleasant companions at a beach-party some summer afternoon? I rather imagine, on the contrary, that an Albert Ellis considers all of them pathological fanatics, rigid, compulsive, and neurotic in their behaviour. And, I dare say, all of them might have profited immensely by reading one of Dr. Peale's many handbooks on healthy-mindedness! In a word, sainthood and psychic soundness are not commensurables. Let us admit it. Let us admit, too, that a discouragingly large percentage of rank-and-file evangelicals are still characterized by conflict, tension, fear, guilt, scrupulosity and aggressiveness. And, consequently, let us engage in a probing reconsideration before we announce to the world that Christianity is a blue-chip panacea for mental illness.

I suppose, however, that the failure of our own unique faith to prove of greater value therapeutically can be partly explained by two factors: first, the Gospel is sometimes misinterpreted; and second, it is sometimes misapplied.

Will any honest evangelical deny that the Gospel is sometimes misinterpreted? Again and again sermons present the good news of redemption and release as gloomy, morbid, world-denying, puritanical, and repressive. God is frequently portrayed not as He really is, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the covenant-keeping God, the God and Father of Jesus Christ, the God of wisdom, power, righteousness, love, and grace. He is portrayed instead as a sadistic monster, a legalistic tyrant, a cosmic egotist, obsessed with minutiae and taboos. It is no wonder, then, that the adherents of a misinterpreted Christianity fail to enjoy a larger measure of psychic health. More than this, the Gospel is sometimes misapplied. An individual may profess faith in Christianity but what if his faith never issues in a personal experience of the new birth? What if it issues only in formal affiliation with a church? What if it is never internalized? What if it is merely institutionalized? What if it never becomes an acute fever? What if, as James says, it remains a dull habit? Under such circumstances we need not be surprised if our own unique faith, sadly misapplied, demonstrates little value, no value, or minus value with respect to healthy-mindedness.

In any event, because the Gospel is misinterpreted and misapplied, we had better exercise care before we make sweeping claims on behalf of its psychic effectiveness. As Christians concerned about the problem of mental illness, we had better set ourselves to the task of serious research and sustained dialogue, attempting to discover why the extraordinary resources of our faith remain untapped.

Christian Perspective on Healthy-mindedness

Now, in conclusion, allow me with utmost brevity to set before you one other thesis, for which I am indebted to the analysis made by Thurneysen (6). As Christians concerned about the problem of mental illness, we must refuse to abandon the distinctive insights, convictions and objectives of our own faith. We must beware of prostituting the Gospel to a sub-Biblical end.

You may remember that I previously insisted Christianity is concerned about human life in its totality and therefore Christianity is concerned about healthy-mindedness. But—and let me be provocatively blunt—fundamentally and finally, Christianity is not concerned about the individual's emotional welfare any more than it is concerned about his physical condition. Fundamentally and finally, Christianity is concerned about the individual's relationship to God. Fundamentally and finally, it sees the individual as a sinner who, apart from a sincere faith, is living in a malignant relationship with God. Fundamentally and finally, it sees him as a creature whose overriding responsibility is to get this wrong relationship readjusted. Fundamentally and finally, it sees him as the bearer of a destiny which stretches out beyond time into eternity, and this destiny is determined by his God-relationship. So Christianity's perspective on mental health may be summed up, I think, in these didactic statements.

1. An individual, quite completely free from tension,

anxiety, and conflict, may be only a well-adjusted sinner who is dangerously maladjusted to God; and it is infinitely better to be a neurotic saint than a healthy-minded sinner.

2. Healthy-mindedness may be a spiritual hazard which keeps an individual from turning to God precisely because he has no acute sense of need.
3. Emotional illness springing ultimately—*ultimately!*—from the rift which sin has driven between Creator and creature may prove a disguised blessing, a crisis which compels an individual to face the issues of his divine relationship and eternal destiny.
4. Thus in a choice between spiritual renewal and psychic recovery, Christianity unhesitatingly assigns priority to the spiritual dimension of personality.
5. Mental illness may be an experience which drives a believer into a deeper faith-commitment; hence mental illness may sometimes be a gain rather than a loss.
6. Tension, conflict, and anxiety, even to the point of mental illness, may be a cross voluntarily carried in God's service.
7. No psychic healing is complete unless it is acknowledged as God's gift and He is praised for it.
8. Health of mind or body is of value only as it is used to serve and glorify God.

These, I suggest, are some of the distinctive insights, convictions, and objectives of our own faith; and as Christians concerned about mental illness we must refuse to abandon them regardless of how they may be criticized by secular psychotherapy.

Years ago in Germany, Christoph Blumhardt carried on a rather phenomenal ministry of pastoral care. Blessed with rare abilities, he helped hundreds of people regain health of body, mind, and spirit. Individuals who could not come to him at Bad Boll would write asking his counsel and prayer. Here is his reply to a woman who had requested intercession for an afflicted friend.

> I increasingly feel we should not pray too urgently for health and help in illness, but rather for our right attitudes toward God in order to make the streams of living water flow more richly. God is often hindered from doing what he would gladly do if we were more his people serving him. Now that God has caused me to experience so many and such great things, I long for the experience of seeing men care more for his Kingdom and take a back seat for themselves. In this way, even illness can become a service for God, and God is again close at hand. I shall faithfully think of your sick friend, but am grateful if she in turn also helps me and wishes even more than her health that God's right be acknowledged on earth and his will alone be done. (6, p. 252. Used by Permission.)

That, in my opinion, is a classic statement of the Christian perspective on health, whether physical or mental.

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*Guilt**

DAVID F. BUSBY**

O, what peace we often forfeit,
O, what needless pain we bear,
All because we do not carry
Everything to God in prayer.

Thus wrote the hymn writer, Joseph Scriven, years ago; thus have sung millions of Christians since; and thus have millions of Christians seemingly concluded this the sum total in essence of the guilt problem, its cause and its cure. But what shall we say of Christians who apparently sincerely take it to the Lord in prayer and find little or no relief from their guilt feelings whether or not they believe intellectually they have been forgiven? Or what, may we ask, would motivate a Christian to choose to suffer "needless pain" and forfeiture of "peace" when complete relief is so immediately available? Or what of the person who "takes it to the Lord in prayer" but does nothing with regard to the brother sinned against? These and many other like questions illustrate vividly the importance of a thorough-going study of our subject today, namely that of guilt.

Its importance is further highlighted by the universality of guilt, the terrible misery it causes, and the blessed relief which comes upon its removal. The late Ernest Jones, noted biographer of Freud, is quoted as having complimented the organizers of a conference on the problem of guilt by referring to them as "both bold and wise: bold because it is probably the most difficult problem in the whole realm of psychology; and wise because it is perhaps the most important." Jones continued: "It may indeed prove to be the one (subject) on which the welfare of mankind depends more than any other . . . The troubles from which the world suffers at present can, in my opinion, very largely be traced to the manifold attempts to deal with the inner sense of guiltiness and therefore any contribution that will illuminate this particular problem will be of the greatest value." (1, p. 26)

*Paper presented at the Seventeenth Annual Convention of the American Scientific Affiliation held at St. Paul, Minnesota, August, 1962.

