<snip>
The immediately following is from Jones' most recent "quote and comment"
posts, after which I provide a bit of commentary of my own
http//www.space.com/scienceastronomy/astronomy/carbonstar_000607.html
SPACE.com ... Jul 17, 2000 ... Star Physics Prove the Delicacy of Life ...
If physical forces within stars were only a little different, our universe
would be almost devoid of carbon and oxygen, so life would not exist,
physicists have concluded in a new study. "I am not a religious person,
but I could say this universe is designed very well for the existence of
life," said Heinz Oberhummer, a nuclear astrophysicist at the University of
Vienna, Austria. ... The study ...began five years ago when Oberhummer
"was just thinking what would happen if the forces were a little different
in our universe. We found that with a small change, life would not exist
in the universe." He added "Life is like a silk thread which can be torn
very easily." Oberhummer and colleagues used computers to simulate or model
the "triple_alpha process" by which helium burns to produce carbon during
the red_giant stage of a star's life. Oxygen, a key component of life_
sustaining water, is produced by the addition of a fourth alpha particle,
which is a helium nucleus. The researchers varied the strengths of the
"strong" force that holds protons and neutrons together in atomic nuclei,
and the weaker Coulomb force that makes protons try to repel each other.
They found that a change in more than one_half percent of the strong force
or more than 4 percent in the Coulomb force would destroy nearly all the
carbon or oxygen in every star. Under such conditions, "the creation of
carbon_based life in our universe would be strongly disfavored," ...
Physicist Steven Weinberg ... disagreed with the findings ...However,
astrophysicist Craig Hogan ... defended Oberhummer and colleagues ...
Oberhummer said the findings mean "the basic forces in the universe are
tailor_made for the production of carbon and oxygen, and therefore carbon_
based life. At present we have no idea why the strength of the forces are
fine_tuned in our universe in such a way that enables the existence of life.
The fine_tuning is really very subtle." Helium is burned to produce carbon
in the "triple_alpha process" in red_giant stars. Hogan saw no need to
invoke religion or any sort of intentional design in forming the
universe. ...
"One of the remarkable things that is quite plausible now is the idea there
are many universes, and in each one of those universes the forces might be
different." ... "Some scientists think it goes beyond the boundaries of
science because you are talking about universes you cannot see. But I
think you have to be more tolerant about that. It could be nature is made
this way, and it is not the same as invoking supernatural forces."
... [Science is now forced to become pseudoscience to escape the obvious
design inference of subtly fine_tuned laws of physics. As Paul Davies said
"In spite of the apparent ease with which the many_universes theory can
account for what would otherwise be considered remarkable feature of the
universe, the theory faces a number of serious objections. Not least of
these is Ockham's razor one must introduce a vast (indeed infinite)
complexity to explain the regularities of just one universe." (Davies
P.C.W., "The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Science," in Templeton J.M.,
ed., "Evidence of Purpose," 1994, pp.52_53)]
Chris
Another little essay follows. This one is prompted by the fact that the
drivel known as the "fine-tuning" argument is still popular with the sorts
of people who read and believe the stories of aliens and God in the
National Enquirer, and by the fact that Jones has repeatedly made approving
mentions of it, despite my having pointed out some of its more obvious
flaws after the first few such mentions. At the end, the reader will find a
nice summary of some of my points and a list of "morals" to be gotten from
the critique of the fine-tuning argument. If the reader keeps these
"morals" firmly in mind when evaluating arguments like the fine-tuning
argument, he will avoid (or correct) *many* grievous errors.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
The number of "universes" does not need to be infinite. It only needs to be
a very *large* number of other universes to increase the probability of
ones like ours to nearly one. Further, even if it *does* have to be
infinite, it is *still* a less radical proposal than that there is a God
(who is *also* claimed to be infinite (and, via infinite knowledge/
intelligence, also infinitely complex). As I've pointed out before,
*NOTHING* is gained, in Occam's Razor terms, by introducing God as an
alternative to naturalistic theories, because the *same* considerations
that might count against naturalistic explanations *also* count against
theistic ones, with the theistic ones having a the additional burden of
proof of their radical *metaphysical* claims. It is trivially easy to prove
that NO theistic explanation can *ever* be simpler than the best
naturalistic explanation, because the theistic explanation always instantly
introduces the need for a *metaphysical* realm that naturalism does not
need __ and nearly always a whole host of other claims about the alleged
God that need proof or coherent conceptualization, as well.
