On Mon, 14 Jun 1999 14:14:41 -0600, Susan Brassfield wrote:
[...]
SB>what you and Johnson seem to omit in this discussion is that there is no
>evidence at all for "divine feet. What *is* the evidence? Since you say "no
>matter what the evidence for it is" you seem to imply that you (or Johnson)
>have some. Can you share a few tidbits?
Susan is like a `hanging judge' who tells the defendant that the court will
not accept that he has any evidence, and then asks him what it is!
Maybe Susan can tell us in advance what evidence for the "Divine foot" she
would accept?
On Sun, 13 Jun 1999 20:19:45 -0700 Chris Cogan (ccogan@sfo.com) wrote:
[...]
SJ>The point is that Lewontin would not even allow the Divine Foot in the door
>*no matter* what the "test" was. He (and all materialist-naturalists) rule
>out the "Divine foot" *absolutely* no matter what the evidence for it is.
CC>As a philosopher, so do I, because, in almost forty years of studying
>philosophy, I've yet to find a non-naturalist concept of anything that had
>the kind of cognitive basis I require for any concept that goes beyond
>minimalist naturalism, or even one, as far as I know, that was even
>coherent.
That is not really very surprising since if one is a materialist-naturalist,
he/she would not even grant that there *was* any "cognitive basis" to a
"non-naturalist concept."
GC>I've never found anyone who could explain a non-natural
>immaterialist whatsit in terms that could, in principle, be cognitively
>justified by the kind of "evidence" offered for them.
The problem is not so much in the explaining but in the metaphysical
framework of the materialist-naturalist the "non-natural" concept is being
explained to. That is why Chris puts "evidence" in quotes. As a materialist-
naturalist he *cannot* conceive that there could be any evidence for a
"non-naturalist concept of anything."
CC>But, as a scientific methodologist, my objection is much more limited:
>Non-naturalism makes claims that are outside the scope empirical method, and
>therefore outside the scope of science.
This is true only if "the scope of science" is limited to what is material and
natural. But apart from the preference of the dominant materialist-naturalist
philosophy, there is no reason why science should be so limited.
CC>As Johnson comments on this:
>
SJ>"That paragraph is the most insightful statement of what is at issue in the
>creation/evolution controversy that I have ever read from a senior figure
>in the scientific establishment. It explains neatly how the theory of
>evolution can seem so certain to scientific insiders, and so shaky to the outsiders.
>For scientific materialists the materialism comes first; the science comes
>thereafter." (Johnson P.E., "The Unraveling of Scientific Materialism,"
>First Things, 77, November 1997, pp22-25...)
CC>It doesn't really matter, since science simply CAN'T study the non-natural
>of the metaphysical, non-empirical kind.
This is simply false. Sciences like archaeology, forensic science, and
exobiology study the *effects* of intelligent design on the natural world.
CC>It's like trying to see with your
>ears, or experience sex by means of mathematical calculations. It may be
>possible to apply mathematical concepts to sex, but it is not possible (for
>a human, at least) to EXPERIENCE sex by making mathematical calculations.
There is an element of truth in this, in that materialist-naturalists first need
to admit that there can be intelligent design before they can "see" it:
"...if people wilfully close their eyes...they will not see" (Grasse P.-P.,
"Evolution of Living Organisms," 1977, p218).
CC>Secondly, there is still the issues of burden of proof, coherency,
>cognitivity, and so forth for non-materialist (or at least, non-NATURALIST)
>claims. We naturalists are still waiting for a sound explanation of and
>cognitive basis for such concepts and claims, with even a fraction of the
>cognitive basis that naturalism has.
Materialist-naturalists will be "waiting" *forever* until they admit that
there can be Intelligent Design. To admit Intelligent Design, they need
to (at least temporarily) suspend their faith in materialism-naturalism.
CC>This will be hard to do, because
>non-naturalism's claims, being, almost by definition, BEYOND evidence, will
>require very peculiar support.
Is Chris here pulling his punches because he knows at a deeper level that
he is conceding my point? The fact is "non-naturalism's claims" are not
"almost by definition, BEYOND evidence" they are "BY DEFINITION, beyond
evidence." "Our materialism is ABSOLUTE. We CANNOT ALLOW the Divine foot
in the door."