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which exists whenever any individual violates the laws of God whether knowingly or not—in other words, relieving one he is relieving the other. It is at this point that some have made, and perhaps rightly so, a distinc-

Another reason for its importance in the context of our convention is that it is a subject and area in which occurs perhaps as many or more misunderstandings between psychotherapists and the clergy as well as other Christians than almost any other. Speaking of this point the late Carl Gustav Jung, who with Freud and Adler was one of the founders of the three psychological "schools," is quoted as having said: "One of the main difficulties lies in the fact that both appear to use the same language but that this language calls up in their minds two totally different fields of association. Both can apparently use the same concept and then are bound to acknowledge to their amazement that they are speaking of two different things." (2, p. 155) Victor White, writing in *Christian Essays in Psychiatry,* elaborates:

> There is probably no subject on which they may find themselves more bewilderingly at cross-purposes than that of guilt. The fields of association which the word guilt can conjure up are indeed so different that it is no wonder that they can provoke perplexities which amount to mutual incomprehension. For example, to the theologian—as well as to the moralist and the lawyer— the word (guilt) will at once suggest something reprehensible and blameworthy, indeed unpardonable except on strict conditions of repentance and amendment. To the psychologist it will suggest more often a pitiable affliction, perhaps possibly a delusion, a symptom of a disorder which causes intense suffering, inhibits life and joy in living, and calls for as much sympathetic understanding and as little reproach as does physical sickness. Although the psychologist will not usually deny that there is such a thing as real culpability, the attitudes toward guilt of the theologian, the moralist and the lawyer will often seem to him quite inhuman and immature; conversely to them, the attitude of the psychologist often seems unrealistic, amoral, anarchic, and perhaps dangerously sentimental. To this a Christian may be inclined to add that the psychologist's attitude betrays a deplorably frivolous attitude toward sin and to its terrible consequences in time and eternity; a view which (in turn) only confirms the suspicion of some psychologists that religious teachings are compounded of ignorant fears which are a menace to public health and individual happiness. (2, pp. 155-156)

The illustration of the complexity and need for clarification of the concept of guilt is the following list of words and phrases commonly used to modify the word guilt, usually in the form of an adjective preceding it: true, false, conscious, unconscious, valid, invalid, real, unreal, normal, neurotic, psychotic, psychological, social, legal, theological, moral, objective, subjective, absolute, relative, appropriate, inappropriate, displaced, too much, and too little. The situation obviously calls for an attempt at definition, description and classification which should be no less than heroic. However, before any attempt be made, I feel that several basic or preliminary considerations should be mentioned and kept in mind as a background for or context of the main treatment of the subject.

Preliminary Considerations

First comes the familiar—perhaps overworked—quotation: "The opinions expressed here are my own and do not necessarily represent those of the sponsor" (whether the sponsor be assumed to be the American Scientific Affiliation or God Himself!). I have no doubt that many of my views do not represent the average psychiatrist and I sometimes wonder whether they may represent the average Christian psychiatrist. The second preliminary consideration concerns itself with the concept of the unconscious mind. The usually understood concept of the unconscious will here be assumed. For the sincerely skeptical evidence may be presented later upon request. The third consideration regards a semantic difficulty. In the book *What, Then, Is Man?* (a book which I highly recommend as the most scholarly elaboration of all aspects of the inter-relationship between psychology and theology), the term "mentalistic language" is used. (3, p. 216) It intends to compare and contrast words such as feeling, awareness, sensation, perception, and experience as occurring at the conscious and/or unconscious level. Let's take the first two, for example. Ordinarily to feel pain and to be aware of pain are considered synonymous. Similarly, one might assume to feel guilt and to be aware of guilt would seem to refer to identical concepts. However, in the field of psychology, the body-mind unit seems to function fragmentally, particularly involving the process known as repression; thus it is presumed that a given emotion or attitude may be experienced by the unconscious mind as evidenced by some form of indirect reaction to same, but without conscious, direct awareness of it. For example, a person may evidence objective signs of a greater degree of anger than that of which he may be subjectively aware at the time. Or again, many persons seem sincerely shocked when it is pointed out that they react to their own hostility with either saccharin sweetness or with an anxious smile or with other indirect behavior such as forgetting or lateness. Having no solution and knowing of no terms that are universally indicative, I will have to ask your indulgence for the fact that most times when I use the word "feeling" it will refer to conscious awareness, but sometimes it may refer to unconscious experience, and I will endeavor to make the context indicate clearly which is in view.

The fourth preliminary consideration is that no attempt will be made to distinguish or differentiate between conscience, super-ego, and the work or voice of the Holy Spirit (or of Satan, for that matter!). This may disappoint or frustrate some; if so, remember it disappoints and frustrates me not to be able to make such differentiations! The fifth and final preliminary consideration is that in an attempt to be positive and constructive some sort of classifications and methods of operation will be suggested. It should be understood that I intend that these be used merely as guiding principles and not as pat formulae or molds into which are squeezed all experiences via reasoning after the fact. I do not desire to give comfort to those given to the latter.

An Important Distinction

In beginning our attempt to define, clarify, and classify terms and concepts our first step will be to suggest that a distinction be made between the word

"guilt" and the phrase "guilt feeling." In the Concise Oxford Dictionary "guilt" is defined as "the having committed a specified or implied offence; criminality, culpability." Drever's *Dictionary of Psychology* defines "guilt" as "a sense of wrong-doing, an emotional attitude generally involving emotional conflict arising out of real or imagined contravention of moral or social standards, in act or thought." It is this latter concept we will refer to as "guilt-feeling" or awareness of guilt. Once having made this distinction, certain of the previously cited adjectives and modifying phrases may begin to fall into some line. For example, the first concept, that of "guilt," would merit the adjectives real, valid, true, absolute, objective, normal, appropriate, unconscious, social, legal, and theological; the latter concept—"guilt-feeling"—may have associated with it the adjectives false, conscious, invalid, unreal, psychological, neurotic, psychotic, subjective, relative, inappropriate, displaced, too much, and too little. As with all such neat divisions, however, this leaves something to be desired. For example, to refer to "guilt-feeling" as "false, invalid, and unreal" might imply and/or convey to the unsophisticated an illusion of its being imaginary or even irrelevant in the case of capable of and deserving of being ignored, whereas nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, while true and conscious guilt may often be carried for a great while with apparent impunity, it is the neurotic displaced guilt which naggingly demands and then ignores all usual attempts at dealing with it.

Discussion of Terms

Let us now go into a brief discussion of some of the individual terms involved, thus hoping to clarify their inter-relationship. First, we may assume that we in A.S.A., believing in the existence and authority of a real and personal God, believe that there is such a situation or condition as absolute, objective or theological guilt which exists whenever any individual violates the laws of God whether knowingly or not—in other words, whether he is conscious of same, or whether he accepts God's laws or even God's existence or not. Legal, moral and social guilt by comparison would then have to be relegated to the realm of *relative* guilt as contrasted with *absolute* (although when one pays a traffic fine it is certainly *absolutely* not just *relatively* paid!).

We now turn our attention to the subject of "guilt feelings," focussing particularly on the psychiatrist's classification, diagnosis, and management of them in therapy. First, he would presume to recognize that, on the basis of his own system of values, guilt feelings may roughly be divided into those which seem appropriate and those which seem inappropriate. The appropriate ones are then referred to as real, true, or valid. However, it does not follow that the inappropriate guilt feelings necessarily are unreal, false, untrue, or invalid in the same vein as mentioned above. Inappropriate guilt may then be further subdivided as to whether it is inappropriate with respect to its amount or to its object. Regarding its amount, we may find there to be either too much guilt, such as in the obsessive-compulsive neurotic, or too little guilt such as in the psychopathic criminal. As regards the object of the guilt, the inappropriate aspect may be constituted by displacement of the guilt from its true object onto a false object; thus, we have a situation where the person is feeling guilty about something he "ought not" feel guilty about, and not feeling guilty about the thing he "ought" to feel guilty about. Thus, it is possible to be guilty and not feel it, and it is also possible to feel guilty and not actually be guilty, at least not of the "thing" felt guilty about. The obsessive-compulsive neurotic, for example, evidences displaced guilt feelings. Also the psychotic, such as the schizophrenic, may manifest a wild, and to the conscious mind, an illogical displacement of guilt.

Treatment of Guilt

Now what does all this mean to the therapist or counselor? First, I might point out that whatever may be the criteria by which the conscientious therapist differentiates between guilt and guilt feelings, between appropriate and inappropriate guilt feelings, one of his inevitable functions will be to assist the patient in making his own differentiation and in proceeding to reattach his displaced guilt to its original and appropriate object. Thus, the psychotherapist will be attempting to relieve only inappropriate (neurotic, psychotic) guilt feelings. He will not, or at least should not, in my opinion, be attempting or implying at the same time a removal of the true, objective, or theological guilt. Unfortunately, however, the psychotherapist may happen to be one who does not accept (intellectually or consciously) the existence of God as an objective authority, in which case he may all too easily convey an assumption that guilt and guilt feelings are synonymous, and that in relieving one he is relieving the other. It is at this point that some have made, and perhaps rightly so, a distinction between a Christian and a non-Christian psychotherapist as being a distinction of valid importance. The Christian therapist will certainly see and feel the ultimate need of the patient to deal with his problem of true, absolute theological guilt.

