Inbetween scientific data and logic on one side, and philosopical bias on
the other, there is another important factor in these "origins" debates:
scientific intuition --- an intuitive judgment, based upon professional
experience, as to where the data is pointing and where new discoveries are
likely to be made. Ignoring this factor readily leads the unfortunate
impasse of, on the one hand, "specialists" claiming that their conclusions
follow simply from their superior knowledge, and on the other hand
"non-specialists" claiming that, since the data does not logically PROVE
the specialists' conclusions, the primary reason for the specialists'
opinions must be plain-old philosophical bias. Neither extreme is true.
----------------------------
Friends, I've been uncomfortable with the tone of many of the recent posts
on "primarily literature" and "priestly attitude."
May I suggest a practical measure that works for me?
--- If you feel your blood pressure rise while you're writing, wait
a full day (and then edit) before posting.
--- Wherever possible, avoid point-by-point, quote-by-quote arguments.
-- Try to make at least half of your post stand-alone prose,
(as opposed to serial responses), and
-- Respond to SEVERAL of our opponents points in one
COMPREHENSIVE argument.
---------------------------------
I'd like to suggest another perspective on this debate.
There are several factors in deciding origins-type scientific questions:
1) Scientific data,
2) Scientific intuition,
3) Logic,
4) Philosopical and religious expectations.
Scientists and non-scientists are equally qualified to address questions
of logic and philosophical (and religious) expectations (bias?).
Scientists (particularly biologists) are better qualified to discern the
strength of scientific data (and the relative strength of potentially
contradictory data). Also, specialists have the most up-to-date data.
"Scientific intuition" is a fuzzy term, but an important one! It is a
terribly important element of the origins debate, but no one seems to talk
about it. It spans the rhetorical ground between data and logic on one
end, and philosophy and religion on the other. (In my opinion, a major
muddying factor in this recent debate is that you've been talking
extensively about data ("primary literature"), logic, and philosophy, but
no one has put a handle on this fourth element.)
"Scientific intuition," as I conceive it, is an intuitive judgment based
upon knowledge and experience in a particular field as to WHERE THE DATA
IS POINTING. Specialists are much better at this than non-specialists.
Many people have some degree of scientific intuition, but the only
significant means of learning and improving it is by professional
experience. "Scientific intution" helps the scientist decide which
theoretical problem to tackle next, which experiment to try next, and
which piece of her experimental equipment isn't working properly.
Scientific intuition, combined with data and logic, helps the scientist
guess where the new breakthroughs are likely to be found, and helps direct
research goals. Scientific intuition allows a scientist say, "I don't
have the data to prove this hypothesis, but I'm pretty confident (based
upon my knowledge and experience) that this is the right direction to
look." (I believe that 90% of "philosophy of science" is an attempt to
describe (or proscribe) how this "scientific intuition" actually works!)
It's very real, and very important.
All of you theologians and tax accountants out there have similar sorts of
"professional intuition," based upon your professional experience. It's
what gives your opinions on difficult questions greater credibility than
the opinions of non-professionals --- even when you can't IMMEDIATELY back
up your opinion with chapter and verse (or sub-section and paragraph
number). And it helps you know where and how to look for the REAL answers
to difficult questions, when non-professionals would have little or no
clue where to start the search.
I would like to suggest that this "scientific intuition," based upon years
of professional experience, is the REAL (albeit not strictly LOGICAL)
reason why such a large percentage of scientists (Christian and
non-Christian alike) believe macroevolution is true. If we ignore this
factor in decision-making --- and talk only about data, logic, and
philosophical bias --- we quickly reach the unfortunate impasse of
"specialists" claiming that their conclusions follow simply from their
superior knowledge of the data, and "non-specialists" claiming that, since
the data does not logically PROVE the specialists' conclusions, the
primary reason for the specialists' opinions must be their philosophical
bias. Neither extreme is true.
--------------
Maybe a hypothetical example will help. Let me pick some "random" names.
