I'm sorry, but it seems we have a failure to communicate here. I did not
realize that this was your main point. I thought you were arguing for HAL
not having type-a consciousness based on the fact that a physical description
sufficient to understand the mechanisms of his physical operation didn't
require it. This is different than what you say above. My point did not
address materialism one way or the other. It is true that I'm happy to grant
your point above as long as it is understood that the rest of the description
involving the immaterial type-a aspect of HAL (or a person), although
necessary for a complete description for him, was not neccessary for
understanding his physical behavior. Thus, there is no objectively/physically
measurable way to tell if he has this type-a consciousness or not (unless his
behavior violates physical law in some way--in which case the extra-physical
part of his description *is* then essential for understanding his physical
behavior, and these violations of physical law then do definitely betray his
type-a consciousness).
>It appears that our differences wrt HAL lie in whether or not we deem HAL to
>be completely reductionistically explicable (which I didn't spend much of
>time addressing), but I don't think that's worth arguing about. I think he
>is; you seem not to think so.
Contrary to what I intimated as my namesake, my client is agnostic about
whether or not HAL is "completely reductionistically explicable" or not,
precisely because the difference is physically unobservable short of ongoing
miraculous behavior. It is the unobservablity of such physical effects that
led my namesake to conclude that HAL indeed had a type-a consciousness
because HAL's physical behavior passed the Turing test so well and his
actions were indistinguishable from a being with such a type-a consciousness
whether or not HAL actually had one. IOW, it was an easy mistake for David
Bowman, the astronaut, to make *if* it is found out that HAL didn't actually
have a type-a consciousness after all. This is because, short of ongoing
miraculous behavior, the behavior of a type-a being is indistingushable from
a type-b machine that passes the Turing test (by definition). David Bowman,
the astronaut, is convinced that HAL was a type-a (but can't prove it) and
you are convinced he is not (but can't prove it). My client is agnostic on
the matter. (I personally side with you that HAL is not a type-a, but I
admit that I have no argument other than my own personal bias to offer as
support for this belief).
> I'm willing to let the matter drop there. (I
>wouldn't be if, as you sometimes imply, my goal were to "convince" HAL that
>-I- am conscious; but I don't really care at all about that, partly because I
>don't think HAL is conscious.)
But is your goal to convince anyone else of your view by a sound argument?
>One note, to restate for emphasis: by "is completely explainable in current
>physically reductionistic terms", I don't mean merely "has an empirical
>component that entirely acts in accord with the current laws of physics,
>possibly with an immaterial component that is (for all we know) something
>else entirely." No sir. I mean this is the whole ball of wax, wrt
>causality/predictivity, AND ontology.
How in the world can can one get at the ontology of the situation from the
physical behavior *if* that behavior obeys the laws of nature? And if it
doesn't, just how does the type-a consciousness act to violate those laws?
> And I should re-re-emphasize "current"
>in this: I made quite explicit that seeing type-a consciousness as going
>beyond -current- physicalism doesn't entail "working miracles". Occasionally
>I think you see I mean these things, but usually I'm not at all sure.
I certainly noticed your emphasis on "current", but couldn't figure out why
you keep making such a point of it. It seems to me irrelevant to the argument
*in principle* whether or not we currently have the completely correct
physical theory. Occasionally, I think I'm understanding you, and then it
seems that I am not. You seem to be saying here that some future physical
theory may explain how type-a consciousness acts in the physical realm, but
it is not now understood, and such effects may only seem to be miracles based
on our currently faulty understanding of physical theory. Is this your
claim? If so, then whatever effects that are compatible with the new physical
theory that are attributed to the action of a type-a consciousness, then these
very actions can then, by the definition of the new physical theory, be
explained with solely physical concepts, and then the need for the type-a
consciousness automatically evaporates. So using the new theory the type-a
consciousness is again invisible as far as its effects go in the physical
realm. Then in order for the type-a consciousness to again make its presence
known in the physical realm it would then have to do something *not*
explainable using the new physical theory. But then we are back to square one
with the argument. Thus, the emphasis on "current" physical theory seems
quite misplaced to me. The promise of the new physical theory must be seen as
a case of false advertising.
>Okay, two notes :^) : you repeatedly ask me to enhance the definition of
>type-a consciousness (for those new to the thread, it was just an ostensive
>pointing to our introspective/perceptual awareness), implying the
>positivistic/empirically predictive vagueness of it renders it unsuitable for
>philosophical argument.
I don't know about philosophical arguments (since I'm no philosopher), but it
seems to me that no *sound* argument (philosophical or otherwise) can be
based on ambiguous definitions.
>Thanks for your comments, and sorry my arguments made you lose your good
>humor, Dave!
I'm sorry my words seemed to you like I lost my humor. I've been tired
lately so maybe I could have chosen some of them with more care. I'm really
not angry at all--just mystified by how we can keep talking past each other
without connecting. I think my apparent caustic style may reflect the fact
that I've read too many exchanges between Glenn and Jim (they set bad example
for me). :-) I suppose blaming others in one's apology is bad form though.
David Bowman
dbowman@gtc.georgetown.ky.us