>[Preliminary Note: I apologize for the length of this post, but I try to
>pull together a number of points from multiple posts.]
>
> As noted by a couple of posts, since its inception this thread (i.e.
>regarding the link between evolution and racism) has probably shifted toward
>a more philosophical issue. For those who have difficulty separating
>Darwinism from philosophy, this was especially predictable. And for those
>who view Darwinism (as "science") as fully separable from philosophy, this
>was predictably undesirable.
> The numerous posts on this matter have been lively to say the least,
>and their sheer number has made it difficult to keep up. With the risk of
>anachronism, therefore, I would suggest that a couple of critical points
>still need to be emphasized.
>
> 1. First, whether a philosophical system has a sufficient LOGICAL
>basis for upholding moral behavior and condemning immoral behavior cannot be
>decisively determined by noting whether or not individuals (or cultures)
>ACTUALLY behave morally or immorally.
> Some have implied that such acts as Hitler's holocaust prove the
>connection between Nietzsche's philosophy and crass immorality.
> Along a different line, Russell Stewart repeatedly contends that his
>atheism clearly provides a sufficient basis for morality because he knows
>his own thoughts, feelings, and behavior; and they are moral. For instance
>he says in one post:
>
>"So far, the consequences [of my atheism] have been that I treat my friends,
>family, girlfriend, and just about everyone else with respect."
>
> On yet another side, some reflectorates (e.g. Russell Cannon) have
>charged that if Nietzsche is responsible for Hitler (and the holocaust),
>then Jesus should be culpable for similar atrocities.
> My response to all of these approaches is that they all utilize the
>same false assumption--that historical (and actual) behavior is what
>provides, or does not provide, the grounds for determining whether or not a
>philosophy itself offers a sufficient ground for morality. My ACTS (or
>sentiments) of morality (e.g. of not killing my neighbor) are not a
>justification for my claim that my philosophy provides an adequate basis for
>that morality. And my ACTS of immorality (e.g. of killing Jews) are not a
>justification for the claim that my philosophy either does or does not
>provide an adequate basis for morality itself.
> The fact is, whether one is a devout Christian or atheist, the
>behavior of ALL of us can be, and often is, INCONSISTENT with the professed
>philosophy we hold. (I would even say that none of us can be fully
>consistent with it.)
> What does all this mean? In part it means that whatever connection
>is claimed between one's philosophy and the grounds for morality must be
>established on some other basis than an individual's (or culture's) actions.
>The point is that there must be a demonstrated LOGICAL connection, not
>simply an historical or autobiographical connection. (This does not,
>however, eliminate a more modest point that one would reasonably expect a
>greater correlation between ostensible immoral behavior and philosophical
>nihilism than between immoral behavior and the profession of a transcendent
>morality. And in the latter case, the transcendent morality would condemn
>the immoral behavior.)
>
This is very nicely stated, however, I have some real problems with a
lot of what I've heard here the last few weeks.
First off, I fail to find any connection whatsoever to Christianity
in all this talk of moral law and logic. For example, suppose we
start with a couple of axioms and then apply our logic:
axiom 1) God exists
axiom 2) A transcendent moral law exists showing (wo)men what
God expects from them.
A reasonable conclusion to draw from these two is that God is
righteous and just.
Now, I must say that this is really really bad news (pun intended)
and would lead me to utter despair. For I know that I stand
condemned already before a God like this with no hope. And what
motivation have I to follow the moral commands of this God,
knowing myself to be condemned already? I know I cannot plead
with such a God by saying I'm moral most of the time. This would
be like telling the traffic cop that I don't run red lights
most of the time. And I cannot promise this God that I'll obey
his laws in the future, now that I'm aware of them, because I
know that I cannot obey them. So, I conclude that its hopeless.
Eat drink and be merry, for tommorrow we burn.
Jim mentioned the gang member who killed a child in a drive by
shooting attempting to tie this fellows actions in with materialist
philosophy but failing to provide any evidence whatsoever for such
a tie. Perhaps his despair comes instead because someone told him
the bad news (axiom 1 and 2, Objective Moralist Logicalism) and
didn't tell him the good news.
[... skipped a bunch of discussion of GM's points about evolution and
morality]
>RK:
> It is tenuous because it posits a "scheme" to evolution in the first
>place. Why should EVOLUTION care about what genes survive? And the key
>point that is missed is that naturalistic evolution, even if true, can only
>describe in the long run of things why some genes survive; it can't be
>logically used, E.O. Wilson notwithstanding, to show why any genes SHOULD or
>SHOULD NOT have survived.
