Re: humans irreducibly complex?

Tom Pearson (pearson@panam1.panam.edu)
Wed, 02 Jun 1999 10:03:16 -0500

At 01:37 PM 05/27/1999 +0000, David J. Tyler wrote:

>The basic
>assumption of many geneticists is that the genes control everything -
>but this IS an assumption. It has never been proved.

David,
Allow me to intrude into this conversation to ask a more generic question,
one that touches on methodology and logic in science.
I infer from your comment above that you would say whatever "has never
been proved" just "IS an assumption." Is that correct?
If so, this partakes of the fallacy of false alternative, and it also
makes most of what we claim to know, particularly in science, disqualified
as "knowledge" at all.
Claims that are available for "proof" are logical claims that can be
reduced to some sort of mathematically-based format, and then analyzed on
that basis. That is why logic, from Aristotle onward, has been very
careful to address itself to the deductive form of arguments, in order to
assess the validity of those arguments. The discipline of logic has been
loathe to focus on the *empirical* content of such arguments, which might
lead to evaluation of the *evidence* for the claims -- an enterprise beyond
the capacity of logical analysis. Thus, the domain of what can be
legitimately "proven" is very narrow, and consists of those arguments which
can be reduced to a linguistic model that can be scrutinized by the
deductive models employed by logic.
But look what happens, then, if every other epistemic claim is cast as an
"assumption." It means that whatever cannot be proven is, at best, an
assumption. That means most of the empirical claims of science are
assumptions: that the sun will rise in the east tomorrow, that the laws of
nature (as expressed by, say, gravity or electromagetic force) operated in
the past as they do today, that human beings are qualitatively different
from canines, that a functional airplane cannot be made out of concrete.
None of these observations can be proven. Are they all then assumptions?
Other sorts of claims are subject to the same fate. Can you prove that
your car is still parked where you left it? Can you prove that you are
still wearing your socks? Can you rpove that your mother is really your
mother? None of these observations can be "proven," either. Are they all
then assumptions, too?
It seems to me that there is a great deal of room between the things that
are amenable to "proof" and things that are merely assumptions. Within
that middle ground there is a lot of human experience that can be explained
by reference to evidence, and the reasoning based on that evidence. This
allows us to say that, while I cannot "prove" that my car is still where I
parked it, or that my mother is really my mother, we can assemble a whole
lot of evidence making those claims reliable and useful. But this does not
make them simply assumptions, either (unless you are using "assumption" in
some idiosyncratic sense). We know a lot of things we cannot prove; we
always have. Just because evidentiary accounts of the world are not
eligible as "proofs" does not disqualify them as knowledge. This middle
ground of knowing about the world, based on evidence and reasoning, is what
possibly makes your original statement into a fallacy of false alternative.
We rely on more than the extremes of proofs and assumptions.
By the way, having read your interesting article on the convergence of
creationist, Marxist and post-modernist critiques of science, I want to
point out that I would regard my own comments here as a type of
post-modernist view of scientific practice. I assume you would, then, find
it attractive. However, if I have taken your statement above and inflated
it out of all proportion to your original intent, I apologize.

Tom Pearson
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Thomas D. Pearson
Department of History & Philosophy
The University of Texas-Pan American
Edinburg, Texas
e-mail: pearson@panaam1.panam.edu