Re: "Scientific" position on philosophical questions

Chris Cogan (ccogan@sfo.com)
Sat, 10 Jul 1999 11:06:52 -0700

> Chris,
>
> > Whether free will is barred by determinism depends on what free will IS,
> > doesn't it? I don't think they are incompatible at all. Why should they
be
> > incompatible?
>
John
> Because determinism says that all of our actions are determined without
> remainder by factors completely beyond our control. It's not possible
that
> we be morally responsible for actions that are completely determined by
> things beyond our control.

Chris
Well, yes and no. The issue I was questioning was free will and determinism,
not responsibility and determinism. Determinism is simply the view that
everything happens according to strict causal principles. This excludes
conventional mainstream theories of free will, but it does not exclude ALL
theories of free will.

Freedom with respect to what? Your phrasing may be misleading: "determined
without remainder by factors completely beyond our control." If you had
said, "determined without remainder by what we are at the time of acting,"
it would have a less misleading flavor. The way you state it makes it seem
that there might be factors outside ourselves somehow forcing us along a
particular path of behavior, whereas I would say that we simply do what our
strongest motives would have us do at the time of acting.

Would you RATHER do something ELSE? Suppose you have long held the
principle, both in belief and in action, that stealing is wrong? Do you WANT
to be free, in a metaphysical sense, to violate this principle, even at
times when you don't want to, when you still think it's wrong to do so, and
you know you have nothing to gain from it?

John
> With traditional materialistic (v., say, theological) determinism, you can
> add that all of our action is ultimately completely non-rational, as well.
>
> (Of course, one can re-define "free" and "rational" to fit materialism,
but
> this just shows the flexibility of language, not the strength of
> materialism.)

<snip>
Chris
> > since, regardless of whether the mind is
> > matter-based or based on something else, the same questions arise
> > as to how
> > it functions. If there actually exists something that is non-matter in
the
> > sense of being neither dependent on matter nor on whatever basic
substance
> > matter is based on or made of, then, it, too, must exhibit the same
basic
> > causal laws as does anything else: What it IS logically specifies what
it
> > DOES, because, ultimately, what it does simply IS what it is.
>
John
> This seems to me like a series of implausible assertions with no reasons
> given to believe them.

Chris
It's just the principle of causation: The law of identity applied to change.
The only way anything exhibits its identity is via causal relations. If an
alleged metal cube behaved EXACTLY like a metal sphere, it would BE a
sphere.

If you wish to proclaim that there are exceptions to it (and therefore to
the law of identity), you have the burden of proof (*IF* you can still prove
anything without assuming the law of identity! :-) ).