As noted by a couple of posts, since its inception this thread (i.e.
regarding the link between evolution and racism) has probably shifted toward
a more philosophical issue. For those who have difficulty separating
Darwinism from philosophy, this was especially predictable. And for those
who view Darwinism (as "science") as fully separable from philosophy, this
was predictably undesirable.
The numerous posts on this matter have been lively to say the least,
and their sheer number has made it difficult to keep up. With the risk of
anachronism, therefore, I would suggest that a couple of critical points
still need to be emphasized.
1. First, whether a philosophical system has a sufficient LOGICAL
basis for upholding moral behavior and condemning immoral behavior cannot be
decisively determined by noting whether or not individuals (or cultures)
ACTUALLY behave morally or immorally.
Some have implied that such acts as Hitler's holocaust prove the
connection between Nietzsche's philosophy and crass immorality.
Along a different line, Russell Stewart repeatedly contends that his
atheism clearly provides a sufficient basis for morality because he knows
his own thoughts, feelings, and behavior; and they are moral. For instance
he says in one post:
"So far, the consequences [of my atheism] have been that I treat my friends,
family, girlfriend, and just about everyone else with respect."
On yet another side, some reflectorates (e.g. Russell Cannon) have
charged that if Nietzsche is responsible for Hitler (and the holocaust),
then Jesus should be culpable for similar atrocities.
My response to all of these approaches is that they all utilize the
same false assumption--that historical (and actual) behavior is what
provides, or does not provide, the grounds for determining whether or not a
philosophy itself offers a sufficient ground for morality. My ACTS (or
sentiments) of morality (e.g. of not killing my neighbor) are not a
justification for my claim that my philosophy provides an adequate basis for
that morality. And my ACTS of immorality (e.g. of killing Jews) are not a
justification for the claim that my philosophy either does or does not
provide an adequate basis for morality itself.
The fact is, whether one is a devout Christian or atheist, the
behavior of ALL of us can be, and often is, INCONSISTENT with the professed
philosophy we hold. (I would even say that none of us can be fully
consistent with it.)
What does all this mean? In part it means that whatever connection
is claimed between one's philosophy and the grounds for morality must be
established on some other basis than an individual's (or culture's) actions.
The point is that there must be a demonstrated LOGICAL connection, not
simply an historical or autobiographical connection. (This does not,
however, eliminate a more modest point that one would reasonably expect a
greater correlation between ostensible immoral behavior and philosophical
nihilism than between immoral behavior and the profession of a transcendent
morality. And in the latter case, the transcendent morality would condemn
the immoral behavior.)
2. A second critical point is to emphasize the distinction between
ONTOLOGY (i.e., what is objectively the case, independently of our beliefs
and knowledge-claims) and EPISTEMOLOGY (i.e., what we can "demonstrate" that
we know).
A Christian ethicist doesn't (or at least shouldn't) claim that she
can epistemically PROVE the existence of an objective, universal moral code.
Such an approach makes the ontological implications of a philosophical
system dependent upon one's epistemological limits. Christian theism offers
a transcendent and objective ontological ground for morality, even if
arguing for it must "pass through" our epistemology. One can, however,
understand the LOGICAL connection between such an existing transcendent and
communicating God and a universal morality to which all are held accountable
(regardless of their acceptance or rejection).
But to say, as Russell Stewart does, that "since Christian morality
is as subjective as any other [morality], it is just as non-applicable"
fails to recognize this critical distinction between ontology and
epistemology. My ability to "demonstrate" the TRUTH of the Christian system
undoubtedly has a "subjective" component--after all, I am a human "subject"
who reasons! But this fact does not at all make "Christian morality as
subjective as any other." ONTOLOGICALLY, the sufficient logical connection
exists between a transcendent, revealer God and a transcendent and universal
moral obligation. But the ONTOLOGICAL connection between an atheistic
philosophy and having sufficient grounds for universal moral obligation
cannot be found.
This, by the way, is where Peter Grice goes wrong in his little
dialogue between the theist and atheist: (just an excerpt)
Monotheist: I can prove right and wrong to my own satisfaction, since I
believe in God, and can refer all moral questions to Him as
the objective, transcendent moral standard - will you grant
me this?
Atheist: Yes of course, but now it's my turn! I can also prove right
and wrong to my own satisfaction,..."
The monotheist does not (or should not) say or imply that, SINCE the
God-believer can "prove right and wrong to my own satisfaction," all moral
questions have an "objective, transcendent moral standard." This
mistakingly makes the ontological ground of morality dependent upon one's
subjective state and epistemic capabilities.
3. Just because an individual can, given a philosophical system,
provide sufficient personal reasons for not e.g. killing his neighbor does
not mean that the philosophical system offers a logical ground for universal
morality. Just because an individual IMPUTES reasons for morality to a
philosophical system does not mean that a LOGICAL connection is present. To
be more specific: to give an evolutionary basis for a moral act (e.g. not
killing your neighbor), as Glen Morton does by scenario, does NOT mean that
universal morality has been given an evolutionary and sufficient basis.