Let us suppose that Gould and Dawkins claim that the scientific data
scientifically proves marcroevolution, and also proves that God played no
role in biological history. Johnson comes along and correctly points out
that their logic is flawed regarding the first point, and that their
philosophical bais (rather than the actual data) leads to the second
point. Unlike some non-specialist opponents of macroevolution, Johnson
does very little criticism of the scientific data; rather, he criticises
non-sequiter conclusions wherever he finds them. Great! So far, Johnson
is doing an unimpeachably excellent job as a "non-specialist" critic, and
he is doing a great service to the truth.
A minor problem arises when Johnson dabbles in a little philosophy of
science (not his area of specialty) to argue that Gould and Dawkins are
being "unscientific" in their belief in macroevolution. Specialists in
philosophy of science properly nail Johnson on this point. Johnson should
withdraw that particular claim.
Now here's where the real problem starts: Johnson the non-specialist
ignores the the specialists' "scientific intuition" as an element in
decision-making. Johnson claims that, since the data (element 1) does not
logically prove (element 3) macroevolution, that Gould's and Dawkins'
support for macroevolution must be almost entirely due to their
Naturalistic philosophical bias (element 4).
Some Christian scientists step in a say, "Wait a minute, we don't share
Gould's and Dawkin's Naturalism, but we DO think that macroevolution is
supported by the data and probably true." Johnson responds that these
Christian scientists must have a philosophy "tainted" by Naturalism. The
Christian scientists offer theological and theistic philosophical reasons
to support their belief. Johnson's supporters repeat the charge of
"taint." Christian scientists say that these critics just don't
understand how science works and don't understand the scientific data.
The critics respond with charges of "elitism." Discussion breaks down and
much yelling ensues.
Well, perhaps this example isn't so hypothetical. ;-)
------------------
I am NOT trying to make professional scientific intuition a "trump card"
to win the debate. I'm only trying to identify a rarely recognized
decision-making factor. I don't want to be "priestly" about it. Intution
is not logic. There is no sharp demarcation between "data" and intuition
on the one end, and there is certainly no sharp demarcation between
professional intuition and plain-old philosophical bias on the other end
(good scientists can confuse the latter for the former).
I would ask non-scientist critics of macroevolution to consider that the
reason so many scientists (including Christian scientists) accept
macroevolution is NOT primarily because of philosophical bias, hidden
assumptions, peer pressure, or indoctrination. The primary reason for
macroevolution's widespread acceptance is scientific intuition (analogous
to any other professional intuition) --- something a great deal more valid
than plain old philosophical bais --- developed by years of practice and
familiarity with the problems, methods, and data of science. (I'm
certainly not saying that this inevitably leads to belief in
macroevolution. Mike Behe is an excellent example of someone who is
convinced by his highly developed scientific intuition that macroevolution
is wrong.) When scientists get exasperated by your criticisms and start
making elitist-sounding claims about their superior knowledge, try to be
charitable; try to assume that they are appealing to knowledge and
training sporadically gleaned from diverse sources over many years, which
they are (understandably) having trouble synthesizing and elucidating in a
simple paragraph or two. (On the other hand, if they make a logical
blunder or a clear philosophically biased statement, nail 'em! :-)
If you want to change a scientist's "professional intuition," there's no
substitute for diving into the professional literature (particularly
refereed journals of original research and review articles), learning the
stuff, and then pointing that scientist towards articles which favor your
claims.
For the specialists out there, I would ask they remember that appeals to
the primary literature and specific data are occasionally useful for
settling minor, narrowly focussed questions. They are hardly ever an
important factor in settling the big questions.
--------------
We all hope the question will ultimately be settled by data and logic.
Until then, to keep this debate SENSIBLE, let's remember that the lion's
share of our decision-making happens by a process a good deal less certain
than data and logic, but a good deal more reputable than mere
philosophical bias.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Our lesson for the day is: good judgement |
comes from experience. And 'experience,' | Loren Haarsma
well, that comes from bad judgement." | lhaarsma@opal.tufts.edu
--Bull (_Tazmania_) |