>
>Off hand, I can think of four reasons why any particular ID-advocate
>might avoid discussing MN --- one good reason, one mediocre, and two
>poor.
>
>Good reason (for an ID-advocate to avoid MN): ID-theory might be right.
>God actually might have designed creation without the ability to "self-
>assemble" first life or increased biological information. God actually
>might have supernaturally intervened in biological history in ways which
>will ultimately be detectable. If that is the case (and it's still too
>soon to tell from the data), then MN would ultimately run up against a
>wall when investigating biological history, and continued reliance upon
>MN would be unproductive.
>
Perhaps its a good idea to define methodological naturalism. I take it
as a recognition of the limits of science (but not on the limits of
reality, of course). I am in agreement with the above, ID might be
right and God may actually have "intervened" (don't like that word:)
in biological history. But the real question is whether or not the
methods of science could ever detect such supernatural intervention.
This is what I mean by recognizing the limits of science.
It's one thing to say that supernatural intervention "... will ultimately
be detectable". Quite another to actually suggest how it could be detected.
Suppose God intervened according to some orderly plan. How then could
we possibly distinguish the results of such intervention from natural law?
Laws are just descriptions of observed regularities. And if God intervened
in ways that we could not identify any pattern, what then? How could we
say anything but "well, I really can't see any pattern to these events".
In an announcement for the upcoming Biola conference, Phil says:
The first step for a 21st-century science of origins is to
separate materialist philosophy from empirical science.
-- Phil Johnson
First let me say that I'm all for separating materialist philosophy
from empirical science ;-). Am I imagining things or does this
statement suggest that ID will be empirically based? If this were
the case then ID would fall within the confines of MN. Now, what
is the implication of this? That the designer is part of the natural
world?
Anyway, let me return to my original plug for MN. In recognizing
the limitations of science we have a natural counter to statements
like the following:
Creativity implies a creator, an active and conscious mind
purposefully fashioning something the world has not seen
before--or so we often think. Yet to biologists, the
most creative force on Earth--the world's finest sculptor,
painter, and biotech inventor rolled into one--is evolution
itself, a process that's completely devoid of any directing
intelligence.
-- Paul Hoffman, "The Science of Creativity," <Discover>,
October 1996, p.6.
I would like to know what instrument Hoffman has for detecting
the presence of a directing intelligence and how he calibrated it ;-).
I've skipped the rest of your reasons [I agree with your conclusions].
If I remember correctly, Phil's reason was that although MN and PN
may be distinguishable in principle they are not distinguished in
practice. It seems to me that the best way to remedy this is to
start distinguishing them in practice by criticizing statements
such as that by Hoffman above.
Enough for now.....
Brian Harper | "If you don't understand
Associate Professor | something and want to
Applied Mechanics | sound profound, use the
The Ohio State University | word 'entropy'"
| -- Morrowitz
Bastion for the naturalistic |
rulers of science |