On Wed, 18 Mar 1998 16:01:51 -0500, Brian D Harper wrote:
[...]
>>>SJ>The God-of-the-gaps argument is really based on the implicit
>>>>assumption that naturalism is more likely to be true and theism
>>>>more likely to be false:...if even theists concede that trying to do
>>>>science on theistic premises always leads nowhere or into error (the
>>>>embarrassing "God of the gaps"), then the likely explanation for this
>>>>state of affairs is that naturalism is true and theism is false."
>>>>(Johnson P.E., "Reason in the Balance", 1995, p211)
>>BH>The more likely explanation is our inability to know the mind
>>>of God.
I agree that we cannot "know the mind of God" *fully*: "For my
thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways,"
declares the LORD. Isa 55:9 "As the heavens are higher than the
earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your
thoughts." (Isa 55:8-9). But if we are created in the image of God,
why should we not be able to in some limited sense think God's
thoughts after Him. Is that not what got science started in the
Christian West?
And if we Christians "have the mind of Christ": "For who has known
the mind of the Lord that he may instruct him?" But we have the mind
of Christ" (1Cor 2:16), then a Christian theistic science has a
greater likelihood of knowing the mind of God in relation to His work
in nature than has a non-theistic science.
>>BH>The issues involved here were grapled with by theistic
>>>scientists before Darwin. Design was excluded from science due
>>>to the concerted efforts of many scientists, many of whom
>>>were theists and many of whom were creationists.
>>SJ>Disagree entirely. Exclusion of design is "tantamount to atheism"
>>as Darwin's defender, Harvard botanist and theistic evolutionist
>>Asa Gray conceded:
BH>Exclusion of design from science is not the same as exclusion
>of design.
If there really was "design" why should it be exluded from science:
"...the reason that valid scientific theories can be achieved only by
making the counterfactual assumption that atheism is true is not
immediately obvious-to put it mildly." (Johnson P.E., "Reason in the
Balance", 1995, p99)
BH>Further, we have to be careful what we mean by design. Does design
>imply intervention or only mindful intention?
Both.
[...]
>BH>D'Alembert quote:
>>The laws of equilibrium and of motion are necessary truths.
>>SJ>This immediately is a false assumption from which all else follows.
BH>Or perhaps you misunderstood what D'Alembert meant by necessary
>truths. Since he is talking about mechanics, perhaps he meant
>that the laws of equilibrium and of motion are the fundamental
>axioms of mechanics. Being as I know something of D'Alembert's
>approach to mechanics, this was fairly obvious to me. D'Alembert
>is best known for reducing dynamics problems to equilibrium
>problems. He also sought to remove totally the concept of
>force from mechanics, preferring instead to relate everything
>to the motion of bodies. Thus we see these two key elements
>of D'Alembert's mechanics in his statement. The fundamental
>axioms are equilibrium and motion, all else in mechanics
>follows. D'Alembert's principle lives on, but his general
>system of mechanics has been discarded. For one thing, D'Alembert
>had a rough time dealing with statics problems :).
There is a *big* difference between "necessary truths" and "axioms".
The first is about *reality* and the second is about *thinking*.
Thus there can be axioms of a geometric system that does not exist is
the real world.
In a God-based system, only God is "necessary" all else is
contingent. D'Alembert was a prominent French agnostic/atheist so I
assume he really means "necessary truths" (ie. in reality) and not
mere "axioms" (ie. thinking).
>>SJ>...D'Alembert thus reveals himself as one who believes in some
>>sense in the eternity of physical laws and/or matter, ie. he is a
>>materialist or dualist. He was a rationalist sceptic who was hostile
>>to Christianity, and is certainly no theist role model.
BH>I had not intended to hold D'Alembert up as a role model
>for theism, sorry if anyone got this idea. This is my
>fault as I followed my statement:
>
>"Design was excluded from science due
>to the concerted efforts of many scientists, many of whom
>were theists and many of whom were creationists."-- BH
>
>with the D'Alembert quote. But as I stated previously, the
>quote was intended to provide a summary of the reasons for
>excluding design from science.
Yes. But since 95% of scientists are not theists, almost all your
role models among scientists advocating "excluding design from
science" will have similar problems.