Further, the *regularities* of a universe (ours or any others) never needs
any explanation except as a *philosophical* issue. It is not even logically
possible to coherently describe a universe without regularities. This
derives almost directly from the law of identity. For things to be *truly*
irregular (to obey *no* laws of physics of any kind), they'd have to have
*no* causal interactions, no causal relationships between them or within
themselves, no actual *particular* attributes of any kind. There would also
have to be no such thing (within such a universe) as change or time; each
"instant" or state would have to be *absolutely* disconnected from all
other instants or states. If we could detect what was going on in such a
universe, we would see *pure* informational "noise," with the only
"regularities" being purely random occurrences of succeeding states that
*we* might see as being similar to causal patterns or patterns that arise
out of causation.
What *is* true, of course, is that there is no apparent metaphysical
requirement that a universe be such at any time as to support any form of
life. But, if, as some suggest, *our* type of universe is the only
logically *possible* type of universe (physically), then it would follow
that the "fine_tuning" *does* have a metaphysical/logical basis, thus
totally obviating the explanatory value of introducing God (since, given
this basis, even *God* could not build a universe that was essentially
different from ours, since any such universe would be logically
contradictory).
About the fine_tuning argument as evidence for designConsider *any*
imaginable universe, with or without life. It is obvious that we could look
at such a universe and find facts about it that the fine_tuning argument
would apply to, facts that are such that, if some basic aspects of said
universe were different, would not be present.
That is, given *any* set of basic constants and factors that make up a
universe, there will be *some* fact or set of facts in or about that
universe which would *not* exist if one of those basic facts were changed
just slightly. In one universe, for example, the gravitational force (if
any) might be *much* weaker than is needed to balance the speed of
expansion, so that all matter is expanding at such a vastly higher rate
that no galaxies and star systems form. Well, *by the logic of the
fine_tuning argument,* this fact would *prove* that there is a God who
*designed* the universe to achieve just this result. After all, if the
expansion had been any slower, it would not be expanding at just the rate
it is in this hypothetical universe. Other, much more sophisticated
examples could be offered, but the reader with a background in physics can
easily make them up by the dozens. The point is that the precise condition
or state of *any* universe (and the things in it) depends on whatever
factors bring that state about, and therefore any change in any one of
those basic factors will bring about *different* states.
The fallacy of the fine_tuning argument is that it assumes that there is
something "special" about life as we know it. But, life is another
phenomenon that may or may not occur, along with millions of others that we
could think up or generate by computer simulations based on varying
whatever facts we take as basic to the nature of our universe, or creating
new ones.
There is no "obvious" inference to the existence of a designer, except in
the primitive person's "obvious" inference that things he doesn't
understand are controlled by gods. For one thing, we don't even *know* what
the basic "constants" (etc.) of our universe are, and we also don't know
how they are related. Unless it can be shown that our universe is special,
we have no basis at all for any such inference. In fact, we don't even need
to suppose that there *might* be (or have been) other universes. The
fine_tuning argument is based on bad logic, arbitrary premises, and rampant
speculation posing as established fact.
Unfortunately for Jones' position, the article he quotes does *not* show
that our universe "peculiar" in any relevant sense, so there is no need to
invoke multiple universes. The purpose of invoking such a possibility to
begin with is simply to point out the unsoundness of the fine_tuning
argument's probability_premises, but such a refutation of the argument is
not the only one, and it could be totally dispensed with if it turned out
to have real problems.
In any case, it is invoked only as a proof of the unsoundness of the
fine_tuning argument, not as a proof of any positive claims. That is, no
one who invokes it needs to actually *assert* that there are other
universes. The point is that, if there are, and even if the *other*
premises of the fine_tuning argument are accepted, the fine_tuning argument
fails. Thus, the fine_tuning argument must prove that *our* universe is the
only universe or that it is one among only a few that exist or ever *have*
existed. It assumes this burden of proof by the very nature of its
premises, one of which is to the effect that an infinite or very large
number of other universes are *possible.* The question is then, Why is
there *this* universe rather than one of the huge number of other possible
universes?
At this point, the atheist needs only to point out that the fine_tuning
argument *itself* asserts that other universes are *possible*, and that all
he's doing is suggesting that they might be *actual* as well. That is, the
idea that there are possibly an indefinitely large number of other
universes is a direct implication of one of the fine_tuning argument's
*own* premises.
This means that the *same* Occam's Razor "problem" that Davies claims for
the multiple universes idea applies also to the corresponding fine_tuning
argument premises. The fine_tuning folks have to prove what amounts to a
contradiction: That an indefinite number of universes are in fact
*possible*, but that not even a mere few trillion trillion trillion of them
are *actual*. *If*, as they claim, such a large number of universes *is*
possible, on what grounds can they possibly positively deny that at least a
few (relative to infinity) of them might *actually* exist?
