I wrote:
><< I'm not going to say that there isn't something
>else to thought or consciousness, but if there is, it's not readily
>apparent. >>
>
>The "not readily apparent" interests me. It seems to me that thought and
>consciousness fairly SCREAM of purpose and design. Everything about my
>contemplations of myself and the world imply that I am more than mere matter.
>I wonder how such obvious inferences can be ignored absent, of course, a
>pronounced naturalistic bias.
The source of the "design" is where the debate rests. The still
unresolved question being whether natural events are sufficient to
produce what you perceive as intentional design. The mind is a great
pattern identifier, but it is also fooled.
>For example, what does the fact that man is the only entity on earth
>which employs a propositional language and verbal symbols tell us?
That we are the only ones who can do it.
>That nothing more than chemical secretions are readily apparent? I
>think not. I think the opposite.
I can accept that. As I mentioned, we all have different thresholds
as to what might convince us is "supernatural".
That we can map many of these abilities to specific portions of
the brain does say a lot. That other animals might actually
be capable of symbolic thought and manipulation also tells us a lot.
It tells us that we really might not be all that different and that
we have a profound physical "presence". I'm not saying that is
all there is, however; I'm simply suspending judgement as to
whether their is something more. How do you explain mind/brain
duality? How do you think the "mind" connects with the brain?
I haven't reached a conclusion in either direction.
Myself, I'm in favor of continuing research on the mind and brain
rather than abandoning it because of theological preconceptions.
If we're wrong, we'll find out eventually or hit a dead end.
>Another example. The formation of concepts does not seem explicable
>as a mere neural mechanism. When we form a concept, we are not
>applying a direct relationship to the physical world.
We're not firing different patterns of neurons in the process?
>Philosophers would say concepts are "ontologically peculiar," not
>existing in the emprical realm. Now, the syllogism:
>
>1. All concepts are universal.
>
>2. No physical thing is universal (they're all particular).
>
>3. Therefore, concepts are not physical.
>
>So logic also screams out for more than mere naturalism. [...]
Concepts are not "physical"; therefore logic suggests supernaturalism?
Philosophy will not demonstrate the existence or non-existence of the
supernatural. Many neurobiologists might suggest that consciousness
and "thoughts about concepts" are processes -- ie. patterns of
interactions on a physical template. Q: Is a computer program a
physical thing or is it a supernatural manifestation? How about
one switch -- is "off" a physical thing?
Regards, Tim Ikeda (timi@mendel.berkeley.edu)