Re: ICR and its slurs (summary reflections)

Russell Stewart (diamond@rt66.com)
Wed, 04 Jun 1997 12:01:54 -0600

At 02:30 PM 6/3/97 EDT, you wrote:
>Rich Knopp wrote:
>
>(1) Russell has not given any specific response to the distinction
>>drawn between what is ontologically posited and what is epistemologically
>>"proveable." What kind of an ONTOLOGICAL connection does the naturalistic
>>evolutionaist have to justify a universal moral obligation? My contention:
>>there is none.
>
>Russell responds:
>
><<I don't understand what you're asking here. You'll have to be a little more
>clear.>>
>
>This is a cop out, Russ. You are an intelligent guy! You can certainly
>understand this if you try. Rich is perfectly clear. The lack may simply be in
>your understanding of philosophical terms. That being so, you are the one who
>oght to do a little more work here. This can be a good thing for you.

It has already been a good thing for me. I have come to understand my own
beliefs much better, and they are even stronger now that I can defend them.

That being said, I can't claim to be perfect. I didn't understand what Rich
was asking. So instead of putting me down for this shortcoming, why don't
you actually try to help me understand?

><<And I provide a similar logic: IF one has empathy for others' emotions, THEN
>the logical course of action is to respect others' rights. Of course, one will
>ask: what if one *doesn't* have empathy for others' emotions? Well, as I have
>said, the vast majority of people do.>>
>
>This is, of course, a material fallacy you have committed. And it's a big one.
>Watch:
>
>1. Emathy >> Rights (this itself is erroneous, but let's accept it for now)
>
>2. Non-empathy >> no rights (the logical consequence of your premises)
>
>3. The answer to #2 is: Most people have empathy >> rights.
>
>This is self-contradictory. Under your system, rights are premised on empathy.
>But if there is not empathy, rights cannot be established by claiming most
>people DO have empathy. That's a big circle, you see? You have not provided an
>answer, you have only avoided the question.

I have provided an answer, you just haven't understood it. The question you
and others were asking is, how can humanist morality be consistent and
reliable if it is based on a subjective concept like empathy? My answer: because
it is quite obvious that the vast majority of people have a natural capacity
for empathy. It's still subjective; I still can't put it in any more basic terms
than that. But it *works*, and that is what is important.

><<And for that minority who don't, we have laws, police, and jails to deal
>with them.>>
>
>This, again, is irrelevant to the question of "rights." It only deals with who
>is caught and who is not.

But it answers directly to the question of what happens in those minority cases
where a person does not have a capacity for empathy.

><<Fine. Your logic is perfect IF your initial assumption is true.>>
>
>Absolutely correct.

And you are subjectively assuming that your initial assumption is true. Hence,
your whole moral system is subjective.

><<That still doesn't gain you anything, and it *certainly* doesn't make your
>system any more logical than mine.>>
>
>Absolutely incorrect. Your system cannot logically support objective morality,
>as demonstrated above and on numerous other occasions.

I NEVER CLAIMED THAT MY SYSTEM CAN LOGICALLY SUPPORT OBJECTIVE MORALITY!!!!!!

How many times do I have to say that to you?

The trouble is, neither can yours! I have asked you dozens of times now to
prove to me that your system is logically objective. You have ignored this
request every time. Why is that? If you are incapable of answering my question,
can't you at least have the intellectual honesty to admit it?

_____________________________________________________________
| Russell Stewart |
| http://www.rt66.com/diamond/ |
|_____________________________________________________________|
| Albuquerque, New Mexico | diamond@rt66.com |
|_____________________________|_______________________________|

2 + 2 = 5, for very large values of 2.