The extent of the individual therapist's own personal role in assisting the patient in dealing with his own true guilt may vary widely from situation to situation. For example, in certain instances, under carefully evaluated and controlled conditions, the therapist might either voluntarily or upon request indicate to the patient his need and possibility of dealing with his guilt immediately, i.e., transmit the "good news" that forgiveness is available. On other occasions the therapist might refer the patient, such as to a pastor. In some instances it is conceivable he may make neither specific step, especially if it is manifest that the patient is already well aware of

such a need and how to meet it. But in *all* cases it is important, at least in my integrated or synthesized concept, that the therapist's entire life be an integrated whole, functioning as a unit and as a healing influence upon the patient in totality—body, mind, soul, spirit, emotions, understanding, etc. This concept is referred to as the holistic or ecological view of man and of therapy. In my opinion not only classification and management of guilt, but also the whole of all therapy should be considered only in this context, anything less being by comparison partial and inadequate if not misleading.

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Biology

IRVING W. KNOBLOCH

The Relationship of the Christian Religion to the College Student

Is a student obligated to have two philosophies, one developed in his church on Sundays with the help of his minister and another developed in his science classes with the aid of his professors? Are there two sets of "truths" and, if so, are these antagonistic, the one to the other? Are there not many students who, faced with an apparent duality, have abandoned their religion and accepted the "certainty" of science in preference to the "uncertainty" of religion?

This particular article is written by a biologist but my views on science and religion would not be endorsed by all scientists. Likewise, if a clergyman were writing on these matters, universal agreement would also be lacking. There are so many possible viewpoints that one can become discouraged. The danger mounts if one becomes dogmatic or if one expresses either too liberal or too conservative a viewpoint. A wise course is for scientists never to write on religious matters and for clergymen never to write on scientific matters. However, the relationship of science to religion is both an interesting and an important subject and must be grappled with by someone. Many attempts along this line have already been made by others and in the space of this short article only some highlights can be given. Although an attempt at objectivity will be made, an unintentional bias may appear; for this, I apologize in advance.

Some of the questions asked by the troubled student are as follows:

1. Is There a God?

   This is a question which neither science nor religion can answer. Apprehension by the senses is impossible in this case, and science can have nothing to say one way or the other. An atheist can deny the existence of a God, but his denial is an act of faith and not of fact. A religious scientist believes in God because it is more logical to believe that an orderly and wonderful universe was ordered by a lawgiver than that everything came into being "all by itself." This latter event, we believe, is improbable.

2. Does God Perform Miracles, and If So, Are These Violations of His Own Laws?

   This is another philosophical question and one very difficult to answer. One seemingly logical position on this is to start by saying that the only kind of a God worth believing in is an omnipotent one. If so, such a God *could* perform miracles. Down through the ages various events have been termed miracles which were subsequently shown to be natural events. After all, a miracle is something we do not understand at all. It also must be remembered that scientists do *not* know all of "Nature's" laws. We are still uncovering relationships only remotely dreamed of 50 years ago. Some miracles, then, may be workings of undiscovered laws. However, the person who believes in an omnipotent God can see nothing wrong in an extrapolation of natural law for some special purpose.

3. Did God Make the Solar System in Six Days or Did it Evolve?

   Not only could books be written on this point alone, but there is little hope of answering the question satisfactorily. Some devout Christians feel that the Bible specifically states a six-day creation and that this automatically rules out evolution. Others are not so sure. One can flatly state that an omnipotent God *could* have made the entire Universe in six days or six seconds. Another "fact" is that change seems to be one of the characterstics of both the organic and the inorganic world. There are organisms here which probably did not exist even fifty years ago, and many species formerly here are no longer with us. A good deal has been learned about evolution since the Greeks proposed the idea and about speciation since Darwin turned his talents to the question. It is becoming increasingly apparent that while speciation (the formation of new species by mutation, hybridization, etc.) is a "fact," evolution, in the phylogenetic sense,

is *not* a fact. Scientists know that most of the phyla were established by the Cambrian period and if *phylogenetic* evolution occurred, it came about *before* the Cambrian. The Theory of Evolution is a grand concept and one that the working scientist must adopt. However, aside from the speciation angle, much in it must be taken on faith. It does seem logical to the Christian that God played some part in the formation of the Universe, but the exact methodology is uncertain.

4. How Can a Student Believe in a Flat, 6000-Year-Old Earth?

   Some critics of the Bible delight in pointing out certain figurative passages which speak of the "four corners of the earth." We use the same expression nowadays. Other passages which infer a sphericity are ignored. The Bible does not state that the earth is flat, nor does it say how old it is. Any figures printed in the margin of the Bible are interpretations, and it is always very important to distinguish between unequivocable statements and interpretations. It seems likely that a God worth believing in is also omniscient and therefore any statements in the Bible which *seem* to contradict the *proven facts* of science are either translator's or copyist's errors.

5. How Old Is Man and Is He an Animal?

   There is a growing conviction that man is older than formerly thought. Some place him in the ice age said to prevail *about* 500,000 years ago, and he *may* have been in existence before that time. The general trend in modern research is to push origins backwards as more information comes in.

   No longer are the early periods of pre-history said to be characterized with exclusively simple forms of life. The Cambrian, for example, has examples of all of the phyla except some soft-bodied ones. However, the Christian student must bear in mind that man himself is not a homogeneous organism. There are a number of races. Some human beings look animal-like while others resemble ancient Greek philosophers. Some of us are relatively good, and some of us are vile. Our vileness may be due to sin or it may be due to our animal inheritance. No one really knows.

   The evidence from anthropologists on man's pedigree is contradictory. The present belief is that man did not come from any present-day primate but that both had a common ancestor. Thus the idea of a missing link has been largely abandoned. Science has not *proved* as yet that man arose from a sub-human ancestor. If a Christian wishes to believe that God created man directly, he can do so on faith and science cannot contradict him.

   There are many devout Christians who believe that phylogenetic evolution is the law of life and that man arose from pre-human ancestors by evolutionary processes. These people also believe in the Doctrine of Redemption and have adjusted their thinking to take in both of these concepts. This can be done, but neither side can quote any proof from science.

   The question as to whether man is an animal or not has been partially answered above. His anatomy suggests that of an animal, but whether his anatomy came about through evolutionary change from a pre-human, or whether God built his body on a plan similar to that of the higher animals for reasons of efficiency, will not be known, at least for some time.

Conclusions

Some fundamentalists will think that this article was written by a liberal, and some liberals will call me a fundamentalist. This is the price one has to pay for considering both sides of a question. Some students will be disappointed in not having a definite philosophy outlined which they can follow verbatim. However, while we know a great deal about nature, there *are* unanswered questions. Archaeological science has verified much that is written in the Bible. Biological matters are a slightly different thing. Science has not disproven the Bible, nor has science made it obsolete. It has, however, made untenable certain interpretations that some people hold *about* the Bible. If these interpretations are corrected, no permanent damage should result to one's faith.

Well-rounded scientists (and there are many who are not) realize that much of science rests on faith of one kind or another and that some of the questions asked above are still outside the realm of empirical science. There is no need for the Christian student to panic in the face of mounting scientific discoveries. One would be well advised to continue reading and probing, to keep an open mind, and, above all, to avoid dogmatism, particularly the kind that says that everything old is bad and everything new is good. After all, what is *really true* in science cannot be antagonistic to what is *really true* in religion because both science and religion are components of one world.

Note: The above essay is a chapter of a projected book. Dr. Knobloch will appreciate additional thoughts as well as corrections for that chapter. Please correspond directly with him at the Dept. of Botany, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Mich.

Sociology: A Defense

PART IV

RUSSELL HEDDENDORF

The degree to which a science can be truly "scientific" is largely dependent upon the cultural background of the scientists and their audience. When analysis is motivated by the vested interest of either of these groups, there is a tendency to subjectivity and the formation of value judgments.

Early American sociologists were largely of mid-western religious stock with strong ethnocentrism and an emphasis on moral principles and the use of sociology for the advancement of social movements. The introduction of Max Weber's works was highly influential in stressing a science which was free of value judgments. A period followed in which it was felt that all social phenomena could be quantified and analyzed by means of precise methodological tools. Although "super-empiricism" is no longer in vogue and a middle of the road approach is being achieved, an audience for sociological insights has been created. The danger in the field is that needs of the new clients of industry, government, and other influential power groups will once again direct studies in paths which are subjectively oriented.

