Mike:
>>> I think all of this misses the point. The point is that CSI *is*
>>> positive evidence of mind's intervention.
Tim replied:
>>Dembski is pretty specific where we wants to go with CSI. He is
>>trying to develop a means of demonstrating that CSI cannot arise
>>via natural mechanisms.
Mike:
>This is not how I would use it, thus I'll skip ahead.
OK, we'll call it "MSCI" for "Mike's CSI".
Mike:
>>> It is a very common way that mind leaves it traces behind (as shown,
>>> for example, by the archives of this listing). That some other dynamic
>>> "might" generate CSI does not remove CSI from the category of evidence
>>> of mind's intervention. After all, below you cite similarities as
>>> positive evidence of evolution, yet a common designer "might" likewise
>>> have generated these similarities.
Tim:
>>Explain to me exactly what pattern a common (or uncommon) designer
>>couldn't produce. Then compare that to the pattern that an IPU
>>(Invisible Pink Unicorn) might generate. I'd like to see how to
>>differentiate models. Divine design explanations have the potential
>>advantage in that they are not limited by need to explain mechanisms,
>>but they are also hindered by their incredible flexibility, which
>>makes differentiation difficult. Hence the need for auxilliary or
>>amending hypotheses to make a nebulous idea more concrete and
>>applicable (more below...)
Mike:
>This is getting away from my point. I was simply noting that the
>similarities you attribute to evolution "might" be due to design. But
>this doesn't keep you from attributing such similarities to evolution.
>Well, in the same way, that CSI "might" be due to non-intelligent
>causation doesn't keep me from attributing CSI to design.
Nothing can stop you -- or anyone -- from attributing CSI to design.
But it does take the wind out of the sails of those (Dembski
& Johnson for example), who claim that CSI can only be due to
intelligence. So I'm trying to distinguish your understanding of CSI
(MCSI) from they way its original formulators understand it. I'd say
that you understand CSI better...
>Now, as for your point. I agree that invoking divine design entails
>all sorts of methodological headaches as far as flexibility is
>concerned. But I suspect that the problems only seem larger than
>they are and if one were to analyze a particular aspect of biological
>reality, he who invokes design and he who denies it would find
>specific interpretations to differ about. It's kind of like emptying
>that box full of pieces and parts to put together an entertainment
>center. It looks intimidating, but you just take it one step at a time
>and proceed gradually. The rest takes care of itself.
I agree that much of biology starts with classification and
collection, followed by synthesis of hypotheses.
Mike:
>Furthermore, don't forget I am a relativist on these matters.
I don't know what you mean by this. Does that mean you are agnostic
as to the proximate origin of life on earth and its subsequent
evolution?
>The approaches that exclude intelligent design seem likewise
>to suffer from flexibility problems. Natural selection has
>a history of being too "just-so"-like (we've just seen on this
>listing how natural selection seemed to be such a good
>explanation in accounting for no hollow bones among land animals,
>yet the reasoning conflicted with the evidence). Similarities
>need not be explained in terms of divergent evolution. One
>can always appeal to convergent evolution, horizontal
>transfer, and simple coincidence. And an approach which
>excludes design can (and does) always appeal to chance at
>some point or rely on "we don't know (yet)."
I agree. I do not believe that we will ever have enough information
to understand the detailed evolution of most of the biosphere.
You propose that it's "evolution PLUS ID". I'm very much interested
in seeing how one distinguishes "evolution" from "evolution PLUS ID".
This gets tricky.
Mike:
>>> Positive evidence for X does not mean that X is the one and only
>>> way to explain the data deemed positive evidence.
Tim:
>>Of course not. You are certainly free to explore the possibility
>>of other explanations such as special intervention. And when you're
>>done, report back on how you were able justify the auxilliary hypotheses
>>about a designer which you must invoke to get a testable or at least,
>>a positively descriptive model of an intelligent designer (see the
>>Sober reference, please).
Mike:
>As I explained in my last message, one can simply employ
>the same basic explanatory strategy you employed to argue
>myoglobin was the product of mutation, drift, and natural
>selection.
Tim:
>>In my last letter, I suggested some formulations or auxilliary
>>assumptions about a designer that might positively identify its
>>interaction. I didn't provide those particular models of possible
>>designer methods to defend them; they were included to demonstrate
>>that positive models *could be* formulated.
Mike:
>But those were more than "positive models." Those were
>essentially *proofs* of design. Like I said before, I
>don't see why a design inference must be a certain proof.
>One can make positive models just as I explained in
>my previous message.
They weren't proofs, they were examples of what to look for,
based on assumptions of a particular mode or type of design.
In contrast, about the only conclusion we can come to now about
a potential designer for life on earth is that it apparently left
a lot of room open for evolution.
>This need for proof is very interesting. Many deny
>outright that design is behind any biological feature, thus
>what is needed (I suppose) is some form of certain proof of design.
