We may be talking at slightly cross purposes here.
We may distinguish the following categories. Let us suppose that life,
various sorts of complexity, etc. require the production of, or the
input of, or the operation of, (or some such), some minimal quantity of
information/structure etc. The source of such information might be:
a. arbitrary, random, unchosen initial conditions acted upon by natural
(and in some sense arbitrary) law
b. arbitrary, random, unchosen initial conditions acted upon by
precise, specifically chosen and structured laws
c. precise, specifically chosen and structured initial conditions acted
upon by natural (and in some sense arbitrary) law
d. precise, specifically chosen and structured initial conditions acted
upon by precise, specifically chosen and structured laws
or
e. non-natural intervention in events at some point(s) subsequent to the
initial creation.
I tend to see (a) - (d) as in some broad sense natural - nature is
taking conditions she finds obtaining, and operating upon them solely in
terms of the laws that define her. The question of *where* and *how*
those laws and conditions themselves came to be I take to be a different
question. Here's a simple analogy. The fall of a rock from an
unsupported position 100ft above the earth's surface is purely natural -
even if the rock got into that position by totally non-natural means.
That the rock is initially there to fall, is not natural, but that it
falls once there is. Similarly, even if the existence of specific laws
and conditions must be explained non-naturally - e.g., in terms of
design, intent, etc. - the flow of events past that point is the natural
outworking of the laws and conditions in question.
I take Behe to (in effect) be claiming that (a) has no sensible chance
of producing irreducible complexity, that given what we know of the
operation of natural law (b) is not likely the actual case, and that (c)
is a live possibility. (d) I would guess he would tend to downplay for
essentially the same reason as (b). (e) would, of course, be a
possibility.
But if taking (a) - (d) as in a broad sense 'natural' is plausible, then
Behe need have no objection to natural generation of irreducible
complexity. Secular Darwinist views fall, of course, in the (a)
category, and some - perhaps most(?) - of those versions of theistic
evolution that are basically Darwinian fall into the (b) category.
On this reading, then, Behe is sympathetic to, but not commited to,
intervention (e), is perfectly happy with the possibility of natural
means of generating irreducible complexity (c) (and possibly even (d) ),
has no quarrel with e.g. common ancestry (e.g., under (c)).
Incidently, the first of my two posts of a few days ago I ran by Behe,
and he endorsed my attributions to him fully.
I did not, however, run the above by him. Caveat emptor.
Del
Del Ratzsch voice: (616) 957-6415
Philosophy Department (616) 451-4301 (home)
Calvin College e-mail: dratzsch@legacy.calvin.edu
Grand Rapids, MI 49546 fax: (616) 957-8551