Jim replies:
>It does if those beliefs included the absolute, "Thou shalt not murder."
I think it depends on what one believes is "murder". For instance,
if an additional absolute belief is: "Jews aren't people like us",
then it doesn't help much. In fact, people who claimed to have
absolute standards have committed atrocities.
>Naturalists, by definition, cannot affirm such absolutes. It would be
>interesting to hear a naturalist try to make the argument, "Killing Jews
>is a bad thing." If you'd like to try, please do. I'd like to see what
>such an argument looks like.
I thought Bertrand Russell or other philosophers might have tried.
Have you checked them? One justification could be operational or
practical: Murder tends to be repaid in kind. I suspect there would
be others.
><<However, as you mention above,
>that does not prevent one from judging according to an agreed standard
>of outcome (or an agreed upon set of starting axioms). The theistic
>moralist claims that this agreed upon set of standards comes from an
>ultimate source. An agnostic would question the source but may agree
>with the theist upon a common set of standards.>>
>
>The first problem is that the "agreement" is not based upon anything--it
>could come from whim, appetite or a bad day at the office. Therefore,
>one may dissent from such "agreements" without any moral counter-argument
>to stop him.
Why would one have to use a moral counterargument or threats of eternal
damnation? Why not suggest that playing "by the agreed rules" reduces
friction and makes things run better for a group as a whole. In fact,
if they don't want to play by the rules, suggest to them that they
are free to pursue their whims under lock and key. Think of it as
a societal contract.
>The second problem, of course, is that agnostic/atheist who does agree
>is merely borrowing the moral capital of theism, but without paying any
>interest.
How is such interest paid? Are we sure it is "borrowing"? There are
certainly instances where atheists and agnostics lead and supported
various "moral" causes before many of the theists followed.
><< Ultimately, the acceptance of moral standards and
>functional criteria are based on personal beliefs, whether one is
>a theist or a "moral relativist".>>
>
>This is undisputed. The point is that the theist can sustain "moral
>standards" logically. The naturalist cannot. Standards cannot exists.
>That why it is called the naturalistic "fallacy." And personal beliefs
>can be explored for their logical consistency, or lack thereof.
Ah, I see. Any set of beliefs, whether they are supernaturally
derived or developed ad hoc can be examined for logical consistency.
The theist can say "These standards came from God so we've got to
accept them" and the relativist can say "These standards came from
observations or trial & error, and I think they work well, so I'll
accept them even if I can't prove them." Thus both groups can
embrace a set a moral standards and test them for logical internal
consistency and functionality. As I said before, the agnostic
doesn't claim that there aren't absolute standards, but instead
questions whether they can be identified as such. This does not
prevent them from adopting any particular set. What makes a
system work? As you mention below; it's consensus.
><<Nor can the "oughts" of one religion (or set of religious beliefs)
>logically displace those of another religion.>>
>
>That's not correct. Read, for example, -Truth in Religion- by Mortimer
>Adler. It is quite possible to make reasoned arguments about religion
>and absolute truth, but the poor naturalist cannot even enter the
>discussion!
Are they missing anything? ;^) Actually an agnostic can enter the
discussion about absolutes. They just don't claim that they're
knowable as absolutes. Consistency of "truths" with the observable
world can still be checked and evaluated. Candidates for "truth"
might be testable.
[Wow, I haven't read Mortimer for years. Thank you for the suggestion.]
><<I do not quite understand how moral relativism appears as such
>a boogey-man to some. Is it the idea that without knowable
>moral absolutes, everyone will do exactly as they please with
>complete disregard to others? How long could one expect such
>actions to be tolerated in any society? >>
>
>Your faith in human society is, I think, a tad naive. I wonder what you
>think of the direction of our own society is, morally speaking.
I fear that a growing segment of the population is needlessly handicapped
by a break in the "chain of civilization". That is, it only takes a
break in one generation to lose years of gain. I'd be the first to
admit that "moral" behaviors (or behaviors that help one integrate
with society) are mostly learned by example, not by deep
"intellectualizing". I've suspected that any people simply do not
like to think deeply about moral or ethical issues (or about anything
at all, it sometimes seems), preferring to rely on "gut" instincts
and familiar patterns of behavior instead. So a loss of important
role models at early stages in development can be very detrimental.
I also think there is a problem with the sense of being part of a
community or identifying with others and a desensitization of
feelings -- Sort of a self-imposed autism. Would religious
moralizing help? Certainly. But it's not an exclusive cure
and I would have worries that it could be taken too far by some
for political gain and become exclusionary and rigidly dogmatic.
>Without consensus what society tolerates can just as easily be, once
>again, something as repugnant as genocide.
Yes, the key word is concensus, not absolute standards, per se.
Perhaps I am odd, but I think that the source of standards is not
so important to a society as the standards themselves and the
interpretations of the standards. Sorry to say, genocide and mass
murder will happen again. It has happened under theists and it has
happened under atheists.
>Only the theist can tell us why it IS repugnant.
I believe that I responded to why that may be in my last response.
Do you mean to suggest that an agnostic cannot mourn the loss
of diversity, talent, potential, and human resources? That they
cannot feel any sympathy, empathy or any other deep human emotion
when confronted with mass murder? Or fear that it could easily
happen to them or their friends? Given that we are a social
species, wouldn't it be prudent for anyone to try to prevent these
acts? After all, conflict has a nasty tendency of mushrooming
into other countries.
In this discussion, I've gotten the sense that theistic morality is
being presented as a monolitic entity. Do all theists agree
on the same moral standards or are there differences in beliefs?
How do they differ? How do you identify and absolute moral
standard? (This is in reference to the "religious relativism"
which I mentioned previously).
>And with individuals, it is simply a matter of cost-benefit. If I can
>get away with some action, currently illegal, why not?
This is a good point (I have often exceed highway speed limits and
will do so again. I've also pulled a few illegal U-turns in my time).
You are correct that cost-benefit analyses can influence one's actions.
However, it does tend to help society if its members follow the
rules and if rule-breakers are punished. One weak argument might
be that if too many break the rules, then the community in which
I live could suffer. If I cheat, then this only contributes to the
problem (This is second-order reasoning).
Let's test the theist's answer: If God will let you escape
the consequences of doing something even though He says it is
"wrong", what is to prevent a theist from doing it if it benefits
them? Is such a situation possible or is the theist never
confronted with this problem?
><<Now let me put the shoe on the other foot:
>I can only hope that someone's vision of religious absolutism doesn't
>lead to hurting other people -- And this hope has been betrayed in
>the past.>>
>
>Define "hurt." Define "betrayed." In naturalist syntax, of course.
It is the same in any syntax.
>But if you borrow the moral capital of theism to agree about "hurt,"
>then I would share your hope. I would also point out that theistic
>moral arguments have alleviated great pain and suffering, and still do.
I could not agree enough. I am not hostile to religion and I see
how it helps so many people, much of the time. I just wanted to
provide a comparison to the "Nazi-atheists" comments. I also
wanted to illustrate the very real possibility of adopting the
wrong moral standards as absolutes.
><<The simple fact that there is a God does not imply that there
>must be ultimate moral accountability (Heck, it doesn't even mean that
>God is moral).>>
>
>Once you admit there is a God, the question becomes "What sort of God?"
>It is another inquiry, but one that is consistent with the logic employed
>in answering the first. Suffice to say, I think you can get to the moral
>God quite easily.
Ok, let's try it! Personally, I doubt whether there is an end to
the permutations of possible rationalizations. Do you think you
could take the reasoning much further than the Golden Rule?
Regards, Tim Ikeda (timi@mendel.berkeley.edu)