>Isn't there plenty of room between a complete denial of X
>and certain proof of X? If one is going to eventually adopt
>a belief about X, doesn't it *begin* with suspicions, then
>evolves into a growing conviction in light of a pattern of
>evidence? I've never seen anyone jump from complete
>denial to certain proof.
No? All it takes is a few well-placed data points. And we're not
starting from complete denial here (at least I'm not), but from
an apparent lack of positive evidence.
Tim:
>>I agree that those examples could seem ridiculous or unusual (or not
>>palatable to Christian beliefs), but nonetheless they do provide
>>positive models and produce distinguishable differences from natural
>>explanations. But again, I'm not about to defend such models; I'm
>>asking "design theorists" to present theirs.
Mike:
>So in what way is the standard evolutionary account a positive model
>that produces distinguishable differences from an explanation that
>employs intelligent design? Why do you want the ID crowd to
>come up with something that cannot possibly be explained without
>ID when science does not find things that cannot possibly be
>explained without evolution? Why can't a design theorist do
>exactly what the non-design crowd does?
Whoa now. I'm asking myself, "Why doesn't science find things that
cannot possibly be explained without evolution?" and coming up with
the answer: "Perhaps that's because evolution was the mechanism?"
Or do you possibly mean that there are no scenarios incompatible with
evolution? In that case I would refer you back to Elliott Sober's
books on the philosophy of biology.
>I'm starting to get the feeling that a double standard is
>in play here. You get to infer evolution behind myoglobin
>because you find evidence you would expect if evolution
>is true, you have a mechanism to extrapolate, and you
>think the case for design is no good. You don't have
>to come up with data that only evolution can explain.
What other natural mechanisms do you think explain the
patterns of life observed? If we're going to invoke
"supernatural" mechanisms or "intervention", then all
bets are off; in that case there is *no* data that only
evolution can explain. (see my description of IPUs below...)
>Yet the only thing you will consider as a positive model
>for design is the identification of things that only design
>can explain. The way I see it, to be balanced, design theorists
>should be allowed to adopt your "less-than-certain" approach
>or you should start by finding things only evolution can
>explain (to rule out the possibility that design "might"
>be behind it).
ID'ers are certainly welcome to adopt my "less-than-certain"
approach. But they'd better be pretty honest about the shortcomings
and current lack of a theory that pulls anything together. And
they had better find some way of distiguishing between natural
mechanisms and supernatural ones, because ultimately, that's the
only way that progress will be made. Paul Nelson, for one, openly
admits this necessity.
Tim:
>>It's not sufficient for a good model to merely match the output of
>>another, or to rely on negative evidence; it must hope to provide
>>a differentiatible example or one that positively explains why one
>>possible result is favored over another that a competing theory
>>cannot provide.
Mike:
>So what has science shown that a design explanation cannot
>provide?
I'd rephrase it: "What _can't_ a design explanation _not_ provide?"
Let's take the following statement:
"The world was made last Tuesday with the perfect appearance
of age by Invisible Pink Unicorns."
This is a perfectly valid "design" explanation that is completely
at odds with but yet is indistinguishable from a "natural"
explanation of great age. However, were we to see other
evidence that a cosmic Loki-designer is indeed at work
(ie. find alternate, orthogonal support for the young-
universe idea), we might be able to distinguish between the
alternatives.
Tim:
>>Sure, a designer can make something very complex
>>biologically. However, there is a competing explanation which
>>suggests that there can be "non-intelligent" routes to
>>biological complexity.
Mike:
>So? I think we are not communicating because you are still
>looking for proofs of design (things that cannot possibly be
>explained by non-intelligent routes). I just think that's
>not a very helpful way of approaching this topic.
I disagree; identifying corraborating evidence from completely
different fields of inquiry can provide *powerful* support for
a theory. For example, let's propose that Noah's Ark really
existed and that a flood really covered all the land masses on
earth. We could look for support from geological evidence (many
possible lines of research here), biological evidence (species
distribution, genetic analyses of populations, fossil records),
and human records.
I think it's a wonderful way of approaching the question. I
agree I'm being more hard-nosed on this subject. That's because
I am a discussing this from the standpoint of doing science
(methodological naturalism). I'm also asking: "What does
proposing intelligent intervention get you, scientifically?"
If you can find Sober's work on the subject (Philosophy of
Biology), you might see where I'm coming from.
Tim:
>>So how do I choose between possible explanations?
Mike:
>But you apparently have. You do think that myoglobin
>is the product of evolution, do you not? What was
>the basis for your choice?
I think that myoglobin was the product of evolution, but
I do not know the origin of its ultimate globin precursor.
I _propose_ natural mechanisms because:
1) I haven't seen any other "interventionist intelligence" at work.
2) I haven't seen any auxilliary evidence of a past interventionist
intelligence.
3) Consequentially, I have no idea how to frame an inverventionst
explanation that is anything but a just-so story.
I recognize that hypotheses about natural mechanisms may be
just-so stories as well, but I would argue that past experience
suggests that many naturalistic just-so stories have the potential
for being validated in the future, and also provide a decent direction
for further work.
