On Fri, 8 Mar 1996 00:50:42 -0800 you wrote:
TI>Is the assumption here that because we can't say the extermination
>of Jews is an absolutely "bad" thing, we must let it occur? ....this
>could happen, but claiming to have a set of absolute beliefs might
>not prevent it either.
>JB>It does if those beliefs included the absolute, "Thou shalt not
>murder."
TI>I think it depends on what one believes is "murder". For instance,
>if an additional absolute belief is: "Jews aren't people like us",
>then it doesn't help much. In fact, people who claimed to have
>absolute standards have committed atrocities.
If the absolute natural moral law that all men accept is "Thou shalt
not murder", but there are debates about what is "murder", that helps
a great deal. It is a mile in front of the naturalist who cannot even
say an absolute: "Thou shalt not murder".
JB>Naturalists, by definition, cannot affirm such absolutes. It would
>be interesting to hear a naturalist try to make the argument,
>"Killing Jews is a bad thing." If you'd like to try, please do. I'd
>like to see what such an argument looks like.
I think Jim makes his job more difficult here. The moral law is not
"Killing Jews is a bad thing" but "killing *people* is a bad thing".
Hitler no doubt could argue that killing Jews is a good thing, ie. he
could claim they were polluting his nation's Aryan blood lines,
destroying the German economy, were part of the "stab in the back" in
1918, etc., but even Hitler presumably would not argue that killing
people is a good thing.
TI>I thought Bertrand Russell or other philosophers might have
>tried...One justification could be operational or practical: Murder
>tends to be repaid in kind. I suspect there would be others.
You now seem to accept the absolute moral principle that "killing
people is a bad thing", but that this absolute principle can be
modified by a a secondary "justification" principle. That's fine.
A theist could accept that.
TI>...that does not prevent one from judging according to an agreed
>standard...The theistic moralist claims that this...comes from an
>ultimate source. An agnostic would question the source but may agree
>with the theist upon a common set of standards.
JB>The first problem is that the "agreement" is not based upon
>anything...Therefore, one may dissent from such "agreements"
>without any moral counter-argument to stop him.
TI>Why would one have to use a moral counterargument or threats of
>eternal damnation? Why not suggest that playing "by the agreed
>rules" reduces friction and makes things run better for a group as a
>whole. In fact, if they don't want to play by the rules, suggest to
>them that they are free to pursue their whims under lock and key.
>Think of it as a societal contract.
A theist uses "moral counterargument or threats of eternal damnation"
because if his God exists, then these are objectively real. But it is
not an either-or. Your observation that "playing by the agreed rules
reduces friction and makes things run better for a group as a whole"
and "a societal contract", can both be accepted by the theist as
common grace and complementary to God's prohibitions. But these
things would be meaningless in themselves if there was no underlying
natural moral law.
JB>...that agnostic/atheist who does agree is merely borrowing the
>moral capital of theism, but without paying any interest.
TI>How is such interest paid? Are we sure it is "borrowing"? There
>are certainly instances where atheists and agnostics lead and
>supported various "moral" causes before many of the theists followed.
There might be disagreement with what the "atheists and agnostics"
believe are "moral" causes, and some "atheists and agnostics" may
even be more moral than some theists. But the point here is that the
atheists/agnostics are being *inconsistently* moral and the theist
being *inconsistently*/ less than moral. The real issue is not about
behaviour but about consistency with avowed principles.
TI>Ultimately, the acceptance of moral standards and functional
>criteria are based on personal beliefs, whether one is a theist or a
>"moral relativist".
JB>This is undisputed. The point is that the theist can sustain "moral
>standards" logically. The naturalist cannot. Standards cannot exists.
>That why it is called the naturalistic "fallacy." And personal beliefs
>can be explored for their logical consistency, or lack thereof.
TI>Ah, I see. Any set of beliefs, whether they are supernaturally
>derived or developed ad hoc can be examined for logical consistency.
>The theist can say "These standards came from God so we've got to
>accept them" and the relativist can say "These standards came from
>observations or trial & error, and I think they work well, so I'll
>accept them even if I can't prove them." Thus both groups can
>embrace a set a moral standards and test them for logical internal
>consistency and functionality. As I said before, the agnostic
>doesn't claim that there aren't absolute standards, but instead
>questions whether they can be identified as such. This does not
>prevent them from adopting any particular set. What makes a
>system work? As you mention below; it's consensus.
