Continuing my discussion of ID with Tim, I wrote:
>The approaches that exclude intelligent design seem likewise
>to suffer from flexibility problems. Natural selection has
>a history of being too "just-so"-like (we've just seen on this
>listing how natural selection seemed to be such a good
>explanation in accounting for no hollow bones among land animals,
>yet the reasoning conflicted with the evidence). Similarities
>need not be explained in terms of divergent evolution. One
>can always appeal to convergent evolution, horizontal
>transfer, and simple coincidence. And an approach which
>excludes design can (and does) always appeal to chance at
>some point or rely on "we don't know (yet)."
Tim replied:
>I agree. I do not believe that we will ever have enough information
>to understand the detailed evolution of most of the biosphere.
I don't think it is a question of coming up with an understanding
of "the detailed evolution of most of the biosphere." I'm simply
pointing out that explanations that exclude ID are tremendously
plastic and flexible. Thus your previous point about ID being
too flexible is not a very serious problem (IMO) when one
adopts the relativistic perspective that I do.
Tim:
>You propose that it's "evolution PLUS ID". I'm very much interested
>in seeing how one distinguishes "evolution" from "evolution PLUS ID".
>This gets tricky.
Yes, indeed. This can be among the most trickiest of things to
explore for many reasons. First, even if ID is behind some
origin event (OE), I do not think we will ever find data that
makes it intellectually impossible to deny ID (just as it will
always be impossible to get all to deny natural selection was what was
behind the OE). The study of all history on this planet is
tied up with uncertainty and this will be exploited by those
whose views are shaped by the philosophical, social, and or
political implications of origins debates. However, in my
opinion, the first trick is in ridding oneself of the need for
certainty and keeping a truly open mind. The second trick
is to make sure the philosophical, social, and political concerns
behind this issue are not logically anterior to the investigation
of the data. And the third trick (related to the first) is to
stop looking for data that will serve as the silver bullet to
decide, once and for all, what was behind a particular OE
(i.e., unequivocally distinguishing between evolution and
evolution +ID). Now, in my opinion, the vast majority of
scientists and investigators are incapable of pulling off
these tricks.
Mike:
>>> Positive evidence for X does not mean that X is the one and only
>>> way to explain the data deemed positive evidence.
Tim:
>>Of course not. You are certainly free to explore the possibility
>>of other explanations such as special intervention. And when you're
>>done, report back on how you were able justify the auxilliary hypotheses
>>about a designer which you must invoke to get a testable or at least,
>>a positively descriptive model of an intelligent designer (see the
>>Sober reference, please).
Mike:
>As I explained in my last message, one can simply employ
>the same basic explanatory strategy you employed to argue
>myoglobin was the product of mutation, drift, and natural
>selection.
Tim:
>>In my last letter, I suggested some formulations or auxilliary
>>assumptions about a designer that might positively identify its
>>interaction. I didn't provide those particular models of possible
>>designer methods to defend them; they were included to demonstrate
>>that positive models *could be* formulated.
Mike:
>But those were more than "positive models." Those were
>essentially *proofs* of design. Like I said before, I
>don't see why a design inference must be a certain proof.
>One can make positive models just as I explained in
>my previous message.
Tim:
>They weren't proofs, they were examples of what to look for,
>based on assumptions of a particular mode or type of design.
I'm sorry, but I interpreted those examples as an expression
of one's need for certainty. Let's re-consider one. When I
asked what data you would interpret as "positive evidence,"
you suggested the following:
"It is also not impossible for a designer to bury a series of 1x4x9
black obelisks around the world in various geological strata
(or on the moon or in orbit around Jupiter). This obelisk could
have inscriptions which depict the organisms living at any
particular time along with diagrams specifically indicating how
the organisms were modified. It might also depict organisms
which we have not yet found and thus provide a predictive
test for what we may find in the future."
Now, I will point out that if indeed we found these black
obelisks, this would be far more than "positive evidence."
These would essentially constitute a proof in that it would
be intellectually impossible to attribute them to anything
other than design and yet still remain rational. But I still
don't see why an ID explanation must amount to this
type of proof.
Tim:
>In contrast, about the only conclusion we can come to now about
>a potential designer for life on earth is that it apparently left
>a lot of room open for evolution.