Since the fine_tuning argument is a probabalistic argument that concludes
that *our* universe is somehow too improbable to be a chance occurrence, we
may ask, "Well then, what is the *probability*, for any of the other
universes you claim are possible, that it actually exists? Obviously, if
you make the probability too low, then it becomes pointless for you to
argue that they are possible alternatives to *our* universe. That is, if,
for one such possible universe, you claim that it has a probability of
existing that is effectively indistinguishable from zero, then it is also
*effectively* impossible. If you apply such a claim to *all* such
alternative universes, and make your claim strong enough to make it
effectively impossible that there *are* such alternative universes, then
*our* universe effectively becomes the only *possible* universe, thus
eliminating the need for fine_tuning.
On the other hand, if you claim that the probability of each of these other
universes actually existing is very *high*, then you implicitly *accept*
the multiple_universes premise as being viable, in which case, the
improbability of our own universe vanishes.
After all, what it means to say that something (such as a universe) is
genuinely possible is that it *might* actually exist or have existed or
come to exist in the future. If the fine_tuning folks want to deny that any
of these universes exist, they will need some positive evidence to restrict
the implications of their own possibility premise. They need to say (and
prove) something like: Though an indefinite number of other universes are
individually possible, only *ours* (and perhaps a *small* number of others)
does exist or ever has existed." This is necessary, because, otherwise, the
implication of their possibility claim is that some or all of these other
universes might actually exist.
What, other than the kind of provincialism that led the ancients to believe
that Earth was the center of existence, could we possibly use to prove such
a claim?
A special case occurs if they claim that an *infinite* number of
alternative universes might each be possible. In this case, no matter *how*
small the probability of any one of them existing is, if it is not *truly*
zero, then there is almost *certainly* an infinite number of such
alternative universes (the probability is *infinitesimally* less than one).
In summaryWhile we can't prove (yet) that other universes exist, neither
can the fine_tuning folks prove that other universes are *possible*. If
they *do* prove that other universes are possible, they will *then* need to
prove that they don't actually exist. They bring this burden of proof on
themselves by adopting the initial claim that other universes are possible.
Davies' (and Jones') claim is thus hoisted on its own little petard.
As is the fine_tuning argument in general, though there are other major
objections to it, such as the fact that two or more basic constants or
other "design" factors might be varied in *complementary* ways to produce
an indefinite number of other "universe designs" that might support life,
and the fact that some of the claimed aspects of "fine_tuning" are or might
be merely different ways of regarding *one* basic fact, not two or more.
For example, if the *mass* of the universe is *inherently* related to the
rate of expansion and/or the gravitational force, then varying whatever is
the source of both may *always* produce a universe that can support life.
The rate of expansion balances the gravitational force, but if the initial
rate of expansion *creates* a matching gravitational force, then the
probability of the rate of expansion "balancing" the gravitational force
becomes one, and thus not remarkable at all. In this case, the fine_tuning
argument would then have to claim that the underlying common causal
relationship must be improbable. This would be fine, except that, if the
number of basic factors becomes so small (such as one) that *their*
particular values no longer sufficiently improbable, then the fine_tuning
argument still fails.
In general, arguments of the fine_tuning sort depend on a raft of premises
and assumptions that need to be individually validated. In daily life, we
can often accept such premises easily, because we have life_long experience
with the relevant facts. However, even in such cases, people are
*notoriously* likely to make seriously wrong judgments about such
probabilities, assuming "design" or some similar conclusion when the facts
involved in the particular case are merely coincidental. The assumptions
that people carry around about probabilities are often incorrect.
But, in the case of the fine_tuning argument for the existence of God, even
the *ordinary* factual "controls" on error are missing, and the common
assumptions of daily life do *not* have even the weak and sporadic support
that they do when applied to daily life situations.
What's the probability that of 23 randomly selected people there will be
two or more with their birthday being the same month and day? Most people
think that it's quite small, but it's actually slightly greater than 0.5.
And this is an elementary example, where all the relevant facts are known.
In the case of the fine_tuning argument, crucial premises are simply
assumed or claimed on the weakest of factual bases, because we simply don't
*have* the relevant facts, and do not seem to be on the verge of getting
them any time soon (even with post_Hubble telescopes, the Large Hadron
Collider, and so on). Part of this is simply a result of the current state
of physics and cosmology, etc. But part of it is the result of a
fundamental epistemological problem: No matter what we find about our
universe scientifically, we still won't be able to logically exclude the
possibility of something naturalistic *outside* of it. Except in the
broadest sense of "universe" (to mean: everything that exists
naturalistically), we cannot, from the inside, determine that there is
*nothing* more than what we know about. We may not be able to claim that
there *is* something, but we cannot claim that there *isn't* something,
either. The fine_tuning argument and the "multiple universes" refutation of
it *both* depend on something outside of the known universe (either other
universes or God), but the empirical facts will not specify *which* might
exist. (And, because of the radical metaphysical claim, the assumption that
any such "something" is naturalistic is better from an Occam's Razor point
of view than the conclusion that that "something" is an infinite and
unexplained God who can create universes out of nothing.)
