>>SJ>But the real question is not "Is killing Jews a bad thing?" but "Is
>>killing humans a bad thing?" Now one might argue that this is not an
>>absolute because killing in self-defence, or mercy-killing, etc.,
>>makes killing justified in some circumstances. But this merely
>>establishes the absolute general principal that killing humans is a
>>bad thing, even though there may be some special circumstances, that
>>mitigate its badness.
>
>DM>OK. Let us look at a "special circumstance", Steve. Let's look in
>>the Book of Joshua, Chapter 10. Steve, if you haven't actually read this
>>chapter before, AND felt the full horror of it, do so now.
>
>SJ>I have indeed read this chapter before and "felt the full horror of
>it".
I thought you might have, but I also thought it worthwhile to be sure.
>But how do *you*, as a presumed moral relativist, claim that the
>killing in "the Book of Joshua, Chapter 10" is a bad thing? According
>to moral relativists, there are no moral absolutes, only social
>conventions geared to survival of a particular group. On your moral
>relativists grounds, therefore, Joshua had ample justification to wipe
>out his enemies, in order to assure the Israeelite's survival in a
>land dominated by the much more numerous Canaanites, who had already
>declared war on the Israelites.
Wow! You really presume a lot, don't you? Yes, I would have called myself a
moral relativist, before I saw your definition. I am definitely not a moral
relativist by that definition.
My definition of a moral relativist is somewhat different. I do claim that
there are no moral absolutes SET DOWN BY SUPERNATURAL ENTITIES. Standards of
moral behaviour are the product of people. There are *relatively* high
standards of moral behaviour, such as those standards set by Jesus,
Mohammed, Buddah and Mathatma Ghandi. And there are *relatively* low
standards of moral behaviour such as those set by Joshua, Caligula, Stalin,
and Hitler. How do I determine whether a standard of moral behaviour is
"high" or "low"? I compare it to my own standard. Can I make a less personal
determination? Yes, I can ask other people to compare it to their standard
and offer an opinion. The more people that make the comparison and offer an
uncoerced opinion, the more universal does the collective consensus become.
Now I am not claiming that this approach is perfect. Morality by consensus
does produce societies that engage in and approve of activities that you and
I would regard as abhorrent. However, morality by claimed divine revelation
also produces societies that engage in and approve of activities that you
and I would regard as abhorrent.
What about morality by *real* divine revelation? Sorry, in the real world, I
don't know how to distinguish that from morality by *claimed* divine revelation!
>SJ>So what is your problem, Derek? If you are claiming that killing
>other human beings is always wrong, then you are espousing moral
>absolutes. Which is it that you believe, moral relativism or moral
>absolutism?
Anoother illusory dichotomy, Steve! :-) I, personally, have moral absolutes.
Most people do. However, I don't live by myself on an island. I live in a
family, which lives in a community, which lives in a state, which lives on
earth. So, even though I have moral absolutes, my family's moral standard,
derived as it is from the weighted consensus of my wife, my children and
myself, is necessarily relative. And so on for my community, state, and earth.
>DM>And just so we are absolutely sure who bears the responsibility for
>>this genocide, we'll have verse 40 again.
>
>DM>40 So Joshua smote all the country of the hills, and of the south,
>>and of the vale, and of the springs, and all their kings: he left
>>none remaining, BUT UTTERLY DESTROYED ALL THAT BREATHED,
>>AS THE LORD GOD OF ISRAEL COMMANDED.
>
>SJ>Indeed. Joshua was commanded by Yahweh to "devote" (Heb. herem) ie.
