On Sun, 12 Dec 1999 11:20:12 -0800, Chris Cogan wrote:
[...]
>>CC>Stephen spends his days (seemingly) largely misrepresenting
>>>evolutionary theory and evolutionists' views (see my posts on
>>>Fred Hoyle and the "mathematics of evolution" (that is,
>>>HOYLE'S theory of evolution!!!!) for the latest several of dozens
>>>of examples -- though I grant that he's been less rabidly
>>>misrepresentative lately than he was before Susan and I called him
>>>on the dishonesty of such misrepresentations).
[...]
>SJ>>Dream on! Contrary to Chris' fantasies, I haven't changed one iota. His
>>and Susan's attacks on my integrity don't faze me one bit and only make me
>>more determined to expose "evolutionary theory and evolutionists' views"
>>to public scrutiny.
>>
>>I have no desire, nor need, to misrepresent "evolutionary theory and
>>evolutionists' views". It is sufficient merely to fairly and accurately
>>*represent* them! That is what I assume that Chris and Susan are *really*
>>complaining of (although to be fair, I do not claim they are aware of it).
>CC>Since many specific examples of your misrepresentations have been pointed
>out over the past several months, I won't bother to go into the matter
>further here. The interested reader can visit the post mentioned and see
>some examples.
As promised, from now on, every time Chris (or anyone else) claims I am
"misrepresenting" them, I am going to post the same challenge to them to
prove their point, as follows:
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It is always possible that I have honestly misunderstood something that
Chris has written. The relevant part of Webster's Dictionary's definition of
"misrepresent" is: "1 : to give a false or misleading representation of
usually with an intent to deceive or be unfair <misrepresented the facts>"
(http://www.m-w.com/cgibin/dictionary). Therefore it is technically
possible to misrepresent someone *unintentionally*. In such cases, all Chris
needs to do is clarify what he meant and if it was just a misunderstanding it
should be resolved.
But I take it that when Chris says I "misrepresent" what he says, he means
it is "with an intent to deceive or be unfair". But how Chris could possibly
know this is beyond me. In each instance he would need to show that:
1) I was representing the facts different from what they objectively were
(i.e. it is not a matter of our different metaphysical worldviews interpreting
the facts differently);
2) I was not *unintentionally* misrepresenting his position, (i.e. due to lack
of clarity in his explanation or my lack of understanding of it); and then,
3) I was *intentionally* intending in my own mind to represent falsely what
Chris had just written, and send my intentional misrepresentation to a
mailing list on which Chris himself is a member!
If Chris wants to make his claims that I am *intentionally* misrepresenting
what he says, then he would need to work through those steps from 1) to
3) proving each one of them to be true.
Until he does that, his claims of *intentional* "misrepresentation" are just
that: *claims*.
Of course if Chris was willing to do that, natural justice would mandate
that Chris himself could not be the `prosecution', `sole witness', `judge',
`jury' and `executioner' in such a `trial'!
until he works through steps 1) to 3) to prove his case, I am going keep
posting this challenge to him. In Australia we have a saying: "Put up, or
shut up"! I challenge Chris to either prove I am intentionally
misrepresenting him, or stop making the allegation.
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CC>But, that was beside the point of the post that Stephen is responding to.
>Where's the causal principle of design theory? Where are the testable
>implications of design theory (ANY testable implications)? Where is the
>*science* in design theory?
As previously stated, ID is in its infancy, as opposed to Darwinism which
has been going 140 years, with millions of dollars of taxpayers' money and
thousands of government and corporately funded scientists.
But ID *has* started to generate testable theories, for example Mike
Behe's claims of irreducible complexity. These are dismissed, not on
evidential grounds but on naturalistic philosophical grounds.
Chris' own highly prejudiced posts show that the *real* opposition to ID is
philosophical, not evidential.
CC>Below is what may be the key paragraph of the post Stephen is responding to.
>Perhaps he will get to it in another post.
>
>"The big problem, as I said in an earlier post, is that ID theory has
>*no* causal principle, no *mechanism* to make it explanatory. It
>posits a cause, but no causal *principle*.
ID *does* have a "causal principle". It is *intelligent, personal agency*.
Sciences like archaeology, forensic science, SETI and all the behavioural
and some of the historical sciences use *intelligent, personal agency* as
a "causal principle":
"It is simply false to assert that scientists explain things merely by using
natural laws, say by invoking a covering law model of scientific
explanation. Scientists also explain by citing causal entities, processes,
events or actions. For example, ...some branches of science, including
SETI, archaeology, forensic science, psychology and sociology, use
personal agency and various internal states of agents (desires, willings,
intentions, awarenesses, thoughts, beliefs) as part of their description of the
causal entities, processes, events or actions cited as explanations for certain
phenomenal....Thus there is nothing nonscientific about appealing to
personal agency and the like in a scientific explanation" (Moreland J.P.,
"Theistic Science & Methodological Naturalism," in Moreland J.P. ed.,
"The Creation Hypothesis", 1994, pp55-56).
