[...]
>
>>GB>I don't see how that aim is incompatible with methodological
>>naturalism, as I stated above.
>
>>SJ>See above. "methodological naturalism" is *by definition*
>>"incompatible" with "intelligent design". MN cannot, in principle,
>>consider "intelligent design", because "naturalism" is the doctrine
>>that nature is all there is:
>
>>BH>why the switch from MN to N mid-sentence?
>
SJ:==
>I had already explained it before. Here it is again:
>
>"It follows from the definition. Naturalism means that nature is all
>there is. So `methodological naturalism' means that the scientist,
>even if he/she is not a metaphysical naturalist (ie. does not
>believe that nature is all there is) must *assume* that nature is all
>there is in doing science."
>
>I presume the "N" in methodological naturalism is the same "N" in
>metaphysical naturalism? If it isn't, perhaps Brian can explain the
>difference between them.
>
Perhaps we can let Phil explain it. In a footnote on page 212
of RITB Phil writes:
=========================================================
In a March 1992 lecture in Dallas I made the following observation:
The statement defining the agenda for this Symposium asserts
that an _a-priori_ commitment to metaphysical naturalism is
necessary to support Darwinism...._Methodological_ naturalism
--the principle that science can study only the things that
are accessible to its instruments and techniques--is not in
question. Of course science can study only what science
can study. Methodological naturalism becomes metaphysical
naturalism only when the limitations of science are taken
to be limitations upon reality (reference ommitted ...--BH).
I would not express the point that way today, but any seeming
inconsistency with the views stated in this paper is semantic
rather than substantive. The key question raised by the
qualifier _methodological_ is this: What is being limitted--
science or reality? When "methodological naturalism" is
combined with a very strong a-priori confidence that
materialistic theories invoking only unintelligent causes
can account for such phenomena as genetic information and
human intelligence, the distinction between methodological
naturalism and metaphysical naturalism tends to collapse.
(Example: "Science can study only naturalistic mechanisms;
therefore we can be confident that life must have arisen
by a naturalistic mechanism, since science continually
advances and solves problems of this kind.") That science
has its limitations is not in doubt; the question is whether
unsound assumptions about reality have been made to permit
science to escape those limitations.
=====================================================
I am quite happy with Phil's definition of methodological naturalism:
"the principle that science can study only the things that are accessible
to its instruments and techniques"
Sound familiar? I hope so since this is what I've been trying to
explain for decades.
I imagine that there are a lot of folks who read RITB but missed
this particular footnote. I am curious whether they found Phil's
statement "...any seeming inconsistency with the views stated in
this paper is semantic rather than substantive" surprising? Let's
take a look at what Phil has to say about methodological naturalism
in the main text of RITB.
In the introduction there is a section entitled Metaphysical Naturalism
(page 16) in which Phil recounts "the grand metaphysical story of
science". Then on page 17:
========================
The the grand metaphysical story is the product of epistomology--
a way of knowing--called methodological naturalism. The
consequences of methodological naturalism are poorly understood.
========================
Yes they do seem to be poorly understood, especially by this poor
deluded fellow. For example, I have a hard time understanding
how "the principle that science can study only the things that are
accessible to its instruments and techniques" can result in a
grand metaphysical story. Actually, it is quite the opposite,
"the principle that science can study only the things that are
accessible to its instruments and techniques" makes it very
clear that the grand metaphysical story is exactly that, a grand
metaphysical story.
In the appendix "Naturalism, Methodological and Otherwise"
which begins on page 205, Phil starts out discussing his
conversations with certain "Christian professors". On page
206 he writes:
=============================================
One of the central issues was an asserted difference
between "metaphysical" and "methodological" naturalism.
There was general agreement that Christian theism
and _metaphysical_ naturalism are contradictory, but
some of the Christian professors argued that _methodological_
naturalism in science is appropriate even for metaphysical
theists.
===============================================
Seems pretty odd that Phil would complain about this since
he asserted a difference between "metaphysical" and
"methodological" naturalism in 1992. Also, it is very hard to
see how Phil's position differs only in semantics and not
in substance from what he said in 1992.
Now, let's return to the footnote quote and in particular Phil's
assertion that "... the distinction between methodological
naturalism and metaphysical naturalism tends to collapse.
(Example: "Science can study only naturalistic mechanisms;
therefore we can be confident that life must have arisen
by a naturalistic mechanism, since science continually
advances and solves problems of this kind.")"
Now, if Phil would only apply here what he said in 1992:
"Methodological naturalism becomes metaphysical
naturalism only when the limitations of science are taken
to be limitations upon reality". I mean, really. Isn't it
painfully obvious that the boundary has been crossed
from methodological naturalism to metaphysical naturalism
an scientism? Phil's example accentuates the distinction
rather than collapsing it.
Brian Harper
Associate Professor
Applied Mechanics
Ohio State University