Re: Premises and Morality

Pim van Meurs (entheta@eskimo.com)
Sun, 29 Jun 1997 22:02:40 -0400

Russell has claimed that: a) the Biblical Christian presupposition of
God's existence is logically inconsistent with the claim of an
objective, transcendent, absolute moral standard,

PDB: The question concerning a moral system, that assumes either the
premise of materialism or the fact of God's existence, is not whether
it is logically objective, but whether the *claim* of objectivity
(independence, absoluteness, transcendence of the standard), if one is
made, is consistent with the premise.

The premise is the existance of a God. Does this mean that the moral
standard exists which is objective, trancendent, eternal, absolute and/or
universal ?
I disagree that such a standard exists. Not only have you failed to show
that God's moral standard is objective but also that it is absolute,
eternal and universal. After all there is no reason to believe why God
should or could not change his standards, hold different standards for the
different parts of this universe.
That one can base one's moral standards on one's interpretation of the
moral standard(s) in the bible hardly means that the standard is
objective/universal/eternal.

PDB: This follows the above. You keep substituting "subjective assumption"
for "premise," or "presupposition." This is not a case of mutual
subjectivity with either claim equally valid. The claim of
materialism and the claim of Biblical Christian theism cannot both be
true. They are mutually exclusive. If one is true, the other must be
false. We must choose one or the other.

Or a third one ?

PDB: The truth or falsity of the premise is something you (at least
initially) don't know. You can't prove its false, we can't prove its
true, because its a premise.

So what about the premise that no objective moral standard exists but that
moral standards are a product of society, culture ?

PDB: No. This does not appear to be a quote from anybody debating with
you, and this is wrong on two counts. 1) The particular assumption of
empathy as a good thing is not important for this point. The
"morality" that you argue for is subjective because subjectivity is
necessarily correlated with materialism. Any non-material value
construct you imagine (or I imagine) is subjective, if materialism is
true, because the only place it can originate is from chemical
reactions within a particular individual. 2) I (and I think others)
am *not* saying that Humanist morality is inconsistent because it is
founded on an initial assumption. It is inconsistent because it
provides no explanation for independent moral reality and, as a
result, inevitably contradicts itself.

What moral reality ? A subjective moral reality perhaps but not an
absolute moral reality. Such reality is very well explained by mere
chemical reactions in a person.

>RS: 2) Following from this, you claim that *your* morality is
therefore superior, because it is logically consistent...

PDB: Sometimes, our individual morality may not be superior, but we
acknowledge a superior moral system, and our claim of this moral
system is logically consistent with our premise.

One can presume all you want but it has neither been shown superior nor
absolute. To claim " We believe in an all powerful god and therefor we
have a superior moral system" is meaningless.

PDB: As for me, Russell, I would much rather trust in the objective rules
of a holy, righteous, gracious, creator God than have nothing but
subjective rules of sinful men.

What objective rules ? You assert they exist but that is hardly a
consequence of your premise. Perhaps a personal interpretation of the
existance of such a deity. But what about the premises that there is no
objective morality and that morality is merely formed by society and
culture ? Inferior to a yet to be proven objective standard of a deity who
may or may not change his/her mind on the issue ? Nor do you know if such
a standard even exists or what the standard is.