In any event, why should design be exluded from science, if there
really was design? And why should Christians like yourself
enthusiastically support such "methodological atheism":
"In the late twentieth century, the most important presuppositions in
intellectual circles are that science has preeminent authority to
describe reality and that science is based on naturalism-or
methodological atheism, as it is sometimes called. This starting
point necessarily implies, whether everyone understands the
implication or not, that room for God exists only in the world of the
imagination, or perhaps somewhere back in a "big bang singularity" at
the ultimate beginning of time." (Johnson P.E., "Reason in the
Balance", 1995, p196)
>>SJ>Here is what the encyclopaedia says about him: ...
>>(Grimsley R., "Alembert, Jean Le Rond d'",
>>Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1984, Vol. 1, p464)
BH>Thanks for this info, I really appreciate it. It led me
>to a book written by Grimsley [<Jean D'Alembert (1717-83)>,
>Clarendon Press, 1963] which I checked out of the library
>a few days ago.
That's OK. Glad to be of help.
BH>Previously I had read only bits and pieces here and there
>about D'Alembert. Several authors pointed out that D'Alembert
>never discussed his religious or theological views in
>public. Sometimes this was followed by speculations as to
>what they might be, sometimes not. Grimsley also mentions
>this point, but he was able to find some of D'Alembert's
>unpublished private letters which other scholars had not
>seen. These put the question, IMHO, beyond any doubt.
>
>D'Alembert did believe in God, but, like Einstein would
>later say, his God was the God of Spinoza. So, he would
>not be a theist in any traditional sense.
Spinoza was a pantheist, ie. everything is God.
BH>I found it to be rather a sad story. Reading between the
>lines it seems to me that D'Alembert may have been driven
>to his rejection of Christianity due to his many and
>bitter fights with the Jesuits. At one point he was even
>compared with Pascal (if anyone hasn't read Pascal's
>Provincial Letters, you're really missing out. Very
>funny and witty satirical attack on the Jesuits).
I agree that D'Alembert may rejected Christianity because of the bad
example other `Christians' like the Jesuits set. But while that may
have been a mitigating factor, ultimately it is no excuse. No one,
certainly not a man of genius, is "driven" to reject Christ.
D'Alembert *chose* to reject Christ for pantheism.
BH>Pascal seems to have been pushed towards a deeper relationship
>with God, D'Alembert pushed to the brink of atheism. A sad
>story.
Yes. But as your example of Pascal shows, being "pushed" is not the
deciding factor. What makes the decisive difference between "a
deeper relationship with God" and "atheism" is our personal *choice*.
[...]
>>BH>...The nature of the Supreme Being is
>>>too well concealed for us to be able to know directly what
>>>is, or is not, in conformity with his wisdom. We can only
>>>discover the effect of his wisdom by the observation of the
>>>laws of nature...
>>SJ>This is either agnosticism or Deism. I am surprised that you
>>think it OK.
BH>I think you have misunderstood D'Alembert's point. Remembering
>that he is talking about mechanics, let me illustrate as
>follows. Based on your knowledge of God and His intentions
>in designing the best of all possible worlds, can you tell
>me which of the following concepts of force conforms best
>with His wisdom?
>
>(a) force is proportional to mass times velocity (Descartes).
>
>(b) force is proportional to mass times velocity squared
> (Leibniz).
>
>(c) force is proportional to mass times acceleration (Newton).
>
>(d) force is a metaphysical concept which should be banished
> from science completely (D'Alembert:).
D'Alembert is not "talking about mechanics". He is talking "The
nature of the Supreme Being" and whether we "are able to know
directly what is, or is not, in conformity with his wisdom".
I have no problem with (a), (b) and (c). But (d) is what positivism
later proposed, that metaphysical concepts which should be banished
from science. But the problem is that it is self-referntial. The
very statement that "a metaphysical concept...should be banished from
science" is itself "a metaphysical concept":
"British philosopher A. J. Ayer (1910-1989) popularized many similar
ideas with his 1936 volume Language) Truth and Logic. This small
book acquainted many with the "verification principle." According to
this standard, a meaningful statement was either analytic-a statement
expressing a necessary truth known strictly a priori (as in deductive
logic, mathematics or tautological statements)-or empirically
verifiable (such as many scientific statements). Any statements that
could not be deemed meaningful by one or the other of these standards
were counted as altogether meaningless pseudostatements because they
were incapable of the requisite verification. Early positivists,
applying this criterion, judged that there was no room for the
disciplines of theology or normative ethics, or for the study of
traditional topics in the philosophy of religion and metaphysics.
