Bill wrote:
> The miraculous aspect may be the timing and/or locale of the event.
> Should that be explicitly stated in your definitions?
Yes, it should.
In one sense, I could easily incorporate that into my definition of
"category 3 events." I will do so in my next revision.
In another sense, Bill, you've just opened a whole messy can of worms
which I had actually decided to leave closed in my earlier version. ;-)
Here's the worms: If a somewhat improbable "natural" event occurs in just
the right time and place to benefit someone, when is it a miracle and when
isn't it? Now we've flopped over into philosophical and religious issues.
For example, if someone told you before-the-fact when and where to look,
that event a good candidate for a "miracle," but if someone tells you
after-the-fact, "God arranged that event for a certain reason," the
decision becomes more problematical. (Or to take another example, does
the "fine tuning" of natural constants _require_ explanation, or doesn't
it?) These are philosophical issues, rather than scientific. The most
that science _qua_ science can hope to do is give the improbability
(infrequency) of the event.
I'll try to incorporate your suggestion without getting worms all over the
place.
-----------------------
David wrote:
> With historical science, the key issue is
> CAUSATION - and none of these three points address this directly.
> Also, by specifying "natural mechanisms", the possibility of
> intelligent causation is not addressed. So, for example, the
> axe-like artefacts recovered at some archaeological sites need
> to be examined not only in terms of natural mechanisms (the
> effects of frosts, rock movements, etc) but also intelligent
> causes (the role of man in forming the shape of the artefact).
> Because the emphasis is on "known natural mechanisms", there is
> a danger that scientists working with presuppositions that
> exclude intelligent causation will not recognise it. They will
> either shoehorn data into (2) or admit (3) grudgingly.
Archeology, SETI, and "intelligent causation" are special cases which
deserve additional treatment. (Thanks for pointing this out again.)
Events/ojects made by intelligent _creaturely_ causation --- such as oddly
chipped stone tools found near million-year-old fossils --- don't exactly
fit category 3 (no known natural mechanisms) and don't exactly fit
category 1 (empirically established natural mechanisms). It's a bit of
both, a special category.
I'll try to incorporate that into the next revision without "broadening
the focus too much."
> LH: "Alternatively, scientists with strong religious or
> philosophical reasons for believing that certain events are
> supernatural can marshal scientific arguments to show that those
> events belong in category 3 rather than category 2."
>
> This makes intelligent causation an avenue which can only "win
> by default" - not a very satisfying intellectual pursuit. It is
> also one which is analogous to a bud which never opens into
> flower - because scientific knowledge of past events is always
> limited and imperfect.
Like Bill, you touch on an issue which I had deliberately decided to leave
out of my earlier version. :-)
I believe that philosophical arguments (e.g. arguments by analogy from
human artifacts to the characteristics of biological life) DO have a
legitimate role in this debate, when argued _carefully_. However, I
didn't feel up to the task of succinctly delimiting that role in a few
sentences (heh heh), so I chickened out and simply wrote that
philosophical arguments can be used as a prelude/motivation to marshalling
scientific arguments. Maybe I'll get bold and try in the next revision.
Any ideas?
---------------
> We _need_ a coherent philosophy of historical science and
> clarification of how it relates to empirical science. These are
> some elements which commend themselves to me (reworked from
> Meyer).
>
> (a) Historical science is concerned primarily with causation:
> sequences of past events, and explanatory links based on
> causation.
> Empirical science is concerned with natural laws and the way
> nature operates, with explanations expressed primarily in terms
> of natural law.
>
> (b) Historical science uses a methodology of abductive inference
> (analogous to detective work).
> Empirical science uses a methodology of induction and
> generalisation: inferring natural laws from observational data.
>
> (c) Historical science works with incomplete data with the
> scientist having relatively little control over the degree of
> completeness.
> Empirical science works with data that is under the control of
> the investigator - who designs the experimental programme to
> ensure the data desired are obtained.
>
> (d) Historical science invokes unobservable entities in
> explanations.
> Empirical science invokes observable entities in explanations.
>
> (e) Historical science tests explanations using indirect methods,
> recognising the unique and unrepeatable character of past events.
> Empirical science tests explanations using direct methods, often
> utilising the repeatability of experiments.
Each of those points is substantially true, if a trifle over-stated.
Please note two important points:
1) "Observational science" fits somewhere between empirical and historical
science. It has some repeatability, but very little control, explanatory
links are expressed BOTH as causation and natural law, it uses both
abductive inference and induction, it uses both observable and
unobservable entities. Empirical & observational science blend at the
edges (difficult-to-control systems), as do observational and historical
science (rare events).
2) You make a strong point about the differences between historical and
empirical science; you should also point out that the strength of their
connection --- the reason they so fruitfully interact --- is that, as much
as possible, they refer to the SAME natural mechanisms.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Danger: Sharp learning curve ahead." | Loren Haarsma
(_Dilbert_) | lhaarsma@opal.tufts.edu