CC>As I said before: Naturalism is minimalist.
That is only if you are a metaphysical naturalist. To a philosophical theist,
*Theism* is minimalist. Metaphysical naturalists must believe in non-
minimalist auxiliary hypotheses to support their so-called "minimalist"
position. For example, many (if not most) materialist naturalists believe that
there must be an *infinity* of universes in order to explain the evidence for
intelligent design of just *one* universe:
"In the 1950s, for instance, Fred Hoyle discovered that the step-by-step
build-up of heavy elements inside stars depends on a series of spectacular
coincidences. Only if the nuclei of beryllium-8, carbon-12 and oxygen-16
exist in particular energy states can hydrogen be built up into the elements
of life such as calcium, magnesium and iron. This fine-tuning has two
possible explanations. Either the Universe was designed specifically for us
by a creator or there is a multitude of universes--a `multiverse'" (Chown
M., "Anything Goes," New Scientist, 6 June 1998, Vol. 158, No. 2137,
pp26-30. http://www.newscientist.com/ns/980606/features.html)
A theist on the other hand has one ultimate simple explanation for everything:
"Why believe that there is a God at all? My answer is that to suppose that
there is a God explains why there is a world at all; why there are the
scientific laws there are; why animals and then human beings have evolved;
why humans have the opportunity to mould their characters and those of
their fellow humans for good or ill and to change the environment in which
we live; why we have the well-authenticated account of Christ's life, death
and resurrection; why throughout the centuries men have had the apparent
experience of being in touch with and guided by God; and so much else. In
fact, the hypothesis of the existence of God makes sense of the whole of
our experience, and it does so better than any other explanation which can
be put forward, and that is the grounds for believing it to be true."
(Swinburne R.G., "The Justification of Theism," Truth: An International,
Inter-Disciplinary Journal of Christian Thought, Volume 3, 1991.
http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth09.html)
CC>ALL non-other claims go BEYOND naturalism and REQUIRE special evidence, and
>special explanation of the factual claims (i.e., immaterial things that
>exist independently of matter or "material," etc.).
Chris' statement above is but one example of an "immaterial thing that exists
independently of matter."
CC>I will take a look at the cited piece by Johnson, but I'm prepared not to be
>impressed; in the past, he has struggled mightily to evade the whole burden
>of proof issue with respect to his basic claim that naturalism and
>non-naturalist theories should be given equal initial credence, expecting us
>to take it seriously as a reasonable "alternative" to naturalism.
Again note that Chris puts "alternative" in quotes. This again supports my
thesis that it is impossible for a materialist-naturalist to conceieve that
there could be a real alternative to naturalism.
Actually one of the major themes of Phil's writings is that he does *not* expect
materialist-naturalists to take "seriously" Intelligent design "as a reasonable
alternative" to naturalism. His aim is to persuade the 95% of the public
who are not philosophical materialist-naturalists, that what we call modern
science has been taken over by the 5% who are.
CC>He is yet
>another who does not grasp that such a position requires special evidence,
>special argument, and special explanation that the less ambitious naturalism
>does not.
Actually what Chris really means is *no* evidence is possible. To test this,
I will ask him, like I asked Susan, to specify in advance what evidence would
he accept for Intelligent Design?
CC>If I tell you that someone who died was killed by aliens from
>Alpha Centauri, you'd require a different kind and strength of evidence and
>argument than If I simply told you he was dead and showed you the body in
>the morgue, cut up into several pieces.
No doubt. But no one is arguing that "someone who died was killed by" God.
Intelligent Design theory is about unique *origin* events, not about the
ongoing *operations* of the cosmos:
"Norman L. Geisler and J. Kerby Anderson have distinguished between
operation science and origin science. They argue that appealing to God as a
personal first cause is legitimate in the latter but not the former. Operation
science is an empirical approach to the world that focuses on repeatable,
regularly recurring events or patterns in nature (e.g., chemical reactions or
the relationship between current, voltage, and resistance in a circuit).