>"utterly destroy" all the Canaanites. This was as originally
>instructed to Moses by Yahweh in Deuteronomy 20:10-18:
>
>"When you march up to attack a city, make its people an offer of
>peace. If they accept and open their gates, all the people in it
>shall be subject to forced labor and shall work for you. If they
>refuse to make peace and they engage you in battle, lay siege to that
>city. When the LORD your God delivers it into your hand, put to the
>sword all the men in it. As for the women, the children, the
>livestock and everything else in the city, you may take these as
>plunder for yourselves. And you may use the plunder the LORD your God
>gives you from your enemies.This is how you are to treat all the
>cities that are at a distance from you and do not belong to the
>nations nearby. However, in the cities of the nations the LORD your
>God is giving you as an inheritance, do not leave alive anything that
>breathes. Completely destroy them--the Hittites, Amorites,
>Canaanites, Perizzites, Hivites and Jebusites--as the LORD your God
>has commanded you. Otherwise, they will teach you to follow all the
>detestable things they do in worshiping their gods, and you will sin
>against the LORD your God."
>
>Note that only the Canaanites were to be utterly destroyed. The reason
>is given, because they would corrupt the pure religion of Yahweh, the
>one true God, with the "detestable things they do in worshiping their
>gods", ie. child sacrifice, ritual prostitution, etc.
Can you explain to me why this concept of religious purity is any less
disgusting than Hitler's concept of racial purity?
And I'm sure Goebbels would have been inspired by the quality of propaganda
in Deuteronomy 20:10-18!
>Archer says:
>
>"In certain instances such as the capture of Jericho and of Ai, Joshua
>records that the Israelites completely exterminated the inhabitants
>according to the command of Jehovah Himself. It needs to be
>emphasized that the responsibility for this extreme measure rested
>with God (that is, if this account is to be trusted) rather than with
>the Hebrews. This needs to be emphasized in view of the frequent
>statement heard in some quarters that the "primitive minded, half
>savage" Israelites performed this atrocity because of their backward
>state of religious development. The text makes it very plain that
>Joshua was simply carrying out divine orders when these inhabitants
>were indiscriminately put to the sword.
>
>What was the justification for this total destruction? The subsequent
>history of Israel serves to illustrate very pointedly the grave danger
>
>that remained for Israel so long as the Canaanites were permitted to
>live in their midst. Given over as they were to the most degenerate
>forms of polytheism and sexual impurity, these depraved inhabitants
>of the land were sure to exert a baneful influence and spread a deadly
>
>contagion among the covenant people of God. Recent archaeological
>discovery has brought to light concrete testimony to the crass and
>brutal features of the Canaanite faith as displayed in the literature of
>the Ras Shamra Tablets. Throughout the region there seems to have
>been a readiness to incorporate into the indigenous worship all the
>foreign cults that were practiced by the surrounding heathen nations.
>Thus we find a series of hyphenated gods: Teshub-Hepa (the Hurrian
>storm-god and his consort), the Osiris-Isis cult from Egypt; Shamash
>(the sun-god) and Ishtar (the bloodthirsty goddess of war and love)
>and Tammuz (a fertility god ) from Mesopotamia. Many sites have
>yielded serpent stelae and Ashtoreth images with sexual symbols. In
>view of the corrupting influence of the Canaanite religion, especially
>with its religious prostitution (cf the abomination of Baal-peor in
>Num. 25) and infant sacrifice, it was impossible for pure faith and
>worship to be maintained in Israel except by the complete elimination
>of the Canaanites themselves, at least in those areas which the
>Hebrews were able to occupy. Much of the periodic spiritual decline
>and apostasy which marked the history of Israel during the time of the
>Judges is attributable to a toleration of the Canaanite inhabitants and
>their degenerate religion in the midst of the land."
>
>(Archer G.L., ."A Survey of Old Testament Introduction",
>Moody Press: Chicago, 1964, p261)
So the Israelites didn't just do it because they wanted the land? They did
it because they were on a "mission from God". I don't think so. More than
likely, Deuteronomy is an exercise in self-justification.
>DM>So, would you care to explain what was so "special" about the
>>"circumstances" surrounding these wholesale slaughters, that God found it
>>necessary to condone, and even participate in the slaughter of women,
>>children and babies. And not even just condone and participate, but even
>>perform one of the greatest miracles ever attributed to Him in order to
>>ensure that there was enough time to ensure that one particular act of
>>genocide was fully completed.
