> Lloyd
>
> On Sun, 26 Apr 1998 23:27:47 -0400 (EDT), Lloyd Eby wrote:
>
> >LE>...the supposed distinction...between "natural causation" and
> >>>"supernatural causation" will not stand up to criticism and
> >>>scrutiny.
>
> >SJ>Disagree. Within theism, there are three logically distinct
> >>categories:
> >>
> >>1. Natural causation-God working normally through secondary
> >>causation (eg. laws of nature);
> >>
> >>2. Supernatural/Natural causation-God working supernaturally
> >>through secondary causation (eg. Geisler's "second class
> >>miracles");
> >>
> >>3. Supernatural causation-God working supernaturally through
> >>primary causation (eg. ex nihilo creation of universe, etc.).
>
> LE>Your discussion here presupposes that we know or can distinguish
> >between natural and supernatural events.
>
> Clearly we *can* (at least in some instances) "distinguish between natural
> and supernatural events". The people who saw Jesus' miracles knew that
> they were beyond natural causes, ie. supernatural:
No. They did not know this. They *thought* they knew it, or at least they
are represented in Scripture as having thought they knew it (as per your
following quote), but they didn't have enough grasp of either natural or
supernatural to come to a conclusive judgment on this question.
I grant you that my view is not a mainstream one in religious circles.
I've been thinking a lot about it in the intervening days and I'm going to
attempt a long post on it soon.
> "Now there was a man of the Pharisees named Nicodemus, a member of
> the Jewish ruling council. He came to Jesus at night and said,
> "Rabbi, we know you are a teacher who has come from God. FOR NO ONE
> COULD PERFORM THE MIRACULOUS SIGNS YOU ARE DOING IF GOD WERE NOT
> WITH HIM." (Jn 3:1-2. My emphasis)
>
> Granted we may sometimes have difficulty distinguishing between first
> and second class miracles, ie. between 3. and 2. above, and in some
> cases between 1. and 2., but that does not mean there is no possible
> distinction between them.
>
> LE> (Notice that you use the terms "normally" and "supernaturally"
> >in your definition-descriptions. In other words, your account is, I
> >think, fatally circular.)
>
> Disagree. I don't see what is necessarily "fatally circular" about
> my definitions at all. Perhaps you could elaborate.
>
> LE>Here's my point, stated briefly: Suppose you observe any event.
> >How can you know whether it is natural or supernatural?
>
> Granted that we may have difficulty in distinguishing some events,
> whether they are "natural or supernatural". But not in all cases. The
> disciples clearly were able to distinguish Jesus' miracles like turning
> water into wine and being raised from the dead after crucifixion.
>
> According to Jesus everyone on Earth will all one day see Him
> "coming on the clouds of the sky, with power and great glory." (Mt
> 24:30).
>
> Are you claiming that even then we will not be able to "know
> whether it is natural or supernatural"?
>
> LE>Clearly, saying that it must be supernatural because it does not
> >conform to any known natural principle will not guarantee that it is
> >supernatural, except by use of handwaving definitions of "natural"
> >and "supernatural."
>
> I agree that I cannot "guarantee" that an event is "supernatural",
> but that is shifting of your argument. The non-theist cannot
> "guarantee" that a theist's claimed supernatural event is natural,
> either!
>
> LE>I think the supposed natural/supernatural divide will turn out, on
> >deeper examination, to be as ephemeral or as impossible to sustain
> >as, according to the account you summarize, demarcation between
> >"scientific" and "non-scientific" has become.
>
> Agree with the second but not the first. The real problem is
> philosophical. I prefaced my remarks with: "Within theism, there
> are three logically distinct categories...". Clearly, if one starts
> with the assumption that there is no such thing as the
> "supernatural", ie. metaphysical naturalism, then no amount of
> evidence will suffice.
>
> What is your position Lloyd? Are you a theist or a metaphysical
> naturalist?
I'm a theist. I think that the proper division is not between naturalist
and supernaturalist, but between materialism (i.e. metaphysical monism --
the claim that all that exists is matter, material forces, and
matter-in-motion) and spiritualism (i.e. the existence of a non-material
but nevertheless fully real world). I'm a metaphysical dualist, of a sort
(that qualification needs working out because I think that there's a
spiritual dimension to material existence and material events) who
believes in both material and spiritual reality.
This difference may seem to you to be merely a semantical quibble, but it
is not. Supernaturalists, in so far as they are supernaturalists, cannot
be scientists because science deals with what is objectively or
intersubjectively knowable and testable, and, by any usual understanding
of the supernatural, it is not objectively testable (in the way that
science understands the objectively testable). But those who hold
to the existence of both matter and spirit can be because we can raise the
question of whether there can be a science of spirit. I think that this is
possible.
I agree if you were to object that my remarks here are cryptic and need a
lot more working out.
> LE>(For myself, I'm not yet convinced that the demarcation problem
> >is unsolvable or meaningless, although I do agree that it cannot be
> >solved by positivistic or syntactical (i.e. Popperian) means.)
>
> Fine. But this is just a faith-statement of what you are "not yet
> convinced" of. When someone comes up with a a "demarcation between
> `scientific' and `non-scientific'" that does not exclude things that
> are normally regarded as "scientific" then we can discuss it!
What would you include in "what is normally regarded as scientific"?
Lloyd Eby