The subject of miracles, accordingly, was judged unfit for serious
philosophical discussion and analysis. Religious discourse and
inquiry were sealed off from scholarly discussion, since these
activities did not conform to the requisite standard of
meaningfulness. Positivism, however, soon suffered several
debilitating setbacks within philosophical ranks. One problem in
particular plagued the positivist method: its own verification
principle was self-referentially defeating. That is, the principle
itself could not be counted as meaningful on its own terms, since the
statement expressing the principle was neither empirically verifiable
nor analytically true!" (Geivett R.D. & Habermas G.R.,
"Introduction", in Geivett R.D. & Habermas G.R., eds., "In Defence
of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God's Action in History",
Apollos: Leicester UK, 1997, p14)
BH>I think Newton provides a good example of the
>points I'm trying to make. Newton believed
>that the laws he discovered reflect the wisdom
>of the Creator and that his scientific work
>represented a much clearer argument for design than
>the biological contrivances of the Paley type
>argument. He encouraged the use of his work
>in apologetics. In a letter to Richard Bentley
>Newton wrote:
>
>#"When I wrote my treatise upon our Systeme I had
># an eye upon such Principles as might work with
># considering men for the belief of a Deity and
># nothing can rejoice me more than to find it
># useful for that purpose"-- Newton
>
>But Newton kept a clear distinction between
>science and metaphysics. He believed the laws
>of nature reflect God's wisdom, but he did
>not employ any views he may have had on what
>types of laws a wise Creator might use (i.e.
>he did not employ teleology), preferring
>instead to just go look at what the Creator
>created (empirical method).
I have no problem if scientists *did* just use the "empirical
method". But many of them can't seem to resist turning their
"method" into a *philosophy*.
BH>Nevertheless, Newton was widely criticized for
>trying to bring miracles and occult qualities
>back into science, most notably by Leibniz.
>Of course, the rivalry between Newton and
>Leibniz is famous, but I don't think Leibniz
>was being merely polemical in his attacks.
>I believe he was genuinely confused by what
>Newton was up to.
OK.
BH>At issue was this really odd notion that
>matter might have some innate and essential
>property whereby it can attract other matter
>over a distance (no contact) and through a
>vacuum. Actually, this is a misunderstanding
>of Newton which seems to persist to this
>day. Newton did not know what gravity was,
>nor would he even feign an hypothesis
>"hypotheses non fingo" being one of the
>most famous quotes of Newton.
Yes. I have seen this used as an argument for creation.
Creationists don't need to know everything about God or exactly how
He worked to hypothesise that He did work. For example, *non-theist*
physicist H.S. Lipson in calling for creation to be considered,
argued that he did not have to describe the Creator:
"If living matter is not, then, caused by the interplay of atoms,
natural forces and radiation, how has it come into being? There is
another theory, now quite out of favour, which is based upon the
ideas of Lamarck: that if an organism needs an improvement it will
develop it, and transmit it to its progeny. I think, however, that
we must go further than this and admit that the only acceptable
explanation is creation. I know that this is anathema to physicists,
as indeed it is to me, but we must not reject a theory that we do not
like if the experimental evidence supports it...I should be happy to
know what my fellow physicists think of these admittedly
extraordinary ideas. In putting them forward l can claim to be in
good company. According to Darwin, when Newton put forward his
theory of gravitation, Leibnitz accused him of introducing 'occult
qualities and miracles into philosophy.' What was this gravitation?
How could two inanimate bodies attract each other? Newton replied
laconically 'Hypotheses non fingo'. When I am asked describe my
ideas of the-Creator I also say 'Hypotheses non fingo'!" (Lipson
H.S., "A physicist looks at evolution", Physics Bulletin, vol. 31,
No. 4, May 1980, p138)
BH>That he also was disturbed by the prospect of
>a force acting over a distance and through a
>vacuum is shown in the following quote:
>
># That Gravity should be innate, inherent, and
># essential to matter, so that one body may act
># upon another at a distance through a vacuum,
># without the mediation of anything else, by and
># through which their action and force may be
># conveyed from one to another, is to me so great
># an absurdity that I believe no man who has in
># philosophical matters a competent faculty of
># thinking can ever fall into it. Gravity must
># be caused by an agent acting constantly
># according to certain laws; but whether this
># agent be material or immaterial I have left to
># the consideration of my readers.