Yes, that would be one conclusion and one that makes
a lot of sense. If one was to design something and deposit
it on the planet for some reason, the mechanisms responsible
for what we call evolution would actually serve
to preserve this designed state by allowing it to be replicated
and modified in accord with the open environment. The
only other potential designer would essentially be a puppet
master, who would have to continually design everything
to ensure the show goes on. And ID does not entail any
notion that the designer must be a puppet-master (nor does
Christian theology).
Me:
>This need for proof is very interesting. Many deny
>outright that design is behind any biological feature, thus
>what is needed (I suppose) is some form of certain proof of design.
>Isn't there plenty of room between a complete denial of X
>and certain proof of X? If one is going to eventually adopt
>a belief about X, doesn't it *begin* with suspicions, then
>evolves into a growing conviction in light of a pattern of
>evidence? I've never seen anyone jump from complete
>denial to certain proof.
Tim:
>No?
Nope, I never have.
>All it takes is a few well-placed data points.
I don't agree. The human brain employs both
bottom-up and top-down processing and, because of this,
well-placed data points that imply explanation X are often open
to reinterpretation so that they don't imply X. This
is all the more true when we are talking about very
ancient, nonobservable, contingent events. History
is rarely captured by a few well-placed data points,
especially when the interpretation of history goes
well beyond an objective analysis of history (as these
origin debates do). It's comforting to pretend we humans
can objectively place data points with everything, but
I see very little evidence of this.
Tim:
>And we're not starting from complete denial here (at
>least I'm not), but from an apparent lack of positive evidence.
You may not have complete denial, but I think that this
is indeed the effective state given what you yourself have
said to be possible examples of positive evidence. Thus, when
you claim there is a lack of positive evidence for ID, it
simply means there are no black obelisks (or something
analogous). Given what you expect from ID if it is true,
I'm not sure why you think you would be able to perceive
positive evidence if it exists. Reread my point. What
data could exist that would cause you to *suspect* ID?
I'm not asking for something that would convince you or
prove ID, just data that might raise suspicions of ID.
If you can't cite what it is that would merely raise suspicions,
I'm afraid your brain might have been conditioned to
miss any evidence of ID that might exist (you will concede
only the black obelisks, etc.). I should make it clear I am
not trying to be offensive here; I just think we all need to
be quite aware of how it is that we actually approach the
world.
Tim:
>>I agree that those examples could seem ridiculous or unusual (or not
>>palatable to Christian beliefs), but nonetheless they do provide
>>positive models and produce distinguishable differences from natural
>>explanations. But again, I'm not about to defend such models; I'm
>>asking "design theorists" to present theirs.
Mike:
>So in what way is the standard evolutionary account a positive model
>that produces distinguishable differences from an explanation that
>employs intelligent design? Why do you want the ID crowd to
>come up with something that cannot possibly be explained without
>ID when science does not find things that cannot possibly be
>explained without evolution? Why can't a design theorist do
>exactly what the non-design crowd does?
Tim:
>Whoa now. I'm asking myself, "Why doesn't science find things that
>cannot possibly be explained without evolution?" and coming up with
>the answer: "Perhaps that's because evolution was the mechanism?"
Perhaps, but perhaps it is also tied with the immense
flexibility (and lack of rigorous competion) that is often
associated with evolutionary explanations.
[BTW (as an aside), I do not view evolution as a mechanism. This
perception causes many to think of evolution to be in the same category
as a force of nature, like gravity. Evolution is simply a label used to
describe a pattern of contingent events. This is significant
since so much of evolutionary explanations rely on vague
extrapolations. It's one thing to extrapolate a law of nature,
but it's entirely another to extrapolate contingent events.]
Tim:
>Or do you possibly mean that there are no scenarios incompatible with
>evolution? In that case I would refer you back to Elliott Sober's
>books on the philosophy of biology.
I meant what I wrote. Explanations that exclude design
never argue that the only possible explanation is the
one that excludes design. Now, unless one feels that
these explanations are so weak they require a handicap,
I don't see why ID explanations have to amount to the
only possible explanation.
I'll try to reply to the rest of Tim's reply at a later date.
Mike