The question being raised here deals with the extent to which contemporary sociology provides a methodological ground to which the Christian may fruitfully apply himself. Is it possible for him to develop data which have broad moral implications and are not merely isolated social quantities without value? At the other extreme, can he ignore the general values prevalent among his colleagues and the values held by the broad range of clients interested in sociological data today? The main orientation in this column, therefore, will deal with methodology, since a science can only be as objective as the tools with which it must work.

A word of caution, however, would limit the field under observation. The Christian must be concerned with tools which are theory oriented. He deals with a model which is often quite different from that which is in common focus. His referents must be constantly conceptualized to test their "fit" into the model. The bulk of sociological methodology today is non-theory oriented, consisting primarily of technical skills in interviewing, scale analysis, and questionnaire formation. For the purpose of convenience, such material is not being considered here.

Functional Analysis

Perhaps it would be more precise to say that we are concerned with methods of analysis in sociology. This term implies dividing the subject matter into parts which have a particular relationship to one another rather than the empirical data-gathering implied in the term methodology. The formation of a system has helped to develop the necessary concepts and models which are directing the field at present.

Identified with sociological analysis is the functional viewpoint.[1] The purpose of functionalism is the same as that of any science; to describe a system and its parts. Both the strength and inherent weakness of this approach is the attempt to consider the requirements to be met by the functioning part. The extent to which such requirements may be stated is a question much discussed by sociologists. The significant point is that such an attempt stresses the possible efficiency of a system, regardless of moral questions.

Such a view is important for contemporary religion, which must go beyond mere moralizing. Too much of modern theology is centered in society and man and not in God. In many areas, there continues the earlier belief that the perfection of social conditions is the ultimate object of religion. In contrast, the Christian anthropologist has shown that the missionary cannot be primarily concerned with his own interpretation of morality on the mission field.[2] The question is whether that which is being dealt with is an ultimate or relative value. Functional analysis allows for the separation of these two concepts into their respective places and the relationship they bear to the total.

On the other hand, the question is also whether the influence of God can be of any effect in such a system which is, ultimately, non-moralistic.[3] Essentially, it is a teleological question. Functional analysis could elucidate the consequence of some action beyond that which was immediately intended. The consequence would be referred to as a latent function or dysfunction and classified as the product of the working of unforeseeable social forces. Assuming then that some action is intended to have consequences which are non-moral, it is possible for moral consequences to result latently. The Christian would hold that such data are consistent with his model of a system controlled by God who imposes Himself into the system and modifies it according to His will. Although the secular analyst would explain latency as non-teleological, the Christian model can provide an ultimate purpose, thereby freeing it of any need to be moralistic in the immediate consequences.

Theories of the Middle Range

Such theories in contemporary sociology are an attempt to deal with problems on a level of abstraction which is not so broad as to be incapable of conceptualization and yet not so concrete as to lose theoretical relevance.[4] The area encompassed by such theories includes a common meeting ground on which ideologies which are often divergent, such as Christianity and sociology, may meet with a minimum of hair-splitting over isolated cases and a maximum of communication. Such results are often difficult to achieve on the broad level

of "general theory," which is usually little more than subjective philosophizing.

Perhaps the best synthesizing agent for a brief discussion here is what the Christian refers to as sin. There is little doubt that a social scientist would agree that the effects of what would be called sin are quite apparent in our society. There are strong moral implications here as well as statistical data on crime which would substantiate this agreement. Hence, the social consequences of sin would be generally accepted.

The point of disagreement would be centered in the origins of sin. While the social scientist would refer it back to social disorganization, the Christian must see it in terms of human depravity. As stated in the previous article of this series, the encouraging thing for the Christian is that his defense becomes stronger as the socially deterministic image of man becomes more untenable. The problem of origin results in the problem of meaning. What is sin, and how is it to be conceptualized? The Christian cannot reconceptualize sin. As a sociologist, however, it is possible for him to seek the data which would refine the meanings of individual responsibility and authority, thereby lending credence to the Christian definition.

On the other hand, the Christian must be able to understand the meaning of sin sufficiently well to allow him to apply it to our society. The requirement of middle-range theory is to find those indicators which will identify the absoluteness of sin and its consequences in our relative society. It is this level of finding common indices of concrete phenomena and their abstractions which is most profitable for the development of a clear understanding of the relationship between them and the supporting ideologies.

"Verstehen" Analysis

The nature of sociological analysis permits the use of a method which would be less appropriate when dealing with non-human referents in a more mature discipline. The analytical procedure of "Verstehen" refers to the subjective perception of the meaning of human action and is claimed by many as a legitimate source of sociological knowledge.[5] Indeed, the initial support given to the concept by Max Weber was sufficient to make it acceptable in the field.

The concept is based on the assumption that if empirical thought is based on observation, then actual experience of the social phenomena by the individual would provide empirical knowledge of its existence. Although "Verstehen" is not a method of verification, it provides the basis for the belief that the stated explanation of the phenomena is a possible one, though not necessarily the true causal one. Simply, "Verstehen" allows the Christian to claim validity for his religious experience; he has experienced it. It must then be given consideration as a possible means of explaining social phenomena.

At this point of sociological development, there is little more that could be done. Even the most sophisticated theoretical models cannot be proven with adequate reliability. The lack of appropriate tools makes the testing of such hypotheses as may be derived by "Verstehen" unlikely. At present, then, it seems that the Christian has as much to contribute to sociology as the atheist. The question is how he will fare when theoretical systems can be tested and discarded or modified until the valid one is found. The challenge will be there and it will be met if Christian sociology is no longer on the defensive.

[1]Kingsley, Davis, "The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology," *American Sociological Review,* Vol. 24, December 1959.

[2]For a particularly lucid description of this topic, see David Moberg, "Cultural Relativity and Christian Faith," *Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation,* Vol. 14, June 1962.

[3]For an excellent defense of the ultimate and moral bases of values in the Christian frame, see William Kolb, "Values, Positivism, and the Functional Theory of Religion," *Social Forces,* Vol. 31, May 1953.

[4]Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1949), pp. 5-10.

[5]The best secondary sources for study of the concept are Theodore Abel, "The Operation Called 'Verstehen,'" *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. 54, 1948, and Peter Munch, "Empirical Science and Max Weber's 'Verstehende Soziologie,'" *American Sociological Review,* Vol. 22, 1957.

BOOK REVIEWS

A Word from the New Book Review Editor

Under new editorial policies for the JASA, the Book Review section is being expanded in several different ways. For one thing, more books will be reviewed than in the past. The editor of this section has begun contacting publishers more or less systematically, describing the types of books we wish to review. In general, publishers of relevant books are very cooperative when told of the size and select nature of JASA readership. Secondly, we expect to widen the circle of reviewers steadily, to include more and more ASA members in this capacity. Already several members whose writing has not previously appeared in JASA have expressed willingness to review books touching on their fields and of interest to other readers of this Journal. Finally, we hope to expand in the thoroughness of our coverage of books most directly related to the objects of ASA, including those that may have been missed in the past. We hope to provide full reviews of *all* books dealing directly with the encounter between science and Christian faith.

In addition to primary reviews of that type, we intend to carry as many reviews as possible of books in the following categories, if the book refers to the science-

faith encounter, *or* if the reviewer can indicate an implicit relation to that encounter:

(1) History, philosophy, or sociology of science.
(2) Physical science, biology, anthropology, evolution, psychology, etc.
(3) Theology, apologetics, philosophy of religion.
(4) Current social issues of mutual concern to Christians and social scientists, such as the impact of technology on society, world peace, racial tensions, etc.
(5) Particular problems of evangelical Christianity, denominational colleges, etc.
(6) Particular problems of scientists as researchers, university professors, college teachers, high school teachers, etc.

Special attention will be given those books which may become authoritative by virtue of an author's distinction, or to have wide circulation (as book club selections)—but also to more obscure books of value which our readers might otherwise miss. Short reviews or notices and occasional full reviews of books in other categories will also appear:

(7) Summary of a specialized field written for non-specialists. (Particularly paperbacks on science, philosophy, or theology)
(8) Biography of scientists, especially those expressing religious conviction.
(9) Fiction dealing with scientists or with science-and-faith.
(10) Children's books in the sciences, including career guidance, if atheistic, agnostic, or atheistic bias is expressed.
(11) Science textbooks written for seminaries or Christian schools.
(12) Sunday School literature dealing with the science-faith encounter.

