>Chris
>> >Yes, many humanists and other materialists hold that happiness is the
>> proper
>> >goal or purpose of happiness. I agree (with some qualifications, having
>> >mainly to do with semantic issues), but that would be an *objective*
>basis
>> >for morality.
>>
>Richard
>> I don't agree. It can't be demonstrated that happiness is the proper goal
>of
>> morality. That's a subjective judgement.
>
>Well, I said I'd need some qualifications.
I thought that your qualifications were to the issue of whether happiness is
the proper goal of morality, not whether there is an objective basis for
such a moral precept.
Perhaps it would help if you stated briefly what those qualifications are.
>And, it can be a subjective
>judgment, but it need not be, just as the belief that the Earth is round
may
>be a subjective judgment, but need not be. This depends on the basis for
the
>judgment.
>
>Why do you think it can't be demonstrated that happiness is the proper goal
>of morality?
I can't imagine how it could be demonstrated. If you have such a
demonstration in mind, then please describe it.
>Put another way: What is the objective criterion
>(epistemological) for determining whether something is or is not the
>objective basis for morality?
I would say that the criterion for determining whether something has an
objective basis is whether its existence can be demonstrated. (That leaves
the question of what constitutes a demonstration, but let's not get into
that unless we have to.)
Since you're the one who is stating a positive position, that there is an
obejective basis for the precept that happiness is the proper goal of
morality (or for moral codes in general), it's up to you to say what that
objective basis is.
>Once you establish this and the objective
>*context* in which the question of what the basis of morality is, the rest
>is easy. But, usually, this is ignored or glossed over or treated quite
>shabbily, so that the results end up being arbitrary or only half-right.
>
>Why do we need morality at all? What do we need it *for*? What would be the
>consequences of not having a morality? What would a "Crusoe Ethics" be
like?
>(Would Crusoe need ethics or morality at all?) If a morality is a code of
>values and principles for guiding our actions, why do we need to guide our
>actions? Why *not* just act randomly? Why act at all? Why not just stop
>where one is, crumple to the ground and never again deliberately do
anything
>at all?
Those are interesting questions, but I think we have enough questions to
discuss for now. Perhaps we can come back to these later.
>I'm not here attempting to prove that happiness is the proper goal of
>morality (in any case, I would not normally phrase it that way), but I'm
>trying to suggest lines of inquiry that can lead one to important insights
>about morality and the basis of it.
The real issue here is not whether happiness is the proper goal of morality
(though that's an interesting question too), but whether there is (or could
be) an objective basis for such a moral precept.
>I will end with an analogy. Just as there is an objective basis for
medicine
>or engineering, there is also, and for very similar reasons, an objective
>basis for morality. If you claim that there is no objective basis for
>morality, you are very nearly (though just barely not) claiming that there
>is also no objective basis for engineering or medicine.
You've said nothing to establish the validity of this analogy. What are your
"very similar reasons"?
In medicine, we can use double-blind testing to demonstrate the existence of
a link between a drug and an effect. What is the analogous test that can
demonstrate the existence of a moral precept?
Richard Wein (Tich)
See my web pages for various games at http://homepages.primex.co.uk/~tich/
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b29 : Tue Mar 14 2000 - 06:19:49 EST