>
>SJ>The first point we need to get clear is: did "God" order the
>destruction of the Canaanites? There are two possibilities:
>
>1. No. This is your position, because you don't believe that God
>can be known or that God doesn't exist. In this case, there is no
>problem. This is just another minor war in a long history of
>purely human wars. God cannot be blamed, only men.
Yes. But men who chose to *justify* their actions by the old "I was only
following orders" excuse. It didn't work at Nuremburg and it shouldn't have
worked in Canaan.
>2. Yes. This is my position. I believe that God did order the
>destruction of the Canaanites because they were evil and a great
>threat to God's plan to establish a nation Israel through whom He
>would, in the fulness of time, send His Son Jesus, who would
>bless the world immeasurably and procure eternal life for uncountable
>millions.
So, presumably, if you became absolutely convinced that God wanted you to
kill whole families of "pagans", you would do it? It may be as I have long
thought: Be careful of people who are prepared to die for their God; such
people are just as likely to be prepared to kill for their God, also.
>SJ>The point is, you cannot hold 1. and argue against 2.
I can, however, hold 1. and argue against a belief in 2. that would justify
the totally unjustifiable actions of 1.!
>SJ>If 1. is right then 2. cannot be wrong by definition.
If 1. is right, then 2. MUST BE wrong by definition!
>SJ>However, if 2. is right then 1. is wrong by definition.
>Either way, you can't prove 2. wrong.
Of course not. What I can, and do, claim is that the occurrence of 1.,
DISGUISED AS 2. or JUSTIFIED BY BELIEF IN 2., is abhorrent.
>SJ>Zacharias says:
>
>"Let me narrate an interaction I had with a student at the University
>of Nottingham in England. As soon as I finished one of my lectures,
>he shot up from his seat and blurted out rather angrily, "There is too
>much evil in this world; therefore, there cannot be a God." I asked
>him to remain standing and answer a few questions for me.
Admittedly, I'm not under the same pressure as this student was, and I
haven't pinned myself to the absurd statement of the student, but let's see
if I would fare any better. Firstly, the amount of evil (and good) in the
world is entirely consistent with no God, but it is also consistent with an
amoral God.
>SJ>I said, "If
>there is such a thing as evil, aren't you assuming there is such a
>thing as good?" He paused, reflected, and said, "I guess so. "
Good and evil are not "things"; they are concepts, the opposite ends of a
continuum of assessments we make on the effect certain occurrences have on
us, individually or collectively.
>SJ>"If there is such a thing as good," I countered, "you must affirm a moral
>law on the basis of which to differentiate between good and evil."...
Not "a moral law" but MY moral law. which may or may not be the same as the
moral law of others.
>"When you say there is evil, aren't you admitting there is good?
Yes. I am also admitting that there is mostly good, partly good, a bit good,
neutral, a bit evil, partly evil and mostly evil.
>SJ>When you accept the existence of goodness, you must affirm a
>moral law on the basis of which to differentiate between good and
>evil. But when you admit to a moral law, you must posit a moral
>lawgiver.
Yes. Me. Or a consensus of people. Or a person authorised by such a
consensus or majority of people. Or a person or people with the power to
impose their moral law on unempowered people.
>SJ>That, however, is who you are trying to disprove and not prove.
With my responses to his questions, he could not have responded thus.
>SJ>For if there is no moral lawgiver, there is no moral law. If
>there is no moral law, there is no good. If there is no good, there
>is no evil.
Alternatively, if I (or we) are the moral lawgiver, there is my (or our)
moral law. If there is my (or our) moral law, there is my (or our)
definition of good. If there is my (or our) definition of good, there is my
(or our) definition of evil.
>SJ> What, then, is your question?" There was a conspicuous
>pause that was broken when he said rather sheepishly, "What, then, am
>I asking you?"...Let me summarize: 1. To justify the question, God
>must remain in the paradigm; without God, the question
>self-destructs."
Not so, as I have just shown.