Finally, we would like to *list* in this section all new books written by ASA members, as they appear in print, and to review any which are related to the object of ASA. Significant reviews published elsewhere, particularly those written by members or concerning books written by members, will occasionally be reprinted.

Members of ASA and other readers thus can help in many ways to make this section more valuable and complete. Suggestions of books you would be willing to review or would like to see reviewed, references to published book reviews which should be reprinted in JASA, notices of publication of books by ASA members, and all other correspondence related to the Book Review section may be directed to the section editor at this address:

Dr. Walter R. Hearn
Dept. of Biochemistry & Biophysics
Iowa State University
Ames, Iowa

Comments, criticisms, and corrections are always welcome. Procedures and policies may change from time to time as a result of experience. Unsigned reviews and comments in this section may be presumed to be written by the book review editor.

* * *

Every professor has heard that "Those who can, do; those who can't, teach." Among writers this saying takes the form, "Those who can, write; those who can't, edit." To show that this dictum does not apply to the new Editor of the JASA, we begin our tenancy in this position with two reviews of one of his recently published books. A single review would probably make the point just as well, but since one review is more critical than the other, we can demonstrate that, within the bounds of critical judgment and good taste, our reviewers have full freedom of the press. If an author feels that a book is dealt with unfairly by a reviewer, he may offer a criticism of the review for publication as a Letter to the Editor. In this case, of course, it would be a Letter *from* the Editor as well.—*W. R. H.*

The Church As A Social Institution: The Sociology of American Religion, by David O. Moberg. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1962. 569 pp., trade $10; text $7.50.

Described on the jacket as "a systematic interdisciplinary approach to the sociology of religion in America," this book is an invaluable asset to the serious student of the contemporary religious situation. It is a massive compendium of data, organized in a schematic unity and readily accessible by means of a 48-page index. The encyclopedic nature of this survey is indicated by the hundreds of articles and monographs cited in more than 1,400 footnotes. It is unlikely that any significant modern contribution to the field has been overlooked.

This is a book for not only the scholar, however. In spite of constant reference to technical studies and the employment of sociological methodology, Moberg's writing is neither pedantic nor cumbersome. The non-specialist who is seriously interested in the church should find it readable, informative, and possibly disconcerting, if he has not been previously exposed to this sort of dispassionate analysis of the "sacred." When Moberg states in his preface that he writes "neither to lampoon nor to laud the church," but "to present a balanced picture of the church as a social institution," he means just that. Very rarely does the reader catch a glimpse of the author's personal value-judgment on the manifold aspects of church life which he presents.

In Part I, an introductory chapter, Moberg sets forth his frame of reference. Sociologically, the key to understanding the church is *organization;* "church" is defined to cover all instances "in which people have established some form of functioning and continuing organization to serve their religious needs and purposes." The sources and methods employed come under the rubric of *institutional analysis;* they include demographic, ecological, typological, case study, structural-functional, socio-psychological, and logical-theoretical approaches.

Part II begins with a presentation of statistical and interpretive data on the demography and ecology of the American religious scene. Then follows a suggestive discussion of social and religious norms, beliefs, and values, and of religious symbolism. This chapter, like the first, is more theoretical than other sections of the book and offers a number of valuable insights into the interplay of religious and secular value-systems. It could be wished that the author, having focused the issues,

might have attempted a general analytical statement on the function of religion in society.

The meaning, development, modification, and heuristic value of the Weber-Troeltsch church-sect typology form the backbone of Part III. After a survey of the relevant literature, Moberg discusses the social sources of religious movements and formulates a life cycle pattern for plotting the natural history of the church as a social institution. A lack of precision in distinguishing between church as "denomination" and as "local congregation" makes the elaboration of this five-stage cycle somewhat ambiguous.

The largest section, and certainly one of the book's most valuable contributions, is Part IV on the social functions and dysfunctions of the church. With clarity and conciseness, Moberg explains the rationale and method of functional analysis, adapted from Merton, Parsons, and others. He goes on to delineate the social functions of the church; attention is given to its role in socialization, in social control and reform, in providing solidarity and stability. Recognition of mutual sanctions and interdependence of church and society in America continues through the discussion of social, recreational, esthetic, economic, and ethical-moral functions. Numerous activities commonly regarded as "purely religious" are revealed as largely social in nature. Doubtless many readers unacquainted with functional theory will find this section an eye-opener, particularly if they have held to a rigid separation of "church" and "world."

Moberg also notes the changing functions of the church in an increasingly differentiated society, particularly the loss of many charitable, educational, and therapeutic functions to secular agencies. In this context, he allows himself one of the few evaluative or predictive statements in the book: "As a more specialized institution, the church may direct the spiritual welfare of mankind more effectively than when it was expected to be the direct agent of society in numerous realms of life."

Informative chapters on educational and missionary activities of the church follow. Extensive documentation and discussion of the ethnocentric and nationalistic aspects of missionary work affords opportunity for sober reflection on the actual situation of Christian missions in today's world.

Part V is a survey of the social processes of cooperation and conflict, both within the church and between the church and the rest of society. The creative possibilities of conflict are noted, as are the serious dysfunctional effects for both the church and the social order. An extensive discussion of interfaith conflict (Protestant-Catholic-Jewish) concludes with helpful suggestions for reducing tensions.

Of particular interest for ASA members are the sections on the fundamentalist-modernist controversy and the conflict of science and religion. Moberg rightly rejects a one-dimensional (doctrinal) view of the conflict over modernism and notes nine contributing social factors, including the advance in scientific knowledge, rural-urban tensions, the need for socio-psychological compensation, and the struggle for power among leaders. A discerning observation has to do with the hyper-rationalism of the extreme fundamentalist approach to Scripture, that is, a materialistic notion of truth which is in itself derived from the scientific method which the fundamentalist fears!

The science-religion controversy is seen as the conflict of "two different normative systems which have two different theories of knowledge, two different approaches to reality, two different methods of extending knowledge, and two different attitudes of mind." Moberg presents an illuminating ten-point typology of science and religion, with the suggestion that these contrasts (inductive-deductive, natural-supernatural, determinist-voluntarist, objective-value-weighed, etc.) actually allow for a complementary, rather than a contradictory, relationship. There are moral aspects to scientific method—intellectual honesty, love of truth, self-discipline, humility—but science is finally limited to telling us what *is*, not what *ought* to be.

The remaining chapters deal with the church in relation to the family, to government, to social problems (race, mental illness, crime, etc.), and with analysis of church membership and participation, conversion and revivalism, and the clergy. These discussions continue the same high level of organization and presentation of multitudinous data which characterizes the whole volume.

A concluding chapter deals with a question which may have troubled readers from the beginning: After this thorough scientific scrutiny, what is left of the church as a divine institution? Or as Moberg puts it: Is the church unique? His answer: "The uniqueness of the church does not lie . . . in its social characteristics. Its social functions, structures, and processes are shared with other institutions . . . It is only by an act of faith that modern man can accept the tenet that the church is a special institution ordained by God and established in a unique manner." The book closes with a plea for comprehensive sociological self-understanding in order that the church may be effective in the modern world.

Whether laymen or specialists, we are indebted to David Moberg for the considerable results of his labors. This book will serve as both introduction and reference source for a long time to come. The author wisely limited himself to an overview of the contemporary American scene, leaving historical, anthropological, and cross-cultural approaches to other workers.

Although it borders on ingratitude to expect more than has been given in this compendium, I was somewhat frustrated by the rather indiscriminate reporting of numerous studies of varying quality, and incorporation of research findings with little attempt at evaluation from a consistent point of view. But to expect critical comment on the wealth of data presented would be to condemn the author to a lifetime of servitude; we

must recognize as he does that sociology is something of an art, as well as a science, and be willing to involve ourselves in the discipline of critical creativity.

Reviewed by J. R. Burkholder, doctoral candidate in Religion and Society, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

* * *

Friends of the ASA who have read David Moberg's articles will find in this new book the thoroughness which they would expect. His scholarship, documentation, organization and concern for detail is impressive. His writing is lucid and flows naturally from one topic to the next. This is a book from which much may be learned.

