<< I'm not going to say that there isn't something
else to thought or consciousness, but if there is, it's not readily
apparent. >>
The "not readily apparent" interests me. It seems to me that thought and
consciousness fairly SCREAM of purpose and design. Everything about my
contemplations of myself and the world imply that I am more than mere matter.
I wonder how such obvious inferences can be ignored absent, of course, a
pronounced naturalistic bias.
For example, what does the fact that man is the only entity on earth which
employs a propositional language and verbal symbols tell us? That nothing more
than chemical secretions are readily apparent? I think not. I think the
opposite.
Another example. The formation of concepts does not seem explicable as a mere
neural mechanism. When we form a concept, we are not applying a direct
relationship to the physical world. Philosophers would say concepts are
"ontologically peculiar," not existing in the emprical realm. Now, the
syllogism:
1. All concepts are universal.
2. No physical thing is universal (they're all particular).
3. Therefore, concepts are not physical.
So logic also screams out for more than mere naturalism.
I wrote:
>There is always a "faith" gap in any way of knowing. I guess I find
>that gap a lot smaller from the supernatural perspective.
Tim responded
>How is it smaller? Effectively, it's putting faith in a stepping
>stone that we don't know is there (and even if it exists, we cannot
>be too sure where it is).
But we can be sure, to the degree of certitude we most often employ in the
course of normal events. The "cannot be too sure" characterization is again
painted with a bias, this time that of rationalistic reductionism. This is
most evident in the compulsion to reduce everything in the world to "perfect"
evidence. There are no gradations allowed, no probability or reasonable doubt.
As G. K. Chesterton once said of compulsive rationalists, "They live in the
clearly lit prison of one idea."
But when we employ reason consistently, in a "coherence" manner (just as in
science), I think there are very good evidences about the nature of that
"stepping stone." So did my favorite thinker, Pascal. I'm with him.
On the other side, though, poor naturalism has to deal with the
self-contradictions we've talked about. It therefore has to cling to faith in
a "stepping stone" that deals with those contradictions, even though there is
no rational argument to support a basis for believing such a stepping stone
exists.
so if we speak of faith as a "gap filler," then the faith needed to fill the
naturalist gap is larger than the supernatural, IMO.
<< Finally, there are thought processes and ideas that we
can generate that allow us to rationalize the events observed.
...[this] last can be highly individualized. I think
that is where we might split on opinions.>>
But we are talking about informed opinions, and using that rascal,
rationality, to assess them. And doing so, I find the gaps less severe over
here on the supernaturalist side.
Yours for a gapless ontological economy,
Jim