># --Newton, from his third letter to Richard Bentley.
OK. Sort of wrecks the argument that creationists have to present the
Creator for scientific scrutiny!
BH>The last sentence brings us back on topic, from
>which I strayed a little :). It turns out that
>Newton viewed gravity as being caused by an
>immaterial agent, namely God. It's possible that
>we would never have known this were it not for
>a young theologian (Bentley) who had the courage
>to write the great man himself to see what his
>views were. In his scientific writings Newton
>left such things to "the consideration of my
>readers."
>
>Unfortunately, Newton also believed that God had
>to regularly intervene in order to keep the
>solar system stable. I say unfortunate not to
>criticize Newton but rather because of the impact
>on apologetics when Laplace showed that the solar
>system required no external intervention to
>remain stable. And we all remember what Laplace
>said to Napolean about God, "I have no need
>of that hypothesis."
I have read somewhere that this has been overdone in anti-creationist
propaganda. It seems to me that Newton may not have actually
proposed that God regularly intervened to keep the Solar System
functioning but was using "God" as a place-holder which was common in
scientific writings then. Even Darwin used the Creator as a
place-holder to explain the origin of life:
"There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers,
having been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or
into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according
to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms
most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved."
(Darwin C., "The Origin of Species", [1872], 6th edition, Everyman's
Library, J.M. Dent & Sons: London, 1967 reprint, pp462-463)
BH>Let me close out on Newton with one of his most
>often quoted statements about metaphysics/science:
>
># But hitherto I have not been able to discover
># the cause of those properties of gravity from
># phenomena, and I frame no hypothesis; for
># whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is
># to be called an hypothesis; and hypothesis,
># whether metaphysical or physical, whether of
># occult qualities or mechanical, have no place
># in experimental philosophy. In this philosophy
># particular propositions are inferred from the
># phenomena, and afterwards rendered general by
># induction. Thus it was that the impenetrability,
># the mobility, and the impulsive force of bodies,
># and the laws of motion and of gravitation, were
># discovered. And to us it is enough that gravity
># really does exist and act according to the laws
># which we have explained, and abundantly serves
># to account for all the motions of the celestial
># bodies and of our sea.
># --Newton, from the General Scholium, <Principia>
># Book III
>
>Perhaps I should have saved the trouble of all the
>Newton quotes and just given this short one from
>Galileo:
>
># "What does philosophy got to do with measuring
># anything?" -- Galileo
>
>With apologies to philosophers of course.
Maybe philosophy has come a little bit further since Galileo's time?
[...]
>>BH>Richard Owen is an excellent example of the creationists
>>>who opposed the use of design in biological science.
>>>Owen even went so far as to use the argument from imperfection.
>>>Owen's point was very much the same as D'Alembert's. It is
>>>not that Owen believed organisms were not designed or that
>>>they were not created (he believed both), but that this was
>>>not a useful principle for doing science.
>>SJ>You should be careful in calling Owen a "creationist". He was
>>probably only a "creationist" in the Agassiz sense, ie. a
>>philosophical idealist.
BH>Owen not a creationist? No wonder Bishop Wilberforce did
>so poorly in his debate with Huxley. He was prepped for
>the debate by a non-creationist :).
There were *two* types of creationists then. Those who were
Christian creationists and those (like Agassiz) who were philosophic
(ie. German neo-platonic idealist) creationists. I don't know if
Bishop Wilberforce was a Christian, but if he was, there would be no
reason why he should not consult someone like Owen who was closer
to his position on points of anatomy.
In any event, you have been reading too much Darwinist propaganda!
Wilberforce did not do "poorly in his debate with Huxley" at all.