Again, there is no inconsistency between beliefs, "standards" that
"came from God" and "standards" that "work well". If the Ten
Commandments were indeed given by God then we should expect that they
"work well". And in fact they have and do - much better than the
shifting sands type "standards" espoused by "moral relativists". :-)
The advantage of "standards" that "came from God" is that we can be
sure they are right, even if it is not immediately obvious why, so
much pain and human misery can be avoided in learning that they are
right by the relativist's "trial & error".
TI>Nor can the "oughts" of one religion (or set of religious beliefs)
>logically displace those of another religion.
JB>That's not correct....It is quite possible to make reasoned
>arguments about religion and absolute truth, but the poor naturalist
>cannot even enter the discussion!
TI>Are they missing anything? ;^) Actually an agnostic can enter the
>discussion about absolutes. They just don't claim that they're
>knowable as absolutes. Consistency of "truths" with the observable
>world can still be checked and evaluated. Candidates for "truth"
>might be testable.
It is a contradiction in terms to say that "an agnostic can enter the
discussion about absolutes" but "They just don't claim that they're
knowable as absolutes"! :-) *By definition* these are not "absolutes"
to the agnostic - he has already dismissed them apriori as absolutes,
before the discussion even began!
And as that great agnostic Pontius Pilate asked, "What is truth"? if
there are no absolutes.
TI>I do not quite understand how moral relativism appears as such
>a boogey-man to some. Is it the idea that without knowable
>moral absolutes, everyone will do exactly as they please with
>complete disregard to others? How long could one expect such
>actions to be tolerated in any society?
JB>Your faith in human society is, I think, a tad naive. I wonder what
>you think of the direction of our own society is, morally speaking.
TI>I fear that a growing segment of the population is needlessly
>handicapped by a break in the "chain of civilization". That is, it
>only takes a break in one generation to lose years of gain. I'd be
>the first to admit that "moral" behaviors (or behaviors that help one
>integrate with society) are mostly learned by example, not by deep
>"intellectualizing". I've suspected that any people simply do not
>like to think deeply about moral or ethical issues (or about anything
>at all, it sometimes seems), preferring to rely on "gut" instincts
>and familiar patterns of behavior instead. So a loss of important
>role models at early stages in development can be very detrimental.
>I also think there is a problem with the sense of being part of a
>community or identifying with others and a desensitization of
>feelings -- Sort of a self-imposed autism. Would religious
>moralizing help? Certainly. But it's not an exclusive cure and I
>would have worries that it could be taken too far by some for
>political gain and become exclusionary and rigidly dogmatic.
The above is a great argument for the theist's "These standards came
from God so we've got to accept them", as opposed to the relativist's
"trial & error"!.
JB>Without consensus what society tolerates can just as easily be,
>once again, something as repugnant as genocide.
TI>Yes, the key word is concensus, not absolute standards, per se.
>Perhaps I am odd, but I think that the source of standards is not
>so important to a society as the standards themselves and the
>interpretations of the standards. Sorry to say, genocide and mass
>murder will happen again. It has happened under theists and it has
>happened under atheists.
There could be no "consensus" without underlying "absolute
standards". If humans did not agree that killing human beings is
wrong, then there could be no consensus reached on that topic. It
would be like trying to reach a consensus that blue is the best
colour.
JB>Only the theist can tell us why it IS repugnant.
[...]
TI>Do you mean to suggest that an agnostic cannot mourn the loss
>of diversity, talent, potential, and human resources? That they
>cannot feel any sympathy, empathy or any other deep human emotion
>when confronted with mass murder? Or fear that it could easily
>happen to them or their friends? Given that we are a social
>species, wouldn't it be prudent for anyone to try to prevent these
>acts? After all, conflict has a nasty tendency of mushrooming
>into other countries.
No one is saying that "agnostic cannot mourn" or "feel...sympathy,
empathy or any other deep human emotion" over anti-social acts. But
Jim's point is that only the theist can say that they are *more* than
just anti-social acts - that the murder of human beings is morally
wrong.
TI>In this discussion, I've gotten the sense that theistic morality is
>being presented as a monolitic entity. Do all theists agree
>on the same moral standards or are there differences in beliefs?
>How do they differ? How do you identify and absolute moral
>standard? (This is in reference to the "religious relativism"
>which I mentioned previously).
The point is that this is not just "theistic morality". To not murder
or steal, to not commit adultery, to not lie, is "morality" common to
all men everwhere. While there might be debate about what is "murder"
or what is a "lie", once that is established, all men everywhere
believe them to be morally wrong.
