Re: A Note on Validation as a Broader Concept than that of Proof.
Earthlink (jzents@earthlink.net)
Sun, 6 Jun 1999 22:09:18 -0500>By "validated," I mean established by cognitive means other than conceptual
>argument from premises. Validation is a broader concept, and applies to
>basic conceptual identification of perceptual entities, for example. We
>can't prove, in a formal sense, that we are in pain when we drop a rock on
>our foot, but WE know, and can validate the claim that we are in pain by
>direct experience. If we limit beliefs to those that can be proved via the
>mode of formal arguments, we can't get anywhere because we can never
>establish any premises. But, like proof, validation has standards, which is
>one reason why there are so many disagreements among witnesses as to what
>happened in auto accidents, etc.; people's standards differ (as well as do
>their abilities with respect to actually perceving what is going on). The
>point of my claim is that there are some premises that cannot be proved but
>that can be validated objectively, and then used to prove other things. One
>such is that one exists. You cannot prove, in a premise-conclusion sense,
>that you exist, but you can provide others with evidence of your existence
>that validates the idea that you do exist, and, of course, you have plenty
>of evidence to validate it for yourself. You can't PROVE to yourself that
>you exist because you have already assumed that you exist in the very act of
>wondering whether you can prove it. Thus all such attempted proofs would be
>circular. But, since you can't, even in principle, prove that you exist,
>does that mean that you don't, or that you don't know that you do? No.
This has a very Randian air about it, which I find interesting. A couple of
questions though. When we start saying that a philosophical position cannot be
proved I immediately want to know what is a "philosophical" position? That
there exist objects outside of the mind for instance? If that is one, then it
seems to me that the plain man's notion of what would count as 'proof' of that
might be very different from a philosopher in the anglo-american tradition.
And why should we restrict ourselves to the philosopher's notion? If one of
the aims of the above paragraph was to find a place for a more commonsense
notion of proof, I donot have a great quibble with it. But I wonder why we do
not just challenge the idea that what counts as 'proof' in geometry or
mathematical logic should be allowed to set the standards of proof and good
reasoning for all fields (cp S. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument).
Second question: If we decide for the sake of discussion to skip the concerns
in my first paragraph can we make any sense of the following idea. A position
can be considered validated if it has survived serious atempts to criticisze or
refute it. I offer this suggestion because what seems plausible about the
perceptual claims that you invoke in the above paragraph (perhaps the point of
pain to one side) is that even though they are not 'proved' they are most often
unrefuted (not unrefutable!).
Thank you for your time,
Jeff Zents
jzents@earthlink.net