Re: Why assume a misrepresentation? (was Yet *ANOTHER* Stephen Jones Misrepresentation)

Stephen E. Jones (sejones@iinet.net.au)
Wed, 15 Dec 1999 19:39:16 +0800

Reflectorites

On Mon, 13 Dec 1999 09:27:02 -0600, Susan Brassfield wrote:

[...]

>>>CC>This is well documented. It hardly needs the burnings of scientists to
>>>proveit.

>SJ>It is *not* "well documented" at all, "that Christianity is opposed to
>>science". This was the thesis of two 19th century books: John William
>>Draper's "History of the Conflict between Religion and Science" and
>>Andrew Dickson White's "A History of the Warfare of Science with
>>Theology in Christendom", but AFAIK no modern historian believes that
>>any more:

[...]

SB>Stephen J. Gould has recently proposed that science and religion need not,
>and in fact do not, conflict.

Gould's claim is even stronger. He claims that "science and religion" *cannot*
"conflict" because the operate in completely different autonomous spheres,
ie. "non-overlapping magisteria" (NOMA):

"Science and religion are not in conflict, for their teachings occupy distinctly
different domains" (Gould S.J., "Nonoverlapping Magisteria", Natural History,
March 1997, p16)

But my claim is not about "science" and "religion" in general. There certainly
are religions which *do* conflict with science, e.g. some American Indian
teachings that they originated in North America. But my claims are only about
*Christianity* and science.

SB>You, yourself, have quoted Johnson sneering at Gould for taking that stand.

I don't know about the "sneering" bit. Susan seems to take it as a personal
affront if anyone dares to criticise evolution or evolutionists!

But Johnson has indeed *criticised* Gould's NOMA position, because it is
unrealistic, and frankly "unscrupulous":

"Lewontin is brilliantly insightful, but too crankily honest to be as
good a manipulator as his Harvard colleague Stephen Jay Gould.
Gould displays both his talent and his unscrupulousness in an essay in
the March 1997 issue of Natural History, entitled "Nonoverlapping
Magisteria" and subtitled "Science and religion are not in conflict, for
their teachings occupy distinctly different domains." With a subtitle
like that, you can be sure that Gould is out to reassure the public that
evolution leads to no alarming conclusions. True to form, Gould
insists that the only dissenters from evolution are "Protestant
fundamentalists who believe that every word of the Bible must be
literally true." Gould also insists that evolution (he never defines the
word) is "both true and entirely compatible with Christian belief."
Gould is familiar with nonliteralist opposition to evolutionary
naturalism, but he blandly denies that any such phenomenon exists.
He even quotes a letter written to the New York Times in answer to
an op-ed essay by Michael Behe, without revealing the context. You
can do things like that when you know that the media won't call you
to account.

The centerpiece of Gould's essay is an analysis of the complete text
of Pope John Paul's statement of October 22, 1996 to the Pontifical
Academy of Sciences endorsing evolution as "more than a
hypothesis." He fails to quote the Pope's crucial qualification that
"theories of evolution which, in accordance with the philosophies
inspiring them, consider the spirit as emerging from the forces of
living matter or as a mere epiphenomenon of this matter, are
incompatible with the truth about man." Of course, a theory based on
materialism assumes by definition that there is no "spirit" active in this
world that is independent of matter. Gould knows this perfectly well,
and he also knows, just as Richard Lewontin does, that the evidence
doesn't support the claims for the creative power of natural selection
made by writers such as Richard Dawkins. That is why the
philosophy that really supports the theory has to be protected from
critical scrutiny.

Gould's essay is a tissue of half-truths aimed at putting the religious
people to sleep, or luring them into a "dialogue" on terms set by the
materialists. Thus Gould graciously allows religion to participate in
discussions of morality or the meaning of life, because science does
not claim authority over such questions of value, and because
"Religion is too important to too many people for any dismissal or
denigration of the comfort still sought by many folks from theology."
Gould insists, however, that all such discussion must cede to science
the power to determine the facts, and one of the facts is an
evolutionary process that is every bit as materialistic and purposeless
for Gould as it is for Lewontin or Dawkins. If religion wants to
accept a dialogue on those terms, that's fine with Gould-but don't let
those religious people think they get to make an independent
judgment about the evidence that supposedly supports the "facts."
And if the religious people are gullible enough to accept materialism
as one of the facts, they won't be capable of causing much trouble."