JB>And with individuals, it is simply a matter of cost-benefit. If I
>can get away with some action, currently illegal, why not?
TI>This is a good point (I have often exceed highway speed limits and
>will do so again. I've also pulled a few illegal U-turns in my time).
>You are correct that cost-benefit analyses can influence one's actions.
>However, it does tend to help society if its members follow the
>rules and if rule-breakers are punished. One weak argument might
>be that if too many break the rules, then the community in which
>I live could suffer. If I cheat, then this only contributes to the
>problem (This is second-order reasoning).
Theists break laws too (so you are not alone <g>). But the theist
believes that such laws are ordained by God (Rom 13:1-6), so he
believes that breaking such laws are wrong even when there is no
possibility of being caught. If a moral relatavist could be sure that
no one was looking, he could do U-turns and break speed limits (or
worse) to his hearts content.
TI>Let's test the theist's answer: If God will let you escape
>the consequences of doing something even though He says it is
>"wrong", what is to prevent a theist from doing it if it benefits
>them? Is such a situation possible or is the theist never
>confronted with this problem?
See above. The point is that God will *not* let the theist escape
the consequences of doing something even though He says it is wrong.
One way or the other, moral wrong must be paid for. Ultimately God in
Christ took upon Himself all our sin and paid the price for us:
2Cor 5:21 "God made him who had no sin to be sin for us, so that in
him we might become the righteousness of God."
TI>Now let me put the shoe on the other foot: I can only hope that
>someone's vision of religious absolutism doesn't lead to hurting
>other people -- And this hope has been betrayed in the past.
JB>Define "hurt." Define "betrayed." In naturalist syntax, of course.
TI>It is the same in any syntax.
Yes. Because there is an underlying moral law, that says hurting
and betraying other human beings is wrong.
JB>But if you borrow the moral capital of theism to agree about
>"hurt," then I would share your hope. I would also point out that
>theistic moral arguments have alleviated great pain and suffering,
>and still do.
TI>I could not agree enough. I am not hostile to religion and I see
>how it helps so many people, much of the time. I just wanted to
>provide a comparison to the "Nazi-atheists" comments. I also
>wanted to illustrate the very real possibility of adopting the
>wrong moral standards as absolutes.
If God is real and He gave those "moral standards as absolutes", then
they cannot be "wrong". But the proof of the pudding is in the eating
- millions of Christians down through the ages (myself included) will
readily testify that when they stopped relying on our own relative
"moral standards", and adopted the Bible's "moral standards", that
their lives took a decided turn for the better.
TI>The simple fact that there is a God does not imply that there
>must be ultimate moral accountability (Heck, it doesn't even mean that
>God is moral).
JB>Once you admit there is a God, the question becomes "What sort of
>God?" It is another inquiry, but one that is consistent with the
>logic employed in answering the first. Suffice to say, I think you
>can get to the moral God quite easily.
TI>Ok, let's try it! Personally, I doubt whether there is an end to
>the permutations of possible rationalizations. Do you think you
>could take the reasoning much further than the Golden Rule?
The point is that "the Golden Rule": "So in everything, do to others
what you would have them do to you," (Mt 7:12), in its positive form,
*is unique to Jesus*! The much easier negative form "do not do to
others what you would not have them do to you" is found in many
cultures:
"This 'Golden Rule' (the Emperor Alexander Severus reputedly had it
written in gold on his wall - not a bad example to follow!) is often
compared with the negative principle (Do not do to others what you
yourself dislike) which is found in a wide variety of ancient literature
from the Athenian Isocrates to Rabbi Hillel (Shabbath 31a; cf. Tobit
4:15). In this form it found its way into early Christian teaching from
the second century, and appears in some early texts of Acts 15:29.
Some earlier Jewish maxims (Ecclus. 31:15; Letter of Aristeas 207)
point towards the more comprehensive positive form of the rule, but
Jesus was apparently the first to formulate it explicitly...As a general
principle to guide us in specific ethical decisions, the Golden Rule
has not been bettered. In the positive form propounded by Jesus it
makes a very far-reaching demand for unselfish love in action"
(France R.T., "Matthew: An Introduction and Commentary",
Inter-Varsity Press: Leicester, 1985, p145-146)
Sorry if there is a bit of overlap in my messages on this topic! :-)
Regards.
Steve
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