I wrote:
><< How
>can we judge whether something is a "better", "worse" or "meaningful"
>conclusion? The answer is that better and worse are operationally
>defined, and not universals per se. Are some people's "neural nets"
>better at converging on answers than other's? Certainly>>
You replied:
>This is a subtle move to get around the naturalistic fallacy, but is not
>logically compelled. Moving from value to operations is just the sort of
>exercise one cannot make in this argument. No one disputes that processes
>can be judged according to an agreed upon standard of outcome; but the
>naturalist cannot tell us which outcomes are better than others.
Nor can the theist, who ultimately places the burden of justification
on someone else (God, in this case). "Because" is not an answer.
>Nazis became very adept, operationally, at exterminating Jews. The
>naturalist is at a loss to tell us why this might be a bad thing.
Is the assumption here that because we can't say the extermination
of Jews is an absolutely "bad" thing, we must let it occur? That
does not follow. I admit that this could happen, but claiming
to have a set of absolute beliefs might not prevent it either.
A moral relativist (or atheist/agnostic) might reply that "good"
and "bad" are meaningless terms in the absolute sense -- Much like
"blue" is also not an absolute term. However, as you mention above,
that does not prevent one from judging according to an agreed standard
of outcome (or an agreed upon set of starting axioms). The theistic
moralist claims that this agreed upon set of standards comes from an
ultimate source. An agnostic would question the source but may agree
with the theist upon a common set of standards. This is not
all that different from what we call "law". Many laws cannot
be supported by absolute moral reasoning, yet as a whole, we
go along. Ultimately, the acceptance of moral standards and
functional criteria are based on personal beliefs, whether one is
a theist or a "moral relativist".
>The only other move left is the one Tim makes, viz., "'Ought'" can be
>as we individually define it." This is, of course, the very definition
>of relativism, and we can all hope that Tim chooses "oughts" which
>don't hurt other people (as I'm sure he will). But Tim's "oughts"
>cannot logically displace those of, say, the Hamas members currently
>blowing up innocent Israelis.
Nor can the "oughts" of one religion (or set of religious beliefs)
logically displace those of another religion. There is simply no way
of being sure that one's God-given moral code is correct. It must
instead be taken as an unprovable (for now) assertion. Note that
Jews have been persecuted on both secular and religious grounds in
the past -- In essence they have been equal-opportunity scapegoats.
I do not quite understand how moral relativism appears as such
a boogey-man to some. Is it the idea that without knowable
moral absolutes, everyone will do exactly as they please with
complete disregard to others? How long could one expect such
actions to be tolerated in any society? I don't think that would
happen for long. I think that there are many behaviors and means
of conduct that are crucial and common to functioning human
societies. No doubt many of these functional mores are commonly
found in religious moral systems as well. Which came first, the
chicken or the egg when it came to moral systems?
Now let me put the shoe on the other foot:
I can only hope that someone's vision of religious absolutism doesn't
lead to hurting other people -- And this hope has been betrayed in
the past. The counter that religious people could do wrong because
they are operating under a mistaken set of standards is a empty one.
It assumes that one knows what the right standards are. But that has
not been demonstrated. FWIW - How would one go about demonstrating
this? If it is a matter of faith, and if we cannot agree on that
faith, then I think there could be problems doing this.
>Tim says, well, "that's life."
>
>But it is only life in a naturalist's world. In the world of theistic
>realism, there is ultimate moral accountability. I like that world
>better. I also believe it has more compelling evidence for its
>existence than a world of nothing more than chemical operations.
I'd like that world as well, but the choice doesn't seem to be mine.
Actually I'd prefer moral accountability in _this_ life -- That would
go a long way to convincing me that there are moral-designers afoot.
The simple fact that there is a God does not imply that there
must be ultimate moral accountability (Heck, it doesn't even mean that
God is moral). It only suggests that there might be accountability.
Moral accountability comes as an independent adjunct to God's existence.
Further, concepts and beliefs about moral accountability can vary from
one religion to another and from one society to another. Thus not only
does one wishing to impose absolute morals have the burden of demonstrating
the existence of God, but also the existence, source and identities
of the moral absolutes. That task, I feel, has not been completed.
Thus I am left with the question of preferences: Would I prefer
operating under a set of codes that I acknowledge are imperfect and
provisional (but subject to discussion, group consent & revision), or
would I prefer operating under a set of unquestionable moral
assumptions that may not be true absolutes (ie. they could be wrong)?
YMMV. Moral relativism or religious relativism? -- I don't see a
lot of difference.
><< My question is whether "fear of the terrible" is a valid
>reason to reject naturalistic explanations or to cease looking for
>them.>>
>
>It is certainly one of the most compelling reasons for seeking answers
>beyond mere naturalism. The most important questions are metaphysical;
>naturalism is of no help here. We should continue our research into
>natural processes for the good of all--but we need theistic realism to
>tell us what that good consists of.
It would help to be able to narrow down the search to only a few
potential theistic belief systems (and religions). Until then, one
can't even be sure what "good" might be.
I used to wonder how one conducts "theistic science" vs. basic
naturalistic science. I thought they might be operationally different.
At least there is some agreement we can have about research into
natural processes. I think that the general approaches and techniques
will be the same regardless of whether one holds to naturalism
(methodological or philosophical) or to "theistic realism".
Regards, Tim Ikeda (timi@mendel.berkeley.edu)