Moberg limits the field under view and stays within the designated bounds. Designed for a broad audience, the book is undoubtedly of great value for the layman interested in the American church. "As a survey of the sociology of American religion", Moberg indicates his desire to record the facts as studies have shown them to exist. There is no attempt to develop a new theoretical approach to the problems at hand. The book is particularly valuable because of its objectivity; it is scientific and interdisciplinarian in outlook.

For two related reasons, however, this could not be called a text on the subject. As Moberg states, the book is "concerned with the church and does not attempt to survey the entire field of the sociology of religion." Undoubtedly, merely for lack of space, much of significance had to be omitted. Nevertheless, the book gives the impression that the church *is* religion, leaving little room for an individual relationship with God. It is this narrow definition of the sociology of religion which seems to me to be the chief weakness of the work.

Certainly, much of American religion is "organized" and manifests itself through church forms. I would not, however, agree with Moberg that the church is an institution. By establishing the church as the frame of reference, all roles, values, goals, and activities to which he refers are made subsidiary to the organization. The church becomes the intermediary. By taking the Durkheimian approach that religion has an integrative function and an origin in religious action and unity, one must then doubt the prevalence, or even the existence, of a personal relationship with God. The emphasis is put upon the social and not the individual needs which are met by society. Perhaps the chapter most highly oriented to the needs of the individual is the one entitled "Religious Conversion and Revivalism." A typical statement here is as follows: "Repentance and faith, turning from sin and to God, are not merely philosophical or theological concepts. They involve group identification to such an extent that 'loving the brethren' is given in the New Testament as a necessary indication of possessing eternal life." (I John 3:14; 4:7-12)

The stated viewpoint of this book is perfectly legitimate. The question is whether the model adequately portrays the facts. Certainly Durkheim has been criticized by many authorities. There is, in this reviewer's opinion, a growing tendency in the field to present a model based upon a disintegrative or at least a non-integrative function of religion which stresses the needs of the individual rather than society.

The previous criticism of the definition of the church as an institution is a problem in semantics with which sociologists are constantly involved. The title and subtitle do not seem to be correct in their conceptualization. Moberg makes a valid attempt to redefine the church by stating that it is "synonymous with 'organized religion.' " This statement would seem to be in keeping with current terminology, since it would allow religion to be defined as an institution (rules organizing statuses and roles so that the purposes of the group and individual may be realized) and the church as an association (a limited set of interests which people feel they may obtain by concerted action).

An accurate evaluation of this book can be made only when it is realized that the author has circumscribed his approach and made little attempt at rigorous use of definitions and concepts; within the thus-defined area of the sociology of religion, this is probably the most complete work available.

Reviewed by Russell Heddendorf, Instructor of Sociology, Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa.

A Structure of Science, by Joseph H. Simons, Philosophical Library, New York, 1960. 269 pp. $4.75.

This is a relatively short book of 28 chapters, clearly written and at a level which should be understandable to most people. The first part of nine chapters deals with the meaning, extent, growth, and place of science, and discusses the subdivisions of science. Concepts such as matter, force, inertia, potential, orderliness, conservation, chance, and so forth are treated in the second part. The third part is entitled "A Tidy Universe" and has material on impacts of objects, affinite quantities, collisions, and similar topics. Little reference to religion is made in this book; the author believes that science and religion deal with different phenomena and therefore do not overlap to any serious extent.

Reviewed by Irving W. Knobloch, Professor of Botany, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Mich.

Obituary

Carl S. Wise

Carl S. Wise, 53, a member of the ASA for many years and a research chemist employed by the U. S. Department of Agriculture for the last 16 years, died in Peoria, Illinois, on June 6, 1962. He had been in ill health for some time and was admitted to the hospital four days previous to his death.

He was born November 18, 1908, in Salt Lake City, Utah, a son of George C. and Marcia Allbee Wise. He married Beulah Dawson on June 10, 1944, at Gilmore City, Iowa. He is survived by his wife, a son, William D., and a daughter, Sue Ellen, residing at their home, 1911 North Bigelow St., in Peoria. Also surviving is his father in Muscatine, Iowa. One brother preceded him in death.

Carl Wise attended Parsons College (Iowa) and received his bachelor's degree from Alma College (Michigan) and his master's from the University of Michigan in 1932. He was a Purdue University Research Foundation fellow in 1936. From 1937 to 1939 he taught natural science at Tabor (Iowa) Junior College and then became Head of the Chemistry Department at William Penn College, Oskaloosa, Iowa. During World War II he served in the Air Force from 1942 to 1943 and at the U. S. ordnance plant at Burlington, Iowa, until 1945. In addition to the ASA, he held memberships in the American Chemical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

In 1946, he began his work at what is now known as the Northern Utilization Research and Development Division of the U.S.D.A.'s Agricultural Research Service, still called the "Northern Regional Lab" or just the "Peoria Lab" among agricultural chemists. As an analytical chemist working in the field of carbohydrates, he developed methods for the paper chromatography and analysis of sugars that have been followed ever since. His work was important in the development of dextran, a medically useful blood volume expander. In 1955 he was cited as a member of the research team that received the Department of Agriculture's Distinguished Service Award. His most recent research was devoted to liquid-liquid extraction of chemicals derived from dialdehyde starch, now produced industrially by a low-cost method developed in the Peoria laboratory and potentially a partial answer to the grain surplus problem. His scientific papers and a patent resulting from his assigned work are as follows:

Improved Techniques in Paper Chromatography of Carbohydrates. Allene Jeanes, C. S. Wise, and R. J. Dimler. *Anal. Chem.* **25, 415 (1951).**

Quantitative Paper Chromatography of D-Glucose and Its Oligosaccharides. R. J. Dimler, W. C. Schaefer, C. S. Wise, and C. E. Rist. *Anal. Chem.* 24, 1411 (1952).

Determination of Easily Hydrolyzable Fructose Units in Dextran Preparations. C. S. Wise, R. J. Dimler, H. A. Davis, and C. E. Rist. *Anal. Chem.* 27, 33 (1955).

Removal of Silicates from Solutions of Sugars such as Isomaltose and Isomaltotriose. R. W. Jones, R. J. Dimler, and C. S. Wise. *Anal. Chem.* **28,** 1352 (1956).

Colorimetric Method for Determining Dialdehyde Content of Periodate-Oxidized Starch. C. S. Wise and C. L. Mehltretter. *Anal. Chem.* 30, 174 (1958).

An Electrolytic Process for Making Sodium Metaperiodate. C. L. Mehltretter and C. S. Wise. *Ind. Eng. Chem.* 51, 511-514. (1951).

A Rapid Colorimetric Method for Determining Glyoxal. C. S. Wise, C. L. Mehltretter, and J. W. Van Cleve. *Anal. Chem.* 31, 1214-1242 (1959).

Process for Separation of Sodium Metaperiodate from Sodium Sulfate. C. L. Mehltretter and C. S. Wise, U. S. 2,989,371. June 20, 1961.

His interest in the profession of chemistry went far beyond his work in the laboratory. Completely outside of working hours, he prepared and wrote about a punched card coding system that received wide recognition. For his efforts in this field he was appointed a member of the American Chemical Society's Punched-Card Committee on Scientific Aids for Literature Searching in 1948 and served until 1955 when the committee was discharged. His publications in this field are:

Multiple Coding and the Rapid Selector. *American Documentation* 1, 76 (1950).

Multiple Word Coding vs. Random Coding for the Rapid Selector. *American Documentation* 3, 223 (1952).

A Punched-Card File Based on Word Coding. Chapter 6 in *Punched Cards,* ed. by R. S. Casey, J. W. Perry, A. Kent, and M. Berry. Reinhold Publishing Corporation. New York. 1st ed., 1951; 2nd ed., 1958.

Mathematical Analysis of Coding Systems. Chapter 20 in *ibid.*

As a Christian, Carl Wise was described by those who knew him best as devout, intense, and strong-minded. He was an outstanding Bible student who carried a Greek New Testament with him and studied it with a scholarly interest in the message conveyed by the original language. Christian laboratory colleagues considered him to be an inspiration to other Christians when they were studying the Bible. Extremely conservative in his theological views, he was disturbed by a number of trends in denominational affairs and frequently found himself in disagreement with others in his own denomination. He was a member of Arcadia Presbyterian Church, Peoria, from 1946 to 1960, and of Grace Presbyterian Church, Peoria, from 1950 to 1954, when he left to form a Bible Presbyterian Church in a suburb of Peoria.

