Chris:
As a philosopher, so do I, because, in almost forty years of studying
philosophy, I've yet to find a non-naturalist concept of anything that had
the kind of cognitive basis I require for any concept that goes beyond
minimalist naturalism, or even one, as far as I know, that was even
coherent. I've never found anyone who could explain a non-natural
immaterialist whatsit in terms that could, in principle, be cognitively
justified by the kind of "evidence" offered for them.
But, as a scientific methodologist, my objection is much more limited:
Non-naturalism makes claims that are outside the scope empirical method, and
therefore outside the scope of science.
> As
>Johnson comments on this:
>
>"That paragraph is the most insightful statement of what is at issue in the
>creation/evolution controversy that I have ever read from a senior figure
in
>the scientific establishment. It explains neatly how the theory of
evolution
>can seem so certain to scientific insiders, and so shaky to the outsiders.
For
>scientific materialists the materialism comes first; the science comes
>thereafter." (Johnson P.E., "The Unraveling of Scientific Materialism,"
>First Things, 77, November 1997, pp22-25.
>http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9711/johnson.html)
Chris
It doesn't really matter, since science simply CAN'T study the non-natural
of the metaphysical, non-empirical kind. It's like trying to see with your
ears, or experience sex by means of mathematical calculations. It may be
possible to apply mathematical concepts to sex, but it is not possible (for
a human, at least) to EXPERIENCE sex by making mathematical calculations.
Secondly, there is still the issues of burden of proof, coherency,
cognitivity, and so forth for non-materialist (or at least, non-NATURALIST)
claims. We naturalists are still waiting for a sound explanation of and
cognitive basis for such concepts and claims, with even a fraction of the
cognitive basis that naturalism has. This will be hard to do, because
non-naturalism's claims, being, almost by definition, BEYOND evidence, will
require very peculiar support. As I said before: Naturalism is minimalist.
ALL non-other claims go BEYOND naturalism and REQUIRE special evidence, and
special explanation of the factual claims (i.e., immaterial things that
exist independently of matter or "material," etc.).
I will take a look at the cited piece by Johnson, but I'm prepared not to be
impressed; in the past, he has struggled mightily to evade the whole burden
of proof issue with respect to his basic claim that naturalism and
non-naturalist theories should be given equal initial credence, expecting us
to take it seriously as a reasonable "alternative" to naturalism. He is yet
another who does not grasp that such a position requires special evidence,
special argument, and special explanation that the less ambitious naturalism
does not. If I tell you that someone who died was killed by aliens from
Alpha Centauri, you'd require a different kind and strength of evidence and
argument than If I simply told you he was dead and showed you the body in
the morgue, cut up into several pieces. You would rightly require even
STRONGER, and even more radically different evidence if I claimed not only
that the alien was from Alpha Centauri, but that he was infinitely large,
infinitely powerful, infinitely knowledgeable, and lived in a "higher plane"
that just happened to coincide with the location of Alpha Centauri in some
fifteen-dimensional non-naturalist non-locational way. Or would you?
Stephen
>And since the opposite of the Divine Foot in the door in Lewontin's quote
>was *materialism*, perhaps you could tell us what "empirical test"
materialism
>would make of the type: "If we look in places where thus and so conditions
are
>met, we will find fossilized whatsits"?
Chris
That's easy: Make a materialist theory about evolution, use it to predict
where the fossils will be, and then dig there and see if the fossils ARE
there. If they are not, make corrections in the theory, make new
predictions, test THEM, and so on. The success of this "materialist" method
suggests that it's a good one for the kinds of questions empirical science
deals with.
That's how science works. Every time a materialist theory works, it tends to
refute or weaken any non-materialist theory that would not make the same
predictions (or, in some cases, any testable predictions at all).
Of course, reflecting the question back to me does not answer it as I asked
it, so the variant remains hanging in the air, unanswered.
Chris