Re: 1. a couple of questions, 2. Re: design: purposeful or random? 2/2

Stephen Jones (sejones@ibm.net)
Wed, 26 Feb 97 06:05:39 +0800

Group

On Tue, 18 Feb 1997 19:05:35 -0500, Brian D Harper wrote Re: a
couple of questions:

[...]

>SJ>... Brian needs to read a bit more carefully. I only said
>that methodological naturalists "must *ASSUME* that nature is all
there is in doing science."

BH>But if MN has nothing to do with whether nature is all there is
>then there is no reason to *ASSUME* nature is all there is.

I really cannot follow Brian's thinking. He must be a genius!

>BH>Or, to put it another way, the instruments and techniques of
>science cannot determine whether or not "nature is all there is".

>SJ Agreed. If they could we would all be atheists.

BH>Really? I think many atheists would become theists though some
>would continue to resist.

And here too!

>BH>A scientist is certainly free to assume that nature is all there
>is if they so choose

SJ>Yes. That is *exactly* the word I used - "assume".

BH>Gee, I think the word wasp also imbedded in a sentence that
>contained the word must. Free to assume if they so choose carries
>a somewhat different meaning than must assume.

OK. I was focusing on "assume' and missed the word "free". I would
disagree then that "A scientist is certainly free to assume that
nature is all there is if they so choose". Scientists are not
"*free* to assume that nature is all there is" *in doing science*.
They *must* assume that "nature is all there is" "in doing science",
*the way "science" is understood today*:

"A biologist may believe in God on Sundays, but he or she had better
not bring that belief to the laboratory on Monday with the idea that
it has any bearing on the nature or origin of living organisms. For
professional purposes atheistic and theistic biologists alike must
assume that nature is all there is." (Johnson P.E., "Reason in the
Balance", 1995, pp8-9)

I was listening to a tape of Phil Johnson debating Eugenie Scott,
and the one not-negotiable thing she insisted on was that science
could only accept naturalistic (ie. non-supernaturalistic)
explanations. She even used the word "pretend", ie. that science
must "pretend" that nature is all there is (ie. even if its not).

>BH>but this assumption has nothing to do with "the principle that
>science can study only the things that are accessible to its
>instruments and techniques".

>SJ>Agreed. Who said anything different?

BH>"must assume" was part of your description of MN. Pardon me for
>assuming that you thought it had something to do with MN.

I think Brian had better go back and read what I said. I am tired of
his endless word-games with their little traps set for the unwary.

Group

On Fri, 21 Feb 1997 16:51:43 -0500, Brian D Harper wrote Re: design: purposeful or
random? 2/2:

[...]

>SJ>...Brian says that I am "free to define information any way" I
>"wish" but he quickly adds that "the only objective definitions I
>know about come from information theory". This effectively means
>that I cannot "define information" any way" I "wish"!

BH>No it doesn't, unless of course my knowledge is so vast
>that I know about every objective definition of information
>that there is. This is, of course, absurd. Actually, I found
>a new one just recently that I believe to be objective,
>namely Murray Gell-Mann's effective complexity. At first
>sight this one seems to bear at least some resemblence
>to Dembski's complex specified information.
>But there are many definitions of information that have
>been proposed. Many I've rejected because they are not
>objective. C.H. Bennett's measure, logical depth, I reject
>primarily because it yields absurd (to me) conclusions such
>as that a beer can has an information content comparable
>to the society that made it ;-).

Well I repeat that I define "information" as "specified complexity"!

>BH>Tell me Steve, how can I make it any clearer?
>
>SJ>It's perfectly "clear" that Brian is setting up the rules so that he
>can win the game. I do not accept his rules and I am not going to
>play his game. It may be that "information" in the sense of
>"meaning" cannot be made "objective" in the sense that Brian demands.
>But that does not make it any the less real.

BH>Who said it was any less real?

Brian implied it by dismissing my defintion of "information" as
"specified complexity" as not "objective".

SJ>It just shows the limitations of "information theory" which is
>based on scientific materialism.

BH>Huh?

If meaning is ultimately non-material, then "scientific materialism"
will be forever unable to deal with it, because materialism means
that matter (including mind) is all there is:

"...philosophical materialism-the postulate that matter is the stuff
of all existence and that all mental and spiritual phenomena are its
by-products." (Gould S.J., "Ever Since Darwin", 1977, p24)

>SJ>The same "objective" problem applies to consciousness which is
>more real to each individual than any amount of "objective" science.

BH>Of course.

Well, why did Brian say "Huh" then?

God bless.

Steve

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