>SJ>(Zacharias R.K., "Can Man Live Without God", Word
>Publishing: Dallas TX, 1994, p182-183)
>
>DM>It would appear that, at least according to God as revealed in the
>>Book of Joshua, the God-commanded wholesale slaughter of humans is
>>not necessarily a bad thing. Like, for instance, if God's people
>>covet the land of those they intend to slaughter?
>
>My point is that this is only a problem *for Christian theists*. It
>cannot be a problem to agnostics or atheists.
We agnostics and atheists have to live with theists who might any day
believe they are, or should be, on a "mission from God" to exterminate
agnostics and atheists. For that reason, it is important to us that the "God
told me to" excuse is forever invalidated!
>DM>But of course, we know better. We know that what the Israelites did
>>was an unmitigated evil. An unmitigated evil commanded and assisted by the
>>Judaeo-Christian God. If the above is true, then my atheist/agnostic
>>morality is higher than the morality of Joshua and the God of Joshua,
>>because I know that what they did was unjustifiable, and they thought that
>>what they did was justifiable.
>SJ>What "evil"? What "morality"? How "unjustifiable"? These are all the
>language of moral absolutes.
No. They are also the language of moral relativism. Something is more or
less evil or unjustifiable if more or fewer people judge it so.
>SJ>Where do you get these moral absolutes from?
>SJ>If there is no God, then this was the work of man. It *cannot* be a
>problem to you, because you either believe God is unknowable or He
>doesn't exist. Please make up your mind, Derek! :-)
The problem is that "man" has a long and dishonorable history of commiting
atrocities in the name of one or another god.
>DM>Can you imagine what it would be like now if the U.S.A., or some
>>other nuclear power, was governed by people who condone what God and
>>Joshua did to Ai, Jerico, Hebron, etc.? How safe could the rest of
>>the world reasonably feel?
>SJ>If they were moral relativists, why would they "feel" anything? If
>Saddam Hussein gets nuclear or biological weapons and wipes out New
>York, how could moral relativists say he was wrong?
These questions stem from our lack of agreement on what constitutes moral
relativism.
>>SJ>C.S. Lewis wrote:
>>"I know that some people say the idea of a Law of Nature or decent
>>behaviour known to all men is unsound, because different civilizations
>>and different ages have had quite different moralities. But this is
>>not true. There have been differences between their moralities, but
>>these have never amounted to anything like a total difference.
>
>DM>I would suggest that Joshua's morality concerning the sanctity of
>>human life was totally different to what is considered appropriate
>>today. Of course, the racist element of right-wing "Christianity"
>>have a precedent in Joshua.
>
>SJ>The point is, as a presumed moral relatavist, how would you counter
>"the racist element of right-wing `Christianity' "?
The way it has been done in Australia - racial villification laws backed by
educative processes and legal sanctions imposed by a majority of the elected
representatives of the people. Not perfect, but good enough.
>SJ>... Men have differed as regards
>>what people you ought to be unselfish to- whether it was only your own
>>family, or your fellow countrymen, or every one. But they have always
>>agreed that you ought not to put yourself first. Selfishness has
>>never been admired.
No doubt, Lewis would have found the Australian adulation of "entrepreneurs"
and corporate raiders during the 80's very instructive.
>SJ>>Men have differed as to whether you should have
>>one wife or four. But they have always agreed that you must not
>>simply have any woman you liked." (Lewis C.S., "Mere Christianity",
>>Fount: London, 1977 reprint, p17)
>DM>Have men "always agreed" that you slaughter your enemies down to
>>the last man, woman, child and baby, as the ancient Israelites did?
>SJ>No. But when it is a war of self-defence, men have often agreed to
>wipe out whole cities full of men, women and children. Think of
>Hiroshima, which makes Joshua's destuction of the Canaanites, look
>like a Sunday School picnic.
But nobody, AFAIK, tried to use the "mission from God" excuse concerning
Hiroshima. The immorality of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, and the
culpability of the participants, can be judged independently of "mission
from God" issues muddying the waters. And I am sure that, had the Axis won
the war, those responsible for ordering and carrying out the atomic bombing
of Hiroshima would have been (correctly, IMO) tried as war criminals.
