> ABSTRACT: Is "observational science" a useful categorisation?
>
> Loren has summarised 5 characteristics of "observational science"
> which make it an intermediate category between empirical and
> historical science. I want to suggest reasons why we should
> stick with just two categories.
> [...]
> To summarise: the empirical and historical distinctions arise
> because of the different questions being asked and the inevitable
> differences in methodology required to find answers. The
> suggested category of "observational science" involves no new
> questions, no new methodologies, and its intermediate status is
> an illusion - because both empirical and historical science
> utilise observations extensively. The more science is limited
> to observations, the more open-ended it becomes, and the greater
> is the opportunity for poorly-constrained theoretical and
> speculative work.
David, I presume you're familiar with the phenomenon of reading an article
and thinking, "Hmmm, the author makes some good points, and they all seem
valid enough as such, but I don't agree with the direction the author is
taking his arguments. I know that some counter-points need to be made,
but I don't have time to think about it right now, so I will simply
suspend judgment and ignore the article for the time being." Philosophers
may do that frequently enough; scientists do it very frequently ---
particularly with philosophical arguments!
I recommend that you use the category of "observational science" (a bridge
between "empirical" and "historical") as a practical matter --- to make
your arguments more convincing to scientists.
You can, as you do, divide science into just two categories: "empirical"
and "historical." You can delineate the very real differences between the
two. That is a logically valid and practical way to study "science."
Your arguments, if you frame them thus, might be very convincing to people
who don't practice science on a regular basis, but I suspect that they
will be ineffective on most practicing scientists.
Scientists see the entire range of empirical to historical science as a
unified whole. We are not formally trained to do this, but it flows
naturally from the subject matter. If you give a scientist a few minutes,
she can probably think of half a dozen examples of where the results of
historical and empirical science feed into each other very intimately,
each making reciprocal predictions on the other.
So if you wrote an article carefully deliniating the important differences
between empirical and historical science, and just left it at that, I
expect most scientists would say to themselves, "That David Tyler makes
some good points, but I think he's overlooking some important
counter-points, though I can't quite put my finger on what they are right
now." And since most scientists are very impatient philosophers, they're
not going to take the time to analyze your arguments, figuring out which
ones they agree with, which ones they have reservations about, and what
additional points they think need to be made to counter-balance your
arguments. Instead, they're going to put your article on a shelf
somewhere in their offices and in their minds, and that will be that.
This will be no fault of your own. Your points will be valid; they just
won't convince.
In order to convince scientists that there are important differences
between historical and empirical science, you are also going to have to
talk about the important similarities and the important bridges (e.g.
observational science) between the two. That way, scientists who read
your work will hear you give what appears to be a more _complete_ picture
of science. Then they'll be happy with you, and perhaps they'll be happy
with your conclusions, too.
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"Why should I have to WORK for everything? |
That's like saying I don't DESERVE it." | Loren Haarsma
--Calvin (_Calvin_and_Hobbes_) | lhaarsma@opal.tufts.edu