On Thu, 11 Dec 1997, Glenn Morton wrote:
(snip)
> > First, what is usually called modern science -- that is the
> >empirical science of today that goes back at least to Copernicus
> >-- has been successful because it has adopted statement 8 (the
> >stance of metaphysical naturalism) as its methodological stance.
> >In other words it has assumed that all observable phenomena or
> >data can be investigated and that this investigation must be done
> >in naturalistic terms -- i.e., it has held that there must be a
> >naturalistic explanation (as opposed to a supernatural one) for
> >everything. We have methods for testing naturalistic hypotheses,
> >but we do not really have methods for testing extra-naturalistic
> >or supernaturalistic ones. Another way of making this point is to
> >say that, for modern science, to be scientific has meant to be
> >naturalistic, and modern science has made enormous discoveries
> >and advances through and because of that stance.
> >
> > In reply to that we can say that there is no adequate reason
> >why metaphysical naturalism must be the only truly scientific
> >stance. But, in practice, this stance has yielded all the results
> >and explanations of modern science, and it seems reasonable to
> >suppose that had this naturalistic stance not been taken then all
> >the advances and discoveries we think of as modern science would
> >not have come about. Moreover, although there may be ways of
> >testing extra-naturalistic hypotheses, we have not, in fact,
> >possessed them in any way that we could really call scientific.
> >The question of whether extra-naturalistic hypotheses and
> >explanations can be tested in any adequate way thus remains open
> >and unanswered, I think. Another way of saying this is that we do
> >not at this time have available any good or adequate model or
> >paradigm for a non-naturalistic science.
>
> With this lack of non-naturalistic science, what exactly are you advocating?
> If we can't provide an alternative are we merely to say that we shouldn't do
> science?
Good question. I'm not sure that I'm advocating anything. I'm observing
that we do not have any model or paradigm or method for dealing with any
non-naturalistic or extra-naturalistic science. I certainly think that we
should do science, but I'm expressing skepticism about whether we can have
any genuine science that's not naturalistic.
> > A second problem is that statements 6 and 7 (in whatever way
> >they are understood, i.e., in whatever way the most recent or
> >most subtle or most adequate form of evolutionism as a stance or
> >ideology is understood to be defined or to operate) do give a
> >paradigm (to use Thomas Kuhn's terminology) and a research
> >program (to use the terminology of Imre Lakatos and others) for
> >the biological sciences. Thus, the denial of 6 or 7 would leave
> >the biological sciences (as they presently exist, anyway)
> >foundering, at least to an important extent. For that reason,
> >those biologists who hold to the notion of evolution embodied in
> >those statements 6 or 7 frequently challenge anti-evolutionists
> >to propose some other testable theory if they wish to deny the
> >evolutionary one.
> >
> > From one point of view that demand is reasonable -- having
> >no alternative theory but nevertheless denying the evolutionary
> >stance or paradigm would seem to leave the biological sciences
> >without any way of going ahead. From another point of view,
> >however, that demand for an alternative need not be met by the
> >anti-evolutionist. One can know or be convinced that an
> >explanation or theory is false or inadequate without needing to
> >propose an alternative.
> This is not really workable. It gives the appearance of stubbornness. it
> appears like saying to others, "I won't accept any data you present in favor
> of your view, and I won't present any alternative to your ideas, but you are
> wrong!"
>
> Could you get away with this in front of your boss? I doubt it. If you
> workplace would not accept such a standard why should anyone else?
I don't see it that way. What is wrong with saying "I 'm convinced that
your theory is wrong (for reasons x,y, or z) but I don't have any better
proposal right now?" It's not the same as saying "I won't accept any data
you present in favor of your view."
Theory-testing and theory-rejection can be separated, both logically and
practically, from theory-proposal.
> (For example, I can know that it is false
> >that John murdered Mary without knowing who did, in fact, kill
> >Mary or even without having any good theory about how Mary died.)
> >So, the burden is not necessarily on the anti-evolutionist to
> >propose another theory, but one can understand why evolutionists
> >frequently become exasperated with anti-evolutionists. It is
> >difficult for any science to admit that it is stymied in its
> >present theoretical base and its research program, and that it
> >does not yet know how to get beyond that impasse. (I mean this to
> >be both a psychological and a logical-methodological
> >observation.)
>
> This is an argument for solipsism. I can't know anything and the burden is
> not upon me to present any explanation at all.
How so? I fail to see how it's an argument for solipsism. It is a claim
that the proffered view or theory is mistaken, without proposing an
alternative. What's wrong with that? How can that be called solipsistic?
I agree that, if one can offer an alternative theory, that further
strengthens one's claim. But I don't see why the critic needs to propose
an alternative in order to carry out a proper scientific or logical role
in refuting the proffered theory.
I can know that the car is not working properly without being a mechanic
who knows how to repair it.
Lloyd Eby