Now I guess I'm a little confused. The reason I suggested those books
was that it seemed to me that you were familiar only with a particularly
narrow view of evolution sometimes referred to as ultra-Darwinism.
But if you have read Goodwin and Eldredge you must be aware that not
everyone takes the view that natural selection + random mutations is
capable of explaining all of macroevolution, yet you seem to present
this narrow view as if it is somehow representative of what scientists
believe about evolution.
>You said about materialism:
>>Perhaps I better elaborate a little more on this. I would tend to
>>make a much stronger claim than the above, it is not losing its
>>hold, its dead, buried almost a century ago.
>
>Bertvan:
>I don't think I agree with that. First, as long as anyone believes in
>materialism, it isn't "dead". I've met many people who freely claim to be
>materialists--and by my definition.
>
No doubt. But when I say dead I mean it in context of our original
discussion. Its dead in the sense that it no longer has a hold
on science that it once had. See my reply to Rich for further
elaboration on the narrow view of materialism that I prefer to
call mechanistic materialism.
Bertvan:
> Second, I don't believe philosophical positions can be "dead",
>"discredited", "buried" or anything else. Philosophical choices are
>personal-- made by each individual with their entire life experience as
>"evidence". Philosophical views can't be disproved by science.
>
Yes, I think I would agree. Science might address the physical
consequences of a philosophy, but not the philosophical views
themselves. This is what I had in mind with mechanistic materialism.
I suppose one could view this both as a philosophical worldview
as well as a physical theory. I was talking about the physical theory
whose main consequence is a deterministic clock-like universe.
Bertvan:
>And finally, it sounds like a facile way to try to get rid of a philosophy
>one doesn't like. I am tired of hearing ideas I find interesting have been
>"discredited". I am not by any definition a materialist, although I may have
>been at some time in the distant past. However, I will defend anyone's right
>to design their own personal philosophy without being told it is
>"unscientific". Science has no special expertise in philosophical matters.
>
Once again I agree.
Bertvan:
>We live in the most exciting time of human history. Until the internet,
>ideas were generally under control of those who happened to find themselves
>in power.
Sorry, Bertvan, but this is a little hard to swallow.
Bertvan:
>Who would have thought each individual might expound their own
>unique ideas, and someone would listen. Maybe only a dozen listeners, but
>that is more than anyone could have guaranteed in the past. I predict this
>rich mixture of ideas will be explosive, and I don't want to restrict
>anyone's input, including the views of materialists, Darwinists,
>creationists--or anyone else with whom I disagree.
>
>Brian:
>>My earlier statement "...this will very much depend upon exactly
>>what one means by materialism and determinism." Is very important.
>>I recall earlier your stating that you had read a lot of Johnson.
>>Apparently you were much influenced by Johnson (nothing wrong with
>>this :) as in another post you gave a definition of materialism
>>that seems very consistent with the way Phil uses the term:
>
>#"I thought materialism had a pretty specific definition.--That
>#nothing exists except matter and energy, and everything is
>#humanly understandable in those terms. That the universe is
>#the result of a series of accidents-- without plan, meaning or
>#purpose. What is your definition?"-- Bertvan
>
>Bertvan:
>If we settled the problem of definitions, we'd surely have less to disagree
>about.
>It is my understanding that methodological naturalism states that science can
>only address phenomena it can measure. Philosophical naturalism claims
>science can measure everything. I believe both Johnson and I agree with the
>first and disagree with the second.
>
I think here we may find a lot of agreement. A minor correction though first.
Claims about the power of science to unlock all secrets generally belong to
a view more commonly called scientism.
I've long had a "vision" that people of various views can find a common
ground in methodological naturalism (MN). This would require self-constraint
with for everyone with respect to mixing metaphysics with science.
I would welcome corrections on the following: It seems to me that a
significant majority of evolutionists on this list are methodological
naturalists when it comes to the practice of science. Unfortunately,
it seems there are practically no creationists who are methodological
naturalists. The only exception I know of is Burgy, but once again I
welcome corrections. In fact, I would be very happy to learn otherwise.
MN has been discussed extensively on this list in the past. Unfortunately,
things get somewhat more complicated than they seem at first. Let's take
Phillip Johnson as an example. On page 211 of <Reason in the Balance> Phil
defines a theistic naturalist as "a theist who thinks MN is the correct
approach to scientific inquiry and hence to understanding (for example)
how living things came into existence." As one reads through this section
one will probably come to the conclusion that Phil is not a methodological
naturalist :).
I can remember a long long time ago when Phil was still the moderator
of this group. There was quite a discussion surrounding Phil's
intended introduction of the term theistic naturalist (this was before
<Reason in the Balance> was published). Some one brought up something
Phil had said in 1992, asking whether he had changed his mind. Phil's
response, as best I remember, was very much like what he writes in
a footnote on page 212 of RitB. Let me reproduce it here:
======begin quote============================================
In a March 1992 lecture in Dallas I made the following observation:
The statement defining the agenda for this Symposium asserts
that an _a-priori_ commitment to metaphysical naturalism is
necessary to support Darwinism...._Methodological_ naturalism
--the principle that science can study only the things that
are accessible to its instruments and techniques--is not in
question. Of course science can study only what science
can study. Methodological naturalism becomes metaphysical
naturalism only when the limitations of science are taken
to be limitations upon reality (reference ommitted ...--BH).
I would not express the point that way today, but any seeming
inconsistency with the views stated in this paper is semantic
rather than substantive. The key question raised by the
qualifier _methodological_ is this: What is being limitted--
science or reality? When "methodological naturalism" is
combined with a very strong a-priori confidence that
materialistic theories invoking only unintelligent causes
can account for such phenomena as genetic information and
human intelligence, the distinction between methodological
naturalism and metaphysical naturalism tends to collapse.
(Example: "Science can study only naturalistic mechanisms;
therefore we can be confident that life must have arisen
by a naturalistic mechanism, since science continually
advances and solves problems of this kind.") That science
has its limitations is not in doubt; the question is whether
unsound assumptions about reality have been made to permit
science to escape those limitations.
-- Phillip Johnson <Reason in the Balance> p. 212 (footnote)
=================================================================
I find his parenthetical example interesting. I sincerely
doubt very many scientists are going to make such an obvious
blunder in logic.
>>>>> I''d be interested in hearing comments about the
>>>>> following web site:
>>>>> http://www.scientificamerican.com/0997issue/0997infocus.html
>
>Brian:
>>Perhaps because all the evidence suggested that mutations were not
>>directed? The important point is genetic variation. BTW, in the
>>study you cited, was there selection?
>
>Bertvan:
>I believe so. I don't think many people deny selection is a factor in nature.
>
OK, so how then would those results be contrary to Darwinism?
>Brian:
>>You seem to me to be too centered in on ultra-Darwinism. Even if u-D were to
>>fail completely it would not provide any evidence for design. You
>>don't find evidence for one theory by knocking down another. This
>>is a logical fallacy known as the argument from the false alternative.
>
>Bertvan:
>True. I'm not sure evidence can be developed for design. It might be a
>philosophical position. However, that doesn't provide evidence for "random
>mutation and natural selection" as a mechanism of macro evolution.
>
agreed.
Brian Harper
Associate Professor
Applied Mechanics
The Ohio State University
"All kinds of private metaphysics and theology have
grown like weeds in the garden of thermodynamics"
-- E. H. Hiebert