At the Eighth Annual Convention of the ASA at Winona Lake, Ind., September 1-3, 1953, he read a paper entitled "The Bible and Physical Research," later published in the JASA, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 21-23 (March, 1954). This paper shows something of his approach to problems of science and Scripture at that time, especially his feeling that positive correlations are to be found between secondary meanings of Scripture passages and the results of modern scientific research. He felt, for example, that in addition to being a message of comfort to the remnant of Israel, Jeremiah

31:37 was also in agreement with the famous Michelson-Morley ether-drift experiment. A number of other ASA members in attendance at that convention disagreed with this approach and argued that Wise was discovering pseudo-correlations and overlooking major problems; a lively discussion followed his paper in the best ASA tradition. In his paper, reference is made to a series of letters to the editor published in *Science* in 1951 and 1952, and to another series published in *Scientific Monthly* in 1953, in each of which Wise replied to an earlier correspondent's assertion of scientific inaccuracies in Scripture verses. The first series dealt with references in the Bible to the shape of the earth; part of Wise's reply was published under the title, "Bible Doesn't Support Flat Earth Theory," in *Science Digest,* 29, 91 (May, 1951). The latter series dealt with the value of pi in II Chronicles 4:2 and I Kings 7:23, Wise pointing out in his rejoinder that the ratio of the stated 30-cubit circumference of Solomon's "molten sea" to its 10-cubit diameter gave a value of pi accurate enough to one or two significant figures.

* * *

Preparing or even reading an obituary account can make one look at his life from a different perspective. Is there any way to tell, while we are yet living, where the emphasis in our lives should be placed? What will others consider to be our major contributions? Some practical discovery that proves useful in a rapidly changing world? Some new insight or technique that paves the way for further scientific work? The investment of our personal lives as parents, neighbors, teachers, friends to others? Communication of the Gospel of Jesus Christ to those who are lost without Him? If all these things are valuable, and *possible* for us to do, shall we try to do them *all,* or should we concentrate our effort in the hope of doing any one of them more effectively? Whether or not Christians have access to more certain answers to these questions, we at least should have an advantage over some of our colleagues in being able to look ahead to our own physical death calmly and perhaps more gracefully.

Life is short and the responsibility for using it well lies heavy upon us; to settle for good the question of our ultimate commitment is a liberating experience, bringing "New Life" to a Christian in more ways than one. And if devoting our life to God seems to mean taking on the gravest possible responsibility, at least we can be less frantic about each day's decisions. If we served "humanity," we would find the conflicting demands made upon us as variable as all mankind; if we chose to serve ourselves, we would also find our taskmaster changing constantly as we "strut and fret our hour upon the stage" between birth and death. We serve not ourselves, nor merely others, but the Unchanging One, Creator and Redeemer, the Alpha and Omega.

"None of us lives to himself, and none of us dies to himself. If we live, we live to the Lord, and if we die, we die to the Lord; so then, whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's. For to this end Christ died and lived again, that he might be Lord both of the dead and of the living. Why do you pass judgment on your brother? Or you, why do you despise your brother? For we shall all stand before the judgment seat of God; for it is written, 'As I live, says the Lord, every knee shall bow to me, and every tongue shall give praise to God.' So each of us shall give account of himself to God." (Romans 14:7-12, RSV)

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Letters to the Editor

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

I was very interested to read the rebuttal by Dwight Ericsson (JASA, 14, 77, Sep. 1962) of my article on "New Testament Christianity and the Morality of Capital Punishment" (JASA, 13, 114, Dec. 1961). I am convinced that this subject is one of greatest intricacy and am not prepared to make a dogmatic pronouncement of the infallibility of the position which I have presented. There are, however, certain profound difficulties raised by the viewpoint advocated by Ericsson which to my mind transcend the immediate question of capital punishment and are therefore worthy of being called to readers' attention.

(1) The implication that New Testament Christianity is not solidly rooted in Old Testament Judaism. Ericsson points out that my article, which claimed to present the New Testament view on capital punishment contained only five quotations from the New Testament as compared to thirty-four from the Old Testament. He comments, "This hardly sounds like a discussion of 'New Testament Christianity'!" The argument that the New Testament, or Christian if you will, teaching on a given subject is not properly derived from a full and proper consideration of both Testaments (the Old Testament is almost four times the length of the New) is one that must be examined with some care if our attitude toward the Bible as the Word of God is not to be changed appreciably.

(2) The implication that Jesus, in speaking of His coming to fulfill the Law, really meant to say that which "amounts, for all practical purposes, to abolishing the Old Testament law code." Yet that very passage seems to indicate something quite different. "Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets:

I am not come to destroy but to fulfill. For verily I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one title shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled. Whosoever therefore shall break one of these least commandments, and shall teach men so, he shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven; but whosoever shall do and teach them, the same shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven." (Mat. 5:17-19) The stern injunction against breaking these commandments is not immediately compatible with the argument that Jesus really meant to abolish them. This is all the more true when Ericsson argues that Jesus seemed to repudiate the Noachian law on capital punishment: "And surely your blood of your lives will I require; at the hand of every beast will I require it, and at the hand of man; at the hand of every man's brother will I require the life of man. Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made He man." (Gen. 9:5, 6) The major import of Jesus' teaching in the Sermon on the Mount is to emphasize how the requirements of God are far more strict than the letter of the Mosaic law; to conclude that He repudiated a basic law which predated the whole Mosaic economy is a conclusion which merits some careful consideration.

(3) The implication that a system of principles developed from the teachings of Jesus by the interpretational devices of man should have precedence over other teachings of the Scriptures. Ericsson would lead us to believe that the teachings of Jesus on the supremacy of love as the only true way to fulfil the law should lead us to the conviction that "the stress in treatment of criminals ought not to be on punishment but on rehabilitation . . . Restraints . . . should be used . . . for the sake of society, not for the punishment of such men." We can certainly agree with the *principle* here, but then to jump to the conclusion that the execution of punishment is contrary to Christianity causes one to wonder how to interpret: ". . . for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil" (Rom. 13:4), or "Submit yourselves . . . unto governors, as unto them that are sent by Him for the punishment of evildoers." (I Pet. 2:14) There is a need to carefully evaluate how far we are going to allow interpreting Scripture by Scripture to become using Scripture to explain away Scripture.

(4) The implication that the criminal may not really be guilty. Ericsson argues, "In many cases, the criminal tendencies of an individual are not his fault, but are an inevitable result of his environment . . . Is it fair to punish man for something that is not his fault? This has the unfortunate ring of shifting the guilt of sin on to God, for what else is the "inevitable result of his environment" except an alternate way of saying the "predestinating influence of God"? Ericsson's question was raised already in the early days of the New Testament and the apostle Paul tried to answer it by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. (Rom. 9:19-21) Perhaps it is not an answer which is satisfying to our human emotions, but it is there in the New Testament; we dare not simply ignore it.

(5) The implication that there is no difference between personal and institutional responsibility. In formulating the Principle of the Second Chance, Ericsson implies that it is intended for immediate application both to personal and to institutional (or social) relationships. The individual is indeed bound to forgive one who wrongs him, regardless even of whether the guilty one is repentant. The same relationships cannot be simply ascribed to the state, which Scripture clearly teaches to be the God-ordained minister for the execution of "wrath upon him that doeth evil" (Rom. 13:4) and "for the punishment of evildoers" (I Pet. 2:14). The whole problem of the relationship between personal and group responsibilities is a knotty one; it cannot be dispensed with by ignoring it.

After all these negative comments, let me say in conclusion that the emphasis which Ericsson provides is surely much needed. Christians must feel and take responsibility for the rehabilitation of those who have sinned both against God and against man. They are the bearers of the Gospel, of the promise of abundant life in Jesus Christ. Readers of this journal should take both papers treating this subject and review them side by side in the light of the brief comments made in this letter. What is the God-pleasing way of combining the great teachings of love and forgiveness, with the awesome revelation of God as a God of holiness and righteousness, who has committed to men both the ministration of the Gospel and the ministration of justice in His name?

Richard H. Bube
789 Holly Oak Drive
Palo Alto, Calif.

Dwight Ericsson's treatment of capital punishment . . . rests on a very superficial understanding of Matthew 5 as it relates to various Old Testament passages . . . a deeper study of that chapter in Matthew can be recommended . . . I suggest Harris, *Inspiration and Canonicity of the Bible,* Zondervan, pp. 45-61.