(Johnson P.E., "The Unraveling of Scientific Materialism", First
Things, No. 77, November 1997, pp22-25.
http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9711/johnson.html)

But not only "Johnson" but a number of *evolutists* who have written
about this (e.g. Dawkins, Ruse, Goodenough) have criticised Gould for
"taking that stand".

SB>I have said in the past that science and
>religion cannot ultimately conflict because they inhabit the same reality

Well this is the complete *opposite* of Gould's position. He claims that
"science and religion cannot ultimately conflict because they" do *not*
"inhabit the same reality"!

SB>(this is the semi-official Unitarian Universalist denominational position).
>You have sneered at *me* for it and quoted volumes (mostly from Johnson) in
>an attempt to refute me.

Susan has repeatedly called me a liar and yet she is upset because she
imagines that I might have "sneered" at her?

SB>Now you are talking out of the other side of your mouth. Which is your
>actual position?

My "actual position" is not the compartmentalization model (Gould's
position), nor the complementarity model (the usual TE position), nor the
conflict model (Draper and White's position) but one similar to Dembski's
"mutual support" model:

"Compartmentalization, complementarity and conflict all grasp some aspect
of the relation between science and theology, but then try to make that
aspect the whole show. In place of these models I want to propose a fourth
alternative, one that recognizes what is correct in these models, yet without
being swayed to their extremes. I call this fourth option the mutual support
model. According to the mutual support model, theology and science
overlap but are not coextensive. Where they overlap, one discipline can
provide epistemic support for the other. Epistemic support is much more
general than proof. Proof-as in decisive, once-and-for-all settlement of a
question-if possible anywhere, is possible only in mathematics. The mutual
support model has no stake in using theology to decisively prove or settle
the claims of science, or vice versa." (Dembski W.A., "Intelligent Design:
The Bridge Between Science and Theology", InterVarsity Press: Downers
Grove IL, unpublished manuscript, 1999, p191)

I would assume that Scripture needs to be read in the light of science and
vice versa. They are two `books' of God and neither can ultimately
contradict the other:

"If we believe that the God of creation is the God of redemption, and that
the God of redemption is the God of creation, then we are committed to
some very positive theory of harmonization between science and
evangelicalism. God cannot contradict His speech in Nature by His speech
in Scripture. If the Author of Nature and Scripture are the same God, then
the two books of God must eventually recite the same story." (Ramm B.L.,
"The Christian View of Science and Scripture", 1967, pp25-26).

Normally science and Scripture rarely if ever conflict, because the authors
of Scripture are not trying to teach scientific truths. *But* if Scripture
*really does* teach one thing and science *really does* teach another, then
to my way of thinking, because Scripture is Special Revelation, it overrides
science which is part of General Revelation.

For example, if Scripture really does teach that man has a non-material
soul, and science teaches that he doesn't, then after looking hard at possible
ways to harmonise Scripture with science, if at the end of the day, I could
not see how Scripture could be reconciled to science without doing
violence to an essential teaching of Scripture, then I would conclude that
science is wrong on that point.

>SJ>Actually I am quite happy for Chris to keep making ad hominem
>>comments, because it tells me that he is running out of arguments!

SB>this is a serious "pot/kettle" problem from the author of the phrase
>"atheist thinking"

As I said, Chris is an "atheist" and it was his "thinking". If that is
not "atheist thinking" then what is it?

BTW if that is the worst claimed "ad hominem" that I am supposed to have
made, then the author of the "Why lie?" thread can't have too many things
to complain about on that score!

Steve

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"I now wish to give some reasons why I regard Darwinism as metaphysical,
and as a research programme. It is metaphysical because it is not testable.
One might think that it is. It seems to assert that, if ever on some planet we
find life which satisfies conditions (a) and (b), then (c) will come into play
and bring about in time a rich variety of distinct forms. Darwinism,
however, does not assert as much as this. For assume that we find life on
Mars consisting of exactly three species of bacteria with a genetic outfit
similar to that of three terrestrial species. Is Darwinism refuted? By no
means. We shall say that these three species were the only forms among the
many mutants which were sufficiently well adjusted to survive. And we
shall say the same if there is only one species (or none). Thus Darwinism
does not really predict the evolution of variety. It therefore cannot really
explain it. At best, it can predict the evolution of variety under "favourable
conditions". But it is hardly possible to describe in general terms what
favourable conditions are except that, in their presence, a variety of forms
will emerge." (Popper K., "Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography",
Open Court: La Salle Ill., Revised Edition, 1982, p171)
Stephen E. Jones | sejones@iinet.net.au | http://www.iinet.net.au/~sejones
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