Re: ICR and its slurs (summary reflections)

Jim Bell (70672.1241@compuserve.com)
02 Jun 97 18:42:40 EDT

Rich Knopp wrote:

<<(1) Russell has not given any specific response to the distinction
drawn between what is ontologically posited and what is epistemologically
"proveable." What kind of an ONTOLOGICAL connection does the naturalistic
evolutionaist have to justify a universal moral obligation? My contention:
there is none.>>

Once again, Rich, you've stated the crucial issue elegantly. And true, Russell
has never responded. But no materialist can. Even Sartre had to admit he could
not. Sartre at least had the courage to admit there was "no exit" and try to
fashion a life after that.

<<(2) Russell fundamentally misunderstands the nature of what must be
"demonstrated" here. I am looking for a logical CONNECTION between a
philosophical system (whether it be theistic or naturalistic) and the
resulting parameters and grounds for morality. In logical terms, what is
sought is the LOGICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN the "if" and the "then" (i.e., "if
>? >? >? then").>>

Right again. Just as you can't get OUGHT from IS, you can't get THEN from IF
under materialism. You CAN under Christianity, of course. Beginning with the
presupposition of theism, a system of universal morality is logical.

It is no answer to say, "Well, that presupposition is just as subjective as
mine..." We can all admit that for this part of the argument, and STILL the
conclusion remains. Materialism offers no logical connection (because it
can't); theism does.

<<As a result, Russell is mistaken is claiming that it is a
"contradiction" to talk of a "logical ground for universal morality." To
the contrary, a transcendent "creator" theism not only DOES provide a
logical ground for universal morality, it is the ONLY system that can do so.
And any purely naturalistic attempt to substantiate a universal moral
obligation simply goes BEYOND the range of the philosophic merit of the
system.>>

So do the very laws of logic. For this reason, the materialist is lost forever
in subjectivity (unless he borrows, of course).

Jim