However, there are nowhere near as many war criminals exposed on the winning
sides of any war as there should be. Another admitted problem with moral
relativism, I'm afraid. But one that I don't believe moral absolutism can
realistically address, either.
>>SJ>I would argue "moral standards" are more than mere "personal beliefs".
>>They are built-in. We are "hard-wired" with moral natures. Only a
>>theist can account for this - we were made moral in the image of a
>>holy God. The "naturalist" cannot rationally account for his "moral
>>standards", since to him they are just "personal beliefs":
>
>DM>What leads you to believe that only a theist can account for our
>>"hard-wired" moral natures? Would it not be more reasonable to
>>believe that the basis for our common morality is in our genes? This
>>appears to be reasonable, since I understand that a number of inheritable
>>(and therefore genetically based) mental disorders manifest as amorality.
>
>It would not matter to a theist if "the basis for our common morality
>is in our genes". But if you argue that, then you are no longer a
>moral relativist.
By your definition, I never was.
>SJ>The next problem you would have is working out whose "genes" were
>right - yours or Joshua's? :-)
Probably very little difference. My respect for human life beyond my own
tribe, which is probably cultural rather than genetic, is undoubtedly more
highly developed, however.
>DM>And if the basis for our common morality is in our genes, from
>>whence did it come? Was it a direct gift from God? Or was it an
>>indirect gift of God via the evolutionary process? Or was it simply
>>necessary that, as a social animal, we, like every other social
>>animal, either behaved altruistically, mostly to our close relatives
>>and less to the rest of our group, or we ceased to be social?
>SJ>Even if granted, this would just be an "is" not an "ought".
An "is" on which "oughts" can be built.
>SJ>Just because it is part of our "evolutionary process", why should we
>continue to obey it?
We shouldn't NECESSARILY.
>SJ>In fact, Dawkins argues that we shouldn't obey our selfish genes:
Not quite. Dawkins argues that we should resist the behaviours that our
"selfish" genes attempt to impose on us, when those behaviours conflict with
the cultivation and nurturing of an altruistic society. Otherwise, obedience
to those behaviours is reasonable and personal-quality-of-life promoting. It
is my opinion that maximisation of happiness involves a balance between
altruism and selfishness.
>And on this basis, how can you condemn Joshua? He was behaving
>"altruistically, mostly to" his "close relatives and less to the rest
>of our group"?
I can condemn Joshua because, measured against my moral standards, his
altruism was too narrowly focussed. In other words, he was a xenophobe. But,
rather than take personal responsibility for his xenophobia, he used the
"mission from God" excuse.
>DM>How can we test these and other alternatives? Based on the
>>teachings of the Bible, Joshua and some other huge moral lapses
>>notwithstanding, we are expected to behave altruistically to all
>>people. But IS that how we behave, especially under stress, when our
>>real natures are revealed? No, we revert to the moral nature within,
>>i.e. me and my family first, my tribe second, anyone else with whom
>>I share significant common purpose third, anyone with whom I have no
>>disagreement fourth, and anyone who stands against us can expect a
>>fight.
>SJ>What "moral lapses"? On the above basis, haven't you just excused
>Joshua?
No. While xenophobia was widespread in the ancient world, and far too
prevalent in the modern world for my liking, Joshua's expression of his
xenophobia in genocide was extreme. But I don't believe that Joshua bears
full responsibility. Presumably he led with the consent, probably even
enthusiasm, of those he was leading.
>DM>If our moral nature was to behave altruistically to all, then
>>theists could account for it. More, I think evolutionists would be
>>very hard-pressed to account for it. But the true nature of our
>>altruism/morality, which is often only revealed under stress, has so
>>much in common with other social mammals (those who are most
>>genetically similar to me come first, and so on), and so little in
>>common with Biblical teaching, that I think the conclusion is
>>obvious.