Let's take "car-key gnomes" as another example of the problem. I
propose that car-key gnomes steal the keys from our pockets and hide
them somewhere in our houses. Now, I don't know what sort of powers
or methods of cloaking they possess, but I really think car-key gnomes
exist. What allows you to believe that they don't exist or, if we can't
confirm their existence today, that they didn't exist in the past?
What's the basis for the decision? Something to do with a razor or
something?
Mike:
>In the end, I suspect it all boils down to a judgment call, as
>this may be one place in epistemology where our inability to arrive
>at certainty is not helped much by science. Thus, at the
>most we might have two parallel explanations and our
>perception of their relative merits might be a function of
>other background beliefs.
Until more work is done and an answer becomes possible, then I agree
it is a philosophical choice. However, as a research program I don't
see ID as viable alternative at this time.
*** *** *** *** ***
Tim:
>>Now in regard to globin's origin; I don't think this will be a
>>productive subject to investigate in this area. The reason is that
>>globin's origin is ancient and apparently shared between all the
>>kingdoms.
Mike:
>I don't agree. Yes, the methodological problems pose a headache.
>But by postulating design near life's origin, one need take only
>a modest step away from Van Till's attractive approach. Recall
>that I am curious about a hybrid of Van Till's and Dembski's
>approach.
It is not a modest step from Van Till's approach, IMO; Howard
envisions a universe infused with the CSI necessary to generate
life. Yours proposes the universe can generate almost everything
but life. We _can_ postulate design near life's origin. We can
also postulate an origin on another world under different conditions
followed by some event of panspermia. Neither of these options are
particularly appealing from a research point of view because they
can place the origin events beyond our "reach" or understanding
(which may be true regardless of actual origins). One caveat is
that at least the panspermia hypothesis has the potential of being
confirmed in the future; all bets are off as to whether a designer
would show its hand again.
I won't (& don't) rule out intervention mechanisms, but again, I don't
see how one can go very far with such an assumption, at least not
with that as the sole assumption.
Tim:
>>Thus it is likely that the last common ancestor of all
>>life already contained it and looking back to see what was there
>>*before* this common ancestor will be very difficult if not
>>impossible to do. It is better, I think, to look instead at more
>>recently acquired components. That's because we're more likely to
>>detect the presence or absence of evolvable intermediates; assuming
>>related organisms which lack the feature can be identified. So if
>>one is going to test whether a gift suddenly appeared in a lineage,
>>it would be better to choose a more recently acquired "gift" in a
>>system where noise has not had a chance to degrade the signal.
Mike:
>Okay, then let's consider important molecules apparently
>not present in the last common ancestor of all life, namely,
>ubiquitin and actin. These proteins play central house-keeping
>roles among all eukaryotes and demonstrate extreme sequence
>conservation over very long periods of time. Now you have
>the entire bacterial and archaebacterial domains to survey
>in order to find "evolvable intermediates."
Excellent! You've proposed another auxilliary assumption about
a designer that potentially lends itself to testing (The initial
assumption was that a creator intervened to create life at least
once).
Aux. Assumption #2: A designer didn't create a single form of
life, but at least two separate forms.
Hmm... Ubiquitin and actin are interesting choices -- Ancient,
with strong functional constrains, and possibly exapted into
new roles around the time of the origin of eukaryotes. But, FWIW,
potential myosin and actin-like proteins have been identified in
prokaryotes (I also found a cyanobacterial connection in Medline
as well). A lot of this work is relatively recent (mid to late
1990's), although I can find a reference that dates back to 1992
from Russ Doolittle (Protein Sci 1992 Feb;1(2):191-200). Now,
when I was learning about myosin and actin back in grad school
the information was much more scanty, but it appears that some
progress is being made.
On the whole, and given other similarities between eukaryotes
and prokayrotes, I'd conclude that Aux Assumption #1 is false:
A creator did not separately create two forms of life. This
leads to:
Aux Assumption #3: A creator reformulated one form of life,
prokaryotes, made some additions, and created the eukaryotes.
Let's evaluate ubiquitin: Hmm... I don't know. I don't see an
easy connection there, yet.
OK, so it looks like Aux Assumption #3 is still in the running.
Does it pass any reasonable test of distinguishability from
natural mechanisms?
Ancient (2+ billion years), and somewhat small proteins (ubiquitin
& actin) with high levels of sequence conservation and (sometimes)
strong functional constraints aren't exactly what I had in mind
when I proposed my test criteria (see above). All those factors
can obscure information about origins. In contrast, examples such
as the evolvability of the blood clotting system (an example cited
by Behe) have a greater potential of being resolved one way or the
other. I would even look for more recent, potential "interventions"
by a designer -- ones where the signals from the molecular data and
phylogenetic connections would not have had time to degrade.
I'm not looking for examples that merely "could have been the
result of special creation events" but those that really make
the decent case for special intervention. Would you agree that
all things being equal, the more recent the event, the more likely
the source has a chance of being positively identified?
Regards,
Tim Ikeda
tikeda@sprintmail.hormel.com (despam address before use)