Rev. A. R. Paashaus
Firth, Nebr.

CHRISTIAN PSYCHIATRY

Although I probably qualify as a student—I am a fourth year resident in Child Psychiatry—I feel that the dues of the ASA have been so modest and so disproportionate to value received from the Journal alone that raising them nominally as proposed on the grounds given for the new dues schedule is justified . . .

I have especially appreciated recent articles in the Be-

havioral Science field. Everyone writes about the existence of an entity called "Christian Psychiatry," but no one seems to define it! It is to the ASA that I look to provide the leadership to make some sense in this critical area.

William D. Sherman, M. D.
Seattle, Wash.

Editorial comment:

Dr. Sherman's question deserves an answer. A related question is whether there indeed is any such entity as a Christian biological science, physical science, or social science. We will welcome brief contributions as well as full-length articles from our readers on this subject.

D. O. M.

EVOLUTION

In regard to editorial policies of the JASA, I think each issue should include editorial comment, which does not need to be limited to comment on the articles in that issue.

One matter, however, deeply concerns me. It is the tendency for the ASA to follow the lead of liberal churches in accepting the interpretation that the evolutionists are correct in describing the development of living things but that God guided the whole process. This is not, as some think, one Christian interpretation; it is not Christian. Evolution is founded upon natural selection through struggle for existence, in which whatever animal *happens* to be more violent or otherwise better fitted to succeed will survive while the others perish. Such a process is—by definition—unguided by God or by any other power.

Such theology seems to be accepted by liberal theologians in order to be intellectually respectable and to avoid a fight. Then they are content to quote authorities instead of looking into the facts. It is well to avoid a fight, *provided there is nothing at stake;* but in this case the belief of children in the Bible is at stake.

Should such articles be published, I suggest that you follow the article with another which states our position of direct and planned creation.

William J. Tinkle
Eaton, Indiana

Editorial comment:

The ASA has no official position on evolution, or any other issue. Can there indeed be any *one* Christian interpretation of Genesis and related passages as long as Christians remain human, hence finite beings who know only in part, seeing things as if "in a glass darkly"?

Furthermore, is it not possible that God may have worked through a biological process of natural selection? Is it possible for the omnipotent Sovereign of the Universe to create through a process? Is He involved only in momentary or sudden fiat acts?

Has anyone made a careful scientific study of the influence of *theistic* evolution on Christian faith as distinct from faith in human interpretations of the Bible?

D. O. M.

"OLE MISS"

Walt Hearn suggested to me that since I am an ASA member teaching at the University of Mississippi, I might want to give other members my impressions of the events related to the riot which took place on our campus last Sunday, September 30. Walt is particularly interested—and he thinks others in the ASA are also interested—in what leadership, if any, Christians have given.

The information I have has been collected over the slightly more than four years I have been on this campus. At that opening faculty meeting four years ago we were told the segregation-integration fight was not ours, but a fight between the state government and the federal government. We were advised rather strongly to teach our subject matter, not to poll students, and not to get into the fight in any way. It seemed clear then that this advice was given because doing any of these things would help the cause of the integrationist; those in power in the state would surely welcome anything which bolstered the argument *for* segregation, no matter how far from his professional duties a staff member might stray. Actually, contrary to this advice some have polled their students every year and they have found students apathetic on the question of the entry of a Negro into the university. This would not be pleasant news for the segregationist.

Over this four year period the "advice" given at that first faculty meeting has been repeated many times and at the same time has been made stronger. A year ago, for example, the faculty were told to be careful even in private conversations. These warnings were made against the background of several small, but meaningful incidents: a law professor is denied tenure because he stated publicly Supreme Court decisions are the law of the land; a colored opera star is not allowed to perform on campus; an entertainer who is discovered to have pro-NAACP leanings is prevented from fulfilling his engagement and so on and on. Because of all these things, tensions have been mounting and as this is being written (Oct. 6), there are many more soldiers than civilians in the Oxford area. Apparently only they can keep the peace.

Why had the "advice" been given? Why has the NAACP made its first serious Mississippi effort at this particular university? I believe the answers to these two questions are related. The white population of Mississippi is not large (about a million) and there is an unbelievably large number of intermarriages generation after generation. These people are related by blood and

culture. However, those among them who are better off economically have apparently decided that the University of Mississippi is the most fashionable of the universities and colleges in the state. But the large majority of the faculty at the University of Mississippi have origins outside the state, many even outside the South. Thus, this is just the faculty that is "dangerous" in the segregationist sense; probably this university is the one place in the state that can "infect" the state with Northern radical (i.e., integration) sentiments by influencing the young of the most prominent families in the state. I am not surprised that the NAACP and the Mississippi aristocracy have met head-on at the University of Mississippi.

Where have the Christians been in this clash? I don't like to say what I must say. Several days before the riot of last Sunday several ministers of the area published a sensible statement urging moderation; most of the evangelically minded ministers did not openly, at least, endorse the statement. On the Sunday morning of the riot one minister urged people to be calm even as he rather brazenly referred to atheistic, socialistic ideas which have infiltrated the state from the outside. On the same morning a prominent evangelical minister used the theme that change in life is inevitable, but it was probably far too tender a treatment to have much effect on the rocks and bullets that were used that evening. I believe he did not say anything about the crisis itself. On the other hand, two ministers I would consider liberals were on the campus during the riot taking rocks out of the hands of rioters.

On the campus itself what little opposition there has been to racist ideas has come largely from professors who would probably not classify themselves as evangelicals. I hope and pray that I am the exception. The faculty is somewhat like the faculty of any Northern university in that respect: there are only a few evangelicals, and those most active in defending civil rights are those who are, in general, less active in church work. Thus, the tension existing between the faculty and the Mississippi whites is not made less when one considers that Protestantism is as strong in this state as it is anywhere. ASA members will be interested to learn that when a group in the state two years ago engaged in a long, public, noisy attack on the university, they found as its worst sins that it taught integration and evolution! My own regrets are that if it *has* been able to teach integration, it has surely been by smuggling, and that it *has* had *no* trouble in teaching evolution.

The center of any integrationist influence on the faculty has been the local chapter of the American Association of University Professors, comprising about one-fourth of the faculty. This group had enough eyewitness evidence of the riot so that it could, three days after the riot, issue a public and widely circulated statement testifying that the mob, not the federal marshals, started the riot. This was an important statement because the state officials have been claiming the reverse. In addition, the statement said that the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court should be obeyed and that everyone should encourage others to obey the law. It is rather sad to consider that these statements, which are hardly stronger than platitudes, will be considered by many to be inflammatory. I am happy to have been one of the signers of this AAUP statement. It is interesting to note that the car of one of the outspoken AAUP members was one of the many destroyed by fire in the riot. What an evangelical student said to me was to the effect that this man had it coming.

This last comment suggests that the deaths and injuries of the riot seem not to have changed people's minds. I fear this is all too true. The university is making an obvious effort to exonerate all but one or two students, even though many persons, and I am one of them, saw hundreds saying and doing threatening things, at least at the beginning of the riot. (Students were not threatened with punishment during either the two-week buildup of tension or the riot itself.) Professors are "encouraged" officially and unofficially by the school administration *not* to make statements like the AAUP statement—probably by far the most daring statement ever proceeding from a faculty group here. There is a tremendous effort being made to minimize what actually happened—"only two people were killed"; "not much damage to university property," etc. Actually, about two hundred were injured and dozens of them were by gunshot wounds. A friend of mine, a professor who was trying to prevent students from destroying a newsman's camera and who was beaten by the students as the state police pulled him away and encouraged the students to continue with the camera, does not feel we should minimize what happened! (This incident took place at the very beginning of the riot before the marshals fought and just before the hundreds of state police were removed from the campus and dozens—perhaps hundreds—of outsiders who were armed entered the campus.) Naturally, in all fairness I should add that state and university policy has not changed the minds of those who are opposed to that policy; the lines are drawn pretty much as they were before the strife.

As a chemist, I have concluded that the social scientists have some tough problems to study! I think I have been living in one of their more interesting laboratories. Please pray for this strife-torn area. We know that men on both sides of the struggle have been attempting solutions made entirely from the mind of man, without God and without the heart-cleansing which they can receive from His Son. We also know this method will not succeed.

Russell Maatman
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