This is good. Think about this for awhile but in terms of a scientific
theory of evolution and you'll probably understand why I maintain
there is no connection between the theory of evolution and racism.
More on this issue below.
[...]
>RK:
> 4. Just because the focus of the thread has shifted some from the
>original question of the relationship between evolution and racism does not
>mean that the original discussion was "resolved." Brian Harper claims,
>however, that since "no one has given any rational arguments as to why the
>theory of evolution should be blamed for such things I will consider that
>phase of the discussion resolved."
> From my perspective (having read all the posts), there IS a
>plausible logical connection between naturalistic evolution and racism, and
>several posts have helped to bring this to light. And those who have argued
>that there isn't any logical connection have not only failed on that point,
>they have failed to explain how naturalistic evolution can provide a
>justification for (or against) ANY morality. If the discussion has been
>"resolved," it's been resolved in favor of those who were contending FOR the
>connection.
Sorry, I must have missed it. The only connections I've seen were
based on distortions. A connection based on distortion can hardly
be said to be logical. But perhaps we're talking about different
things. I said the theory of evolution whereas you are talking
about naturalistic evolution, which I take to mean philosophical
naturalism combined with a belief in evolution.
A similar switch of words occurred early in this thread when
Russell used theory of evolution and Jim replaced it with
evolutionism. Whether naturalistic evolution or evolutionism
is logically connected to racism is hard for me to say, since
I know very little about these philosophies. Besides, its not
that interesting to me since I ain't one of those. I am,
however, an evolutionist and so I would like to know about
this logical connection if one exists. After all, logic is
all powerful so if what you say is true I better go home and
sell my half-breed children.
Before I blather on too much let's see if we can agree on our
terminology. Do you believe that there is a connection between
evolution as a science and racism? If so, for what reason?
>RK:==
> In a related post, Brian Harper specifically asks three questions
>(points a,b,&c). Based on my position as expressed above, I offer my own
>brief responses.
>(a) How would you answer a person who refuses to accept your
> views of morality?
> I would say that, relative to the objective nature of morality, it
>is irrelevant whether they accept it or refuse it.
>
Yes, this is a good answer, *if* morality is objective and *if*
your view of morality happens to coincide with that objective
morality.
But I understood the question as presented to Russell as requiring
him to justify the application of his moral standards to someone
else. Merely telling someone their views are irrelevant doesn't
seem to me a very satisfactory answer. I suspect this is why
Jim's answers to these questions involved attempts at reasoning
with the person.
I think part of what bugs me about this particular answer has to
do with my being raised as a good Southern Baptist. I'm perfectly
willing to agree that there is a transcendent moral law, but I'll
be dad-gonned if I'll let you or any other person dictate to me
what exactly it is ;-).
For some reason, this reminded me of a quote Hugh Ross attributed
to Galileo:
The holy scriptures cannot err and the decrees therein contained
are absolutely true and inviolable. But ... its expounders and
interpreters are liable to err in many ways.
-- Galileo
>(b) How would you answer a person who refuses to accept the
> existence of a transcendent moral system?
> I would say, once again, that it is irrelevant with respect to its
>truth. Secondly, I would contend that they can claim whatever they want,
>but their behavior will undermine the very point they profess. They can't
>(and don't) live that way when it comes to what somebody does to them or
>their wife or kids. So someone who refuses a transcendent moral system is
>either saying something IRRELEVANT to its truth or they are INCONSISTENT
>with themselves. In either case, it's not a very effective basis for
>justifying one's rejection.
>
>(c) How would you answer a person who accepts a transcendent
> moral system which is, according to your view, immoral?
> For example, an Islamic terrorist.
> I would say that, if there is a transcendent moral system, there's
>only ONE. And on the assumption that the one transcendent moral system
>advocates GOODNESS rather than evil, then any immoral application must be
>inconsistent with that transcendent system and therefore condemned. The
>real question is not whether one CLAIMS a transcendent moral system; it is
>whether a specific application can rightly be derived from that transcendent
>moral system.
But this employs a circular argument. It is true that you, I and the
Islamic terrorist would agree that there is only one transcendent
moral system, however, you are using the tenets of yours (by claiming
an immoral application) to exclude his. He could do likewise.
Brian Harper
Associate Professor
Applied Mechanics
The Ohio State University
"God forbid that we should give out a dream of
our own imagination for a pattern of the world"
-- Francis Bacon