Hi Rich, thanks for your comments. I fear I was a little sloppy
in my first post which may have resulted in some confusion. Let
me try again. I never meant to imply in any way that materialism
is dead. What I was saying is that a particular form of materialism,
popular in the 17th century, is dead. I gave all the various names
that I had heard this view referred to in the hopes that people
familiar with the philosophy of science would recognize it. What
I failed to do, unfortunately, was to give a definition :). This
was a blunder since, as you mention below, there are some aspects
of the definition Bertvan gave which probably don't belong as
part of the definition, though some may still believe that they
are consequences of the view.
My preferred name for the type of materialism I was referring to
is mechanistic materialism for several reasons (a) it arose from
the successes of mechanics (b) it emphasizes mechanisms in a very
mechanical way :), viewing the universe as nothing but a huge machine,
(c) it implies that other types of materialism are possible.
OK, I believe the best definition of mechanistic materialism would
be that used by its adherents. Everything is matter and motion.
Today, energy is often thrown in, but in the view of mechanistic
materialists energy is a consequence of the motion of matter.
How would one identify a mechanistic materialist? Perhaps by looking
at what MM's thought to be the chief consequence of the mechanical
view of nature. Basically, the chief claim was that given the
present state of the universe plus physical laws, all future
states of the universe are specified, i.e. extreme determinism.
be the absence of free will.
Rich:==
>(1) Nothing exists except matter and energy.
>
>I've seen at least one philosopher claim that abstract things like
>propositions exist, thus falsifying this statement, but I contend that
>this is an equivocation on the word "exists". Matter and energy exist
>in a different *way* than abstract things.
>
>The real point of (1) is that immaterial spirits and vital forces
>don't exist. That's my opinion, anyway. Seen in this light, (1)
>is far from dead.
>
Yes, but saying that "...immaterial spirits and vital forces don't
exist" is quite different from saying that only matter and energy
(or motion) exist. Thus, if this is the key point, it might
be better to define materialism something like this:
"every natural event must have a bodily or material basis."
I put this in quotes because I found this in some book as a
possible definition of materialism. Unfortunately, I neglected to
write in my notes what book I took it from :).
In any event, I would not claim that this form of materialism
is dead. But this view does not necessarily have the same
consequences as the mechanistic view.
>(2) Everything is humanly understandable.
>
>I don't know why this should be part of the definition of materialism.
>It seems very likely to me that there are some things that are just
>too complex for our finite brains to understand.
>
>(3) Everything is understandable in terms of matter and energy.
>
>I was going to say that in *principle* I think everything can be
>explained in terms of physical law. But I changed my mind.
>
>I think it's logically impossible to understand everything. In
>response to any explanation, one can always ask, "But *why* is it
>that way?" Why does the universe obey this particular set of laws
>and not some other? Even if the answer is that there are an infinite
>number of universes, all with different laws, one can ask, "Why is it
>that way?" Even if the answer is, "God did it," one can ask, "Why
>did God do it that way? And where did God come from? How did God
>exist forever?"
>
>Since this problem exists for both materialists and theists, (2) and
>(3) should be deleted from the definition of materialism.
>
Agreed. That should be a part of what would normally be called
scientism.
>(4) The universe is the result of a series of accidents.
>
>I take this to refer to current conditions within our universe,
>rather than the origin of the universe. For example, it means that
>the evolution of intelligent life on Earth was partly a matter of
>chance.
>
>Whether you want to say that chance or physical law is more important
>is perhaps a matter of taste, but certainly the universe is not
>*completely* the result of a series of accidents. Perhaps what
>Bertvan really means by (4) is that there is no intelligence
>in control of the universe. *That* is certainly something all
>materialists woulld agree with.
>
>(5) There is no plan, meaning, or purpose in the universe.
>
>Materialists would agree that the universe as a *whole* has no
>purpose, but that does *not* mean that purposes cannot exist *within*
>the universe. People have purposes. Even animals have purposes.
>There is no comprehensive meaning of life, but people can invent
>individual meanings for parts of their lives.
>
I really should have objected to this part of Bertvan's definition.
Come to think of it, I had objected to it previously :). In the
mechanistic materialist view there really is no room for real
chance. There may in fact be things we have to deal with as if
they were by chance (i.e. probabilistic theories), but this is
more a consequence of our lack of knowledge than it is a reflection
of reality.
Materialists today would probably go along with the chance, accident,
no purpose aspects of Bertvan's definition but the original
mechanistic materialists would not. In fact, paradoxically, most
of the originators of this view were theists.
Sidelight: Why did I bother getting into all this? I remembered your
original response to Bertvan:
#I *think* that Brian was referring to the indeterminacy of quantum
#mechanics. Deterministic materialism has indeed lost its hold, but
#materialism certainly has not. Vitalism is dead, at least in the
#scientific community. -- Rich
I would generally tend to agree that most scientists, if asked,
would say that they are materialists (if they have read much on
the philosophy of science the may add methodological materialist).
Further, they would probably have in mind just what you mention.
What I was worried about is that someone familiar with Johnson's
writings might go to one of his books to find a definition for
materialism. With this definition and your statement above, their
worst fears might be confirmed. They may believe that most scientists
are materialists in the sense that Johnson defines the term. So
this was my point. Johnson uses a very narrow definition for
materialism and tries to convince the reader that for all practical
purposes all other types of materialism are identical with this
narrow view. He further tries to argue that naturalism is for all
practical purposes the same as materialism. What I believe he is
trying to do is identify practically all of science as being wedded
to an extremely narrow form of materialism.
I probably haven't explained this very well. For more detailed (and
considerably better) presentation of this, see Robert
Pennock's paper "Naturalism, Evidence and Creationism:The Case
of Phillip Johnson" in <Biology and Philosophy> 11:543-559, 1996.
[also see Phil's response to Pennock and Pennock's reply to that
response in the same issue of B&P>
Brian Harper
Associate Professor
Applied Mechanics
The Ohio State University
"All kinds of private metaphysics and theology have
grown like weeds in the garden of thermodynamics"
-- E. H. Hiebert