>Here you are a bit confused, Derek? On your basis, the Bible was a
>production only by men, not by God since either he doesn't exist or he
>is unknowable. So why on your basis should Biblical teaching have "so
>little in common" with "the true nature" of this "social mammal"?
Because the best Biblical teaching (of which Joshua 10 is NOT a good
example, or is a good example of what to repudiate), like the best teachings
of all religions and philosophies, encourages us to aspire to a higher
quality of life than we would have if we obeyed only the limited altruistic
instincts that are our genetic heritage. We are inspired to extend the
limits of our altruism to all of humanity. Buddhism, and most ecological
movements, go further and inspire us to extend the limits of our altruism to
all animal life and the whole global ecosystem, respectively.
>DM>Our morality is a product of evolution. The only questions that
>>remain are, (1) Was/is God involved in evolutionary processes?
>>(2) If so, to what extent?
>According to you God is unknowable, so your answer to both 1. and 2.
>are either "no" or "I don't know"?
I know what my answers are. What about your thoughts?
>DM>These are theological/philosophic questions, the answers to which
>>we disagree without significant hope of agreement.
>SJ>Agreed! :-)
>DM>What I am hoping that you will see is that, while our moral IDEALS,
>>i.e. what we aspire to, might be derived from religious or cultural
>>influences, our moral actions when stressed are the product of the
>>genetically-based altruism we inherited from our social-mammal
>>ancestors.
>SJ>So, on your basis, why was Joshua wrong to exterminate the Canaanites,
>since his "moral ideals" where "derived from religious or cultural
>influences"and his "moral actions" were "the product of the
>genetically-based altruism we inherited from our social-mammal
>ancestors"?
Because he failed to rise above the moral ideals of his religion and culture
which were too narrowly focussed on his own tribe. Not only did he fail to
rise above those ideals, he gave full expression to the worst of them in
genocide.
>>SJ>"...Objective morality makes sense if real moral laws or oughts exist
>>and if normative, moral properties like rightness, goodness, worth,
>>and dignity exist in acts (the act of honoring one's parents) and
>>things (persons and animals have worth). If physicalism is true as a
>>worldview, there are no moral properties or full-blooded oughts.
>>Physical states just are, and one physical state causes or fails to
>>cause another physical state. A physical state does not morally
>>prescribe that another physical state ought to be. If physicalism is
>>true, oughts are not real moral obligations telling us what one should
>>do to be in conformity with the moral universe. Rather, "ought"
>>serves as a mere guide for reaching a socially accepted or
>>psychologically desired goal (e.g., "If one wants to have pleasure and
>>avoid pain, then one 'ought' to tell the truth") . Moral imperatives
>>become grounded in subjective preferences on the same level as a
>>preference for Burger King over McDonald's." (Moreland J.P., "Scaling
>>the Secular City", Baker: Grand Rapids MI, 1987, p93)
>
>DM>I would suggest that "oughts" or "moral imperatives" have much less
>>to do with subjective preferences and much more to do with our
>>genetic inheritance. They are imperatives because they REALLY ARE
>>part of us. All that our religion and culture does is to formalise
>>and, perhaps, polish them a little. But notice how quickly the
>>formalities and the polish disappear in times of great stress. If
>>you doubt that, look at how we honour those few people who DO hold
>>the high moral ground under great stress.
>SJ>Christianity hold that man is a fallen being, and to some extent he
>has reverted back to his animal (as opposed to his spiritual) nature.
There is a valid conflict between the scientifically derived theory of
evolution and the "man is a fallen being" theory of theology. It would
appear that, no matter how much creativity God imposes on the evolutionary
process, humanity begins as imperceptibly different from animals, and thus
has nowhere to "fall" from. So, any "fall of humanity" must have come after
humanity had developed significant mental capacity. The first humans would
have had nowhere to fall from. Which would appear to wipe out the Biblical
Adam and Eve as our physical ancestors, though you could probably make an
argument, within your paradigm, for their spiritual ancestry. But this
requires those parts of Genesis that deal with Adam and Eve to be, not
actual account of real events, but parable.