Gould admits this:
"...we should note with interest that the most famous story in all
the hagiography of evolution is, if not false outright, at least
grossly distorted by biased reconstruction long after the fact. I
speak of Thomas Henry Huxley's legendary encounter with the bishop of
Oxford, "Soapy Sam" Wilberforce, at the 1860 meeting of the British
Association for the Advancement of Science, held in His Lordship's
own see." (Gould S.J., "Knight Takes Bishop?", in "Bully for
Brontosaurus", 1991, p385)
"I also felt strong discomfort about the official tale for two
definite reasons. First, it is all too pat-the victor and the
vanquished good triumphing over evil, reason over superstition. So
few heroic tales in the simplistic mode turn out to be true. Huxley
was a brilliant orator, but why should Wilberforce have failed so
miserably? Much as I dislike the man, he was no fool. He was as
gifted an orator as Huxley and a dominant intellectual force among
conservative Anglicans. Second, I knew from preliminary browsings
that the official tale was a reconstruction, made by Darwin's
champions some quarter century after the fact. Amazingly enough (for
all its later fame), no one bothered to record the event in any
detail at the time itself. No stenographer was present. The two men
exchanged words to be sure, but no one knows what they actually said,
and the few sketchy reports of journalists and letter writers contain
important gaps and contradictions. Ironically, the official version
has been so widely accepted and unchallenged not because we know its
truth by copious documentation, but rather because so little data
exist for a potential challenge." (Gould, 1991, p388)
In fact the earliest known (and probably therefore most accurate)
reference to it has that Wilberforce *won*:
"...I received a letter from my friend and distinguished Darwin
scholar Sam Schweber of Brandeis University. Schweber wrote: "I
came across a letter from Balfour Stewart to David Forbes commenting
on the BAAS meeting he just attended at which he witnessed the
Huxley-Wilberforce debate. It is probably the most accurate
statement of what transpired." I read Stewart's letter and sat bolt
upright with attention and smiles. Stewart wrote, describing the
scene along the usual lines, thus vouching for the basic outline:
`There was an animated discussion in a large room on Saturday last at
Oxford on Darwin's theory where the Bishop of Oxford and Prof.
Huxley fell to blows.... There was one good thing I cannot help
mentioning. The Bishop said he had been informed that Prof. Huxley
had said he didn't care whether his grandfather was an ape [sic for
punctuation] now he [the bishop] would not like to go to the
Zoological Gardens and find his father's father or his mother's
mother in some antiquated ape. To which Prof. Huxley replied that
he would rather have for his grandfather an honest ape low in the
scale of being than a man of exalted intellect and high attainments
who used his power to pervert the truth. Colorful, though nothing
new so far. But I put an ellipsis early in the quotation, and I
should now like to restore the missing words. Stewart wrote:
"I think the Bishop had the best of it." Score one big point for my
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
long-held suspicions. Balfour Stewart was no benighted cleric, but a
distinguished scientist, Fellow of the Royal Society, and director of
the Kew Observatory. Balfour Stewart also thought that Wilberforce
had won the debate!" (Gould, 1991, pp388-389)
BH>Seriously, Steve, I'm very interested in this period in
>the history of science. If you've seen any author who
>questioned whether Owen was a creationist I would really
>like to have the reference.
I will keep an eye out. But I didn't say that Owen was not a
"creationist". I said he may have only been "a `creationist' in the
Agassiz sense, ie. a philosophical idealist." I know of no evidence
that Owen resisted Darwin on Biblical or theological grounds. Like
Agassiz it may have only been on philosophical (ie. idealistic)
grounds.
>>>SJ>If that's the case, why be a theist?
>>BH>Jesus.
>>SJ>That's great but it contradicts what you posted from D'Alembert,
>>about "The nature of the Supreme Being" being "too well concealed
>>for us to be able to know directly what is, or is not, in conformity
>>with his wisdom." Which is it to be?
BH>I hope you will reconsider the implications of the choice you
>offer me.
Brian, it is *your* "choice" not mine*. *You*, not *me*, posted
approvingly a quote by D'Alembert, a pantheist, to the effect that
"The nature of the Supreme Being" being "too well concealed for us to
be able to know directly what is, or is not, in conformity with his
wisdom".
If that is the case, how do we know that "Jesus" reveals "The nature
of the Supreme Being"?
Maybe *you* need to "reconsider the implications of the choice you
offer" *me*?
Steve
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3 Hawker Avenue / Oz \ Steve.Jones@health.wa.gov.au
Warwick 6024 ->*_,--\_/ Phone +61 8 9448 7439
Perth, West Australia v "Test everything." (1Thess 5:21)
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