>Chris
>I agree with the basic point made here, also. However, I don't think there
>is much point to seeking to find scientific evidence for their God, unless
>they can somehow define how there could be scientific evidence for *God* as
>distinguished from evidence for, say, alien beings who make universes like
>ours (out of existing substance) via technological means for their science
>classes, etc.
Well, if this alien being did everything that their God is supposed to do,
then for all practical purposes it would be a God. If it looks like a God
and quacks like a God...
A super-powerful alien being wouldn't have the absolute moral authority that
they claim for their God. But, as far as I'm concerned, even if their
absolute God (eternal, omnipotent, etc) existed, I would not accept its
claim to absolute moral authority (though I would probably obey its
edicts!).
>I reject the dichotomy between values and facts, though I don't think
>empirical science has anything to do with values in any basic sense. It is
>one of the jobs of philosophy to uncover and validate basic values. Science
>can tell us about some of the facts to which these values apply. Thus, if
>we decide that human life is a basic value, science can give us enormous
>assistance in promoting our survival and wellbeing.
I think that individual values may be arrived at by reasonable means, based
on logical inference from other moral values combined with premises about
the world. But I fail to see how there can be any rational basis for our
most fundamemtal moral values. If we decide that human life is a basic
value, on what do we base that decision? We are into a potentially infinite
regression, which, at some point, must start with a value judgment that has
no basis.
Unless... The one possible ultimate value is personal satisfaction. I'm not
sure about this, and I hasten to add that this wouldn't mean that we should
all behave selfishly. Behaving altruistically may bring us psychological
satisfaction.
In any case, regardless of whether there can be a rational basis for values
in principle, it's obvious that in practice many values people hold are not
rational. So I *do* claim that there's a dichotomy between facts and values
(or at least *some* values).
>Though Gould's approach, as I understand it, seems superficially plausible,
>it ultimately fails because it permits unreason in the field of values.
>While *science* can be said to be irrelevant to philosophical values,
>reason cannot be irrelevant to discovering and validating values. The basic
>"law" of rationality is to believe all, but *only*, what one has adequate
>cognitive validation for, and Gould's way violates this principle.
I don't understand why you seem to be equating facts with reason. I equate
them with science, which you seem to agree is irrelevant to (philosophical)
values.
I reject Gould's approach because I cannot imagine a religion which did not
make factual claims (beyond those supported by science). All religions that
I know of do so. If a value system existed that appealed only to
reason and scientific facts, would it be called a religion? Humanism is
probably such a system and it's not generally considered a religion.
Richard Wein (Tich)
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