Re: random observations on science and the supernatural

David J. Tyler (D.Tyler@mmu.ac.uk)
Fri, 19 Apr 1996 17:33:29 GMT

Michael farley wrote on 19th April:

> It is the inherent uncertainty and lack of predictability of an
> omnipotent, omniscient Mind or Will that makes appeals to intelligent
> causation by God difficult to test or incorporate in a scientific framework.

My science is founded on a belief in the faithfulness and consistency
of God: by his providence, he upholds/sustains the cosmos. The
expectation that his government can be described in terms of "laws"
is rooted in a knowledge of God's character. This, according to my
reading of history, was a key element in the thinking of many of the
pioneers of science. Now - if intelligent causation is a real
element in our studies of origins, God does not suddenly become
arbitary in his behaviour. This gives me confidence that intelligent
causation can be handled in a rational way (although with humility on
our part - as God's ways are higher than our ways).

> Archaeologists can make reasonable predictions because they have some
> familiarity with the subjects of study; i.e. archaeologists know something
> about human creativity and they also have some knowledge of the technological
> and physical constraints on human creativity.

But God is not an "unknown" to believers! We know something of his
character and his actions.

> It is this lack of constraints
> that makes God's intentions and actions a complete mystery to human beings
> APART FROM REVELATION. How can we know what intelligent divine causation
> in history will look like if God does not tell us? If God has told us
> exactly what he has done (personal revelation is the only way to know the
> mind and intentions of any personal being) then by all means our theology
> can provide a fruitful source of scientific predictions. If you can
> derive specific, testable theories of abiogenesis or the origin of higher
> order taxa from Scripture, then by all means do so and evaluate them by
> the evidence available. I don't think this can be done because of the
> lack of scientific specificity of the creation account regarding these
> types of specific questions.

I welcome these comments. For the Christian, there is, in principle,
an interaction between scientific studies of origins and revealed
truth. I recognise that you see insuperable problems here - but if
the PRINCIPLE is accepted, there is a basis for meaningful
communication. We can go on to explore whether there is sufficient
scientific specificity to guide/constrain our investigations of
origins. For example, does the biblical revelation about God's
purposeful creative activity constrain our thinking about mechanisms?

> Supernatural intelligent divine causation is always a possible
> explanation for any event in history. But I don't see how miraculous acts
> of God can be distinguished from God's providential working through
> natural mechanisms unless we have a clear word from God Hiself. Until
> PC's can provide a set of criteria that will enable us to distinguish
> miraculous from providential actions of God apart from Scripture, then I
> am afraid that MN is simply the most prudent assumption to make in light
> of our finite knowledge.

Again, I welcome these comments as constructive. Many in the
scientific community will dispute the first sentence of this
paragraph - but it needs to be said! I accept that Christians have
differed on how to handle miraculous and providential actions of God.
Steve Jones has debated with numerous people regarding the
Creation/Providence distinction, where differences are clearly
evident. It seems to me that PCs and YECs do tend to emphasise the
distinction, whereas TEs tend to complementarity. If the PC or YEC
position is taken, then people will be able to develop "intelligent
causation"-type approaches to origins. Such people do consider that
they have "a clear word from God himself". But from what you have
said, an openness to revelation informing science should still be on
the agenda for TEs! Whilst TEs may adopt MN pragmatically as a
"prudent assumption", they would be unwise to argue that MN is THE
way to do science. This is where I have to side with Meyer and
Johnson: I think that MN can only be defended philosophically by
adopting the premisses of metaphysical naturalism.

Thank you for your thought-provoking comments, Mike. I hope this
reciprocates!

Best wishes,

*** From David J. Tyler, CDT Department, Hollings Faculty,
Manchester Metropolitan University, UK.
Telephone: 0161-247-2636 ***