>So man's actions today cannot be regarded as normative:
>
>"So I find this law at work: When I want to do good, evil is right
>there with me. For in my inner being I delight in God's law; but I
>see another law at work in the members of my body, waging war against
>the law of my mind and making me a prisoner of the law of sin at work
>within my members. What a wretched man I am! Who will rescue me from
>this body of death?" (Rom 7:21-24)
>
>But you miss Moreland's point: "If physicalism is true as a worldview,
>there are no moral properties or full-blooded oughts".
If physicalism is true as a world view, there are such moral properties as
we invent, and our "oughts" are those that we prescribe.
>>SJ>Tim's argument might be true if all religions were equally valid.
>>But even he might believe a religion that taught as its highest truth
>>"love your neigbour as yourself" (Judeo-Christianity) was more true
>>than one which had temple prostitutes and sacrificed its children to
>>idols as did the Canaanites and the Incas.
>DM>Just step back a bit and you will see temple prostitutes and child
>>sacrifice for what they really were. Like much associated with
>>religion, they were about the exercise and flaunting of power.
>SJ>On your basis, what is morally wrong with them then?
Nothing intrinsically wrong with temple prostitutes, unless they were forced
or coerced into prostitution. What is wrong with human sacrifice generally
is that it devalues human life. What is additionally and specifically wrong
with human sacrifice to idols is that it sends a powerful symbolic message
that a god (or even a God) can be more important than a person.
>DM>Temple prostitutes were, as much as anything, a source of income
>>and, no doubt, a bit of blatant "Rank hath its privileges" for the
>>priests. Child sacrifice was simply a brutal exercise of absolute
>>power. If a leader could cause people to sacrifice their children on
>>his command, then he knew that his power over them was absolute.
>>And, equally or more importantly, they knew it too!
>SJ>The religion of the Bible was absolutely opposed to such practices,
>and that is why Yahweh commanded Joshua to wipe the practiontioners of
>those "detestable things they do in worshiping their gods" (Dt 20:18).
The religion of the Bible was not just opposed to the practices (assuming,
for the sake of argument, that the practices were real and not just
propaganda designed to inflame the Israelites against the Canaanites and
dehumanise the Canaanites in the minds of the Israelites - standard practice
before going to war and while at war) but was also opposed to the people who
allegedly committed the practices.
Not quite the same religion as that of Jesus who hated sin but loved sinners.
>Are you now claiming that the religion of the Bible was morally better
>than that of the Canaanites?
Since, in my moral judgement, there is no greater evil than genocide (except
the destruction of Earth's whole ecosystem), then the religion (or moral
system) of the Israelites, during the conquest and genocide of Canaan, was
far inferior to that of the Canaanites they conquered.
>DM>But all of this talk of temple prostitutes and child sacrifice is
>>little more than a diversion. There are no temple prostitutes or
>>child sacrifices in Judaism, Islam or Buddhism. How does
>>Christianity substantiate a claim to greater validity than those?
>SJ>On the contrary, Derek. The discussion of "temple prostitutes or
>child sacrifices" is *central* to our discussion of why Yahweh ordered
>Joshua to exterminate the Canaanites.
When I wrote the above, I had missed the bit about temple prostitutes and
child sacrifice as an intrinsic part of the Canaanite religion. I saw the
reference to Aztecs, but not the reference to Canaanites. So I withdraw my
"little more than a diversion" comment unreservedly.
>SJ>You trying to switch the
>subject to the relative "validity" of "Judaism, Islam or Buddhism" and
>"Christianity" is a transparent "diversion".
I'm sure it seemed so. But it really was a case of careless reading on my
part, not a deliberate diversion.
>SJ>But one I will take up in the next thread! :-)
Oh, no! :-)
Regards
Derek
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| Derek McLarnen | dmclarne@pcug.org.au |
| Melba ACT | dmclarne@ncomcanb.telstra.com.au |
| Australia | |
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