Operation science tests theories against these recurring patterns of events
and, theologically speaking, secondary causes are the only focus.
Secondary causation refers to God's acting mediately (i.e., through the
instrumentality of natural laws); primary causation refers to God's acting
immediately (i.e., directly, such that discontinuities obtain in the world). In
contrast to operation science, origin science focuses on past singularities
that are not repeatable (e.g., the origins of the universe, life, various life
forms, and mankind). Such singularities can have a personal first cause, and
it is within the domain of origin science to look for such causes. God, as a
term in origin science, means, roughly, a first cause of some discontinuity
or singularity who acts with intentionality in light of knowledge and
purpose." (Moreland J.P., "Christianity and the Nature of Science," 1989,
p225)
CC>You would rightly require even
>STRONGER, and even more radically different evidence if I claimed not only
>that the alien was from Alpha Centauri, but that he was infinitely large,
>infinitely powerful, infinitely knowledgeable, and lived in a "higher plane"
>that just happened to coincide with the location of Alpha Centauri in some
>fifteen-dimensional non-naturalist non-locational way. Or would you?
Chris in his desire to set up a straw man contradicts himself. If this "alien"
was in fact "infinitely large, infinitely powerful, infinitely knowledgeable,
and lived in a `higher plane'" He would not be living on Alpha Centauri. He
would not even be an "alien." He would in fact be God!
>SJ>And since the opposite of the Divine Foot in the door in Lewontin's quote
>was *materialism*, perhaps you could tell us what "empirical test"
>materialism would make of the type: "If we look in places where thus and so
>conditions are met, we will find fossilized whatsits"?
CC>That's easy: Make a materialist theory about evolution, use it to predict
>where the fossils will be, and then dig there and see if the fossils ARE
>there.
There is nothing in this "test" that is necessarily "materialism." The outlines
of the fossil record were well-known and developed by *theists* a century before
Darwin's materialistic "theory about evolution." Indeed, Darwin's materialistic
"theory about evolution" did not pass an "empirical test" of the fossil record,
as Darwin himself admitted:
"But I do not pretend that I should ever have suspected how poor was the
record in the best preserved geological sections, had not the absence of
innumerable transitional links between the species which lived at the
commencement and close of each formation, pressed so hardly on my
theory." (Darwin C.R., "The Origin of Species," 6th Edition, 1928, reprint,
p311)
What I wanted was exact *details* of a *specific* fossil prediction that is an
"epirical test" of materialism to the exclusion of the "Divine foot".
CC>If they are not, make corrections in the theory, make new
>predictions, test THEM, and so on. The success of this "materialist" method
>suggests that it's a good one for the kinds of questions empirical science
>deals with.
See above. First tell us *exactly* what these "predictions" of "materialism" were.
CC>That's how science works. Every time a materialist theory works, it tends to
>refute or weaken any non-materialist theory that would not make the same
>predictions (or, in some cases, any testable predictions at all).
See above. I await Chris telling us what *exactly* was his "testable prediction"
that his "materialist theory" *uniquely* made that "*any* non-materialist
theory...would not make".
CC>Of course, reflecting the question back to me does not answer it as I asked
>it, so the variant remains hanging in the air, unanswered.
I am not simply reflecting the question back to Chris. He made a claim that the
"Scientific method" (by which he means "a materialist theory") could make a
an empirically testable prediction that:
>"If we look in places where thus and so conditions are met, we will find fossilized
>whatsits."
I want to know if his claim is true. What empirically testable prediction of
finding *a specific type of fossil* does a scientific method based on materialism
make that a scientific theory based on theism could not in principle make?
Steve
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"The concept of organic evolution is very highly prized by biologists, for
many of whom it is an object of genuinely religious devotion, because they
regard it as a supreme integrative principle. This is probably the reason why
severe methodological criticism employed in other departments of biology
has not yet been brought to bear on evolutionary speculation." (Conklin
E.G., "Man Real and Ideal," Scribner, 1943, p147, in Macbeth N., "Darwin
Retried: An Appeal to Reason," Gambit: Boston MA, 1971, pp126-127)
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