> <<The lack of an acceptable naturalistic mechanism for the appearance of
> humans, does not automatically require one to invoke a supernatural
> explanation. This is a bias as large as what you accuse Glenn