CC>Even if you believe that
>naturalistic evolutionary theory is false, you have to grant that it
>at least *tries* to make sense of the data. It offers an explanation
>of *why* genetically more-complex organisms do not appear
>until *after* simpler ones do. It offers an explanation of why the
>offspring of organisms are not genetically identical to there
>parent- organisms. It offers an explanation of why animal
>breeding works (and even why, after a time, there is a slow-down
>to further breeding along any one "dimension" until the rest of the
>genome has a chance to adjust to and re-integrate with the
>modified genes).
All these things can be also explained equally as well, if not
better, by ID theory. ID theory, being a more comprehensive
scientific theory, will subsume evolutionary theory as a subset,
just like Einstein's Theory of Relativity subsumed Newtonian
Mechanics.
CC>And this all comes from *two* principles:
>Variation and the need of the replicator to have characteristics
>that enable it to survive in it's environment long enough to
>reproduce sufficiently to perpetuate itself." (Cogan C., "A Rant Against
>Anti-Science," 1999)
That these two Darwinian "principles" can explain *some* things
biological, is readily granted. That it can explain *all* things biological, is
not granted.
Indeed, all the above would predict is that the replicator would maintain
itself as is in its environment. There is no prediction from those two
Darwinian "principles" that the replicator would even change:
"When he considers the scientific status of Darwinism, Patterson writes
that the theory can be presented in the form of a deductive argument, for
example: 1. All organisms must reproduce; 2. All organisms exhibit
hereditary variations; 3. Hereditary variations differ in their effect on
reproduction; 4. Therefore variations with favorable effects on
reproduction will succeed, those with unfavorable effects will fail, and
organisms will change. Patterson observes that the theorem establishes only
that some natural selection will occur, not that it is a general explanation
for evolution. Actually, the theorem does not even establish that organisms
will change. The range of hereditary variations may be narrow and the
variations which survive may be just favorable enough to keep the species
as it is. Possibly the species would change a great deal more (in the
direction of eventual extinction) if the least favored individuals most often
succeeded in reproducing their kind. That the effect of natural selection
may be to keep a species from changing is not merely a theoretical
possibility. As we shall see in Chapter Four, the prevailing characteristic of
fossil species is stasis the absence of change. There are numerous "living
fossils" which are much the same today as they were millions of years ago,
at least as far as we can determine." (Johnson P.E., "Darwin on Trial",
1993, pp23-24).
As Popper pointed out, Darwinism "does not really predict the evolution of
variety" and "It therefore cannot really explain it":
"I now wish to give some reasons why I regard Darwinism as metaphysical,
and as a research programme. It is metaphysical because it is not testable.
One might think that it is. It seems to assert that, if ever on some planet we
find life which satisfies conditions (a) and (b), then (c) will come into play
and bring about in time a rich variety of distinct forms. Darwinism,
however, does not assert as much as this. For assume that we find life on
Mars consisting of exactly three species of bacteria with a genetic outfit
similar to that of three terrestrial species. Is Darwinism refuted? By no
means. We shall say that these three species were the only forms among the
many mutants which were sufficiently well adjusted to survive. And we
shall say the same if there is only one species (or none). Thus Darwinism
does not really predict the evolution of variety. It therefore cannot really
explain it. At best, it can predict the evolution of variety under "favourable
conditions". But it is hardly possible to describe in general terms what
favourable conditions are except that, in their presence, a variety of forms
will emerge." (Popper K., "Unended Quest", 1982, p171)
Steve
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"The purpose of science is not to find "facts" or discover "truth," but rather
to formulate and use theories in order to solve problems and ultimately to
organize, unify, and explain all the material phenomena of the universe.
Scientists attempt to avoid the use of "fact, "proof," and "truth," because
these words could easily be interpreted to connote absolutes. Nothing in
science is deemed absolute. Science deals only with theories or relative
"truth,"-a temporary correctness so far as can be ascertained by the rational
mind at the present time." (Stansfield W.D., "The Science of Evolution",
[1977], Macmillan: New York NY, 1983, Eighth Printing, p7)
Stephen E. Jones | sejones@iinet.net.au | http://www.iinet.net.au/~sejones
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