In short, the fine_tuning argument fails in almost all imaginable respects
in which such an argument *can* fail. Jones' continued support for this
logically invalid and foundationally unsound argument is a testament to his
unwillingness to analyze it critically. And Davies simply appears to have
long ago sold out serious thought about such topics in favor of cheap
popularizations and facile but ultimately flimsy sensationalism (it
certainly sells more books to make such statements as the one Jones quotes
than it does to point out that such claims are unjustified by any known
rules of inference from any known facts).
The morals of all this include
1. Check the premises of arguments. The fine_tuning argument supporters
seem to *love* to use unstated premises as established fact. Dig out these
premises and examine them and their real implications.
2. Check the *logic* of arguments. Unless the fine_tuning argument can both
reasonably assert the *possibility* of an infinity (or very large number)
of other universes *and* the claim that none (or incredibly *few*) of such
universes *do* exist, the fine_tuning argument is invalid because it does
not soundly exclude a perfecty viable alterntive to its own conclusion.
3. Watch for gross *abuses* of current scientific theories and hypotheses.
The ones most radically and virulently abused by "fine tuners" are "basic"
constants and relationships among them and other such basic facts of our
"known" universe (such as the amount of matter in it, and the speed of
expansion, etc.) Most of these "constants" and basic facts are, at best,
poorly understood. They don't provide support for *any* special
metaphysical claims because we don't know *their* metaphysical basis, we
don't know how "deep" they go, and we don't even know if they *are*
constants (and, if they are, whether they are constant across all possible
universes or just ours, etc.).
4. Watch for attempts at subverting Occam's Razor by mis_comparing
more_specific propositions ("There may be a large number of other
universes") with vaguely stated alternatives ("Design"). Consider what the
alternative claims *really* involve, and *then* ask yourself what Occam's
Razor would say. In this case, the "design" hypothesis expands (minimally)
to something like: An infinite being with infinite knowledge and infinite
power (and an infinite *number* of distinct powers) and who can create an
infinite number of universes out of nothing, and who utterly metaphysically
transcends ordinary naturalistic reality, including space and time.
*This* statement of the design hypothesis (even in this small form) does
not compare well, in Occam's Razor terms with the simple hypothesis that
there *might* be a very large number of other universes (or perhaps our own
universe in various past "incarnations"). Whenever you hear a theist making
an Occam's Razor claim for theism, consider what theism *really* entails,
and the Occam's Razor claim will be seen not only to be unsupportable, but
that Occam's Razor, insofar as it provides support for any theory, provides
support only for non_theistic theories in all such cases (this is true even
when the claimed "God" is *not* claimed to be infinite). Remember, by the
usual definition provided by theists themselves, the existence of and the
claimed nature of God is the most *extreme* of nearly all imaginable claims
that are not outright and directly self-contradictory. Compared to the
pathetic little process that evolutionists are claiming, the God claim is a
*monstrous* violation of the entire *idea* of parsimony and reasonableness
of hypothesis as related to the facts to be explained. It is *worse* than
the police, upon finding a person who has been killed and who has what
appears to be a bullet hole through his head, concluding that he was killed
by psychic means because the *sentence* "He was psychically killed" is
simpler than the *sentence* "Some human with a forty-five caliber pistol
and some bullets shot him."
Occam's Razor basically only applies in comparing two theories if the two
theories *do* the same things, or in which the more *powerful* theory is
compared favorably to another, weaker theory. Since design theory does not
begin to explain evolution in predictive terms (for one example: on the
basis of the design premise, ID folks can't predict that animal breeding of
an as-yet-unknown animal will work, whereas evolution can make such
predictions on the basis of its basic principles). Since evolutionary
theory is *vastly* simpler in principle than the claim of theism, and since
it is a *weaker* theory (in predictive terms), it will always lose to
evolutionary theory.
Incidentally, though it helps *immensely* to replace theistic design with
intelligent design done by aliens or "metaverse" beings, etc., it doesn't
help *enough*, because, given the current evidence for design (essentially
none at all), it is still vast overkill for the facts to be explained.
Jones, et. al., *still* don't grasp that the extreme radicalness of their
theistic claim requires a *type* of proof that they simply cannot get from
empirical means (for example, even if the fine-tuning argument were valid
up to its conclusion, all we could conclude is that some being or beings
designed the universe. We could *not* rationally conclude that the
designer(s) were even remotely similar to God.
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