Glen Morton's "demonstration" "from the evolutionary worldview why
killing fellow humans is wrong" is flawed at several points, including this
one. Even IF he "demonstrated" that evolutionary considerations would
prevent killing SOME individuals--which is MAXIMALLY what he did--he did not
demonstrate anything about the more significant and relevant question of
whether killing itself is morally "right" or "wrong." In part, the problem
is that EVEN IF evolution DID operate in this limited way, it still cannot
say anything about what behavior OUGHT or OUGHT NOT to occur. As a
consequence, it cannot LOGICALLY condemn any behavior. (With God gone, are
we to believe that our behavior now becomes accountable to the "evolutionary
SCHEME of things"?) (Cf Morton's statement: "Without such a selective
advantage, murder provides no benefit in the evolutionary scheme of things.")
Furthermore, to posit that the "scheme" of evolution is to safeguard
one's associated gene pool seems not only extremely tenuous, it misses a key
point. [Note Glen Morton's statement: "[S]tatistics show that you are more
likely to kill members of your family than strangers. Thus by killing a
member of your family, you are eliminating your own genes from the gene
pool. Thus assuming your genes are
the fittest, you with your gun have eliminated those fit genes."]
It is tenuous because it posits a "scheme" to evolution in the first
place. Why should EVOLUTION care about what genes survive? And the key
point that is missed is that naturalistic evolution, even if true, can only
describe in the long run of things why some genes survive; it can't be
logically used, E.O. Wilson notwithstanding, to show why any genes SHOULD or
SHOULD NOT have survived.
Glen Morton's second point for why evolution can provide a "good
reason" for murder being "wrong" seems to misapply the very concept of
evolution. [Cf. G. Morton: "[S]ince even a mutant with no legs and an IQ of
50 can pull a
trigger eliminating Einstein, murder provides no basis for natural
selection."]
First, I think it's undeniable that "murder provides no basis for
natural selection." But the REAL question is whether natural selection
provides any basis for murder! Secondly, I don't know why ANY evolutionist
would want to claim that the "fittest" individual ALWAYS defeats the "less
fit." So what if the mutant kills Einstein. In the long run, there will be
other "Einsteins" who will do in the mutant. IN THE LONG RUN, the fitter
organisms will prevail. But even with this understanding, evolution still
can't provide a LOGICAL basis for telling me or anyone that murder is
"wrong"--that the Einstein's SHOULDN'T eliminate the mutants. And it can't
tell me why, if the Einstein's do eliminate the one's with a 50 IQ, those
Einstein's should be held not only morally culpable but punitively accountable.
4. Just because the focus of the thread has shifted some from the
original question of the relationship between evolution and racism does not
mean that the original discussion was "resolved." Brian Harper claims,
however, that since "no one has given any rational arguments as to why the
theory of evolution should be blamed for such things I will consider that
phase of the discussion resolved."
From my perspective (having read all the posts), there IS a
plausible logical connection between naturalistic evolution and racism, and
several posts have helped to bring this to light. And those who have argued
that there isn't any logical connection have not only failed on that point,
they have failed to explain how naturalistic evolution can provide a
justification for (or against) ANY morality. If the discussion has been
"resolved," it's been resolved in favor of those who were contending FOR the
connection.
In a related post, Brian Harper specifically asks three questions
(points a,b,&c). Based on my position as expressed above, I offer my own
brief responses.
(a) How would you answer a person who refuses to accept your
views of morality?
I would say that, relative to the objective nature of morality, it
is irrelevant whether they accept it or refuse it.
(b) How would you answer a person who refuses to accept the
existence of a transcendent moral system?
I would say, once again, that it is irrelevant with respect to its
truth. Secondly, I would contend that they can claim whatever they want,
but their behavior will undermine the very point they profess. They can't
(and don't) live that way when it comes to what somebody does to them or
their wife or kids. So someone who refuses a transcendent moral system is
either saying something IRRELEVANT to its truth or they are INCONSISTENT
with themselves. In either case, it's not a very effective basis for
justifying one's rejection.
(c) How would you answer a person who accepts a transcendent
moral system which is, according to your view, immoral?
For example, an Islamic terrorist.
I would say that, if there is a transcendent moral system, there's
only ONE. And on the assumption that the one transcendent moral system
advocates GOODNESS rather than evil, then any immoral application must be
inconsistent with that transcendent system and therefore condemned. The
real question is not whether one CLAIMS a transcendent moral system; it is
whether a specific application can rightly be derived from that transcendent
moral system.
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Rich Knopp, M.Div., Ph.D.
Professor of Philosophy and Christian Apologetics
Lincoln Christian College and Seminary
Lincoln, IL. 62656
"If God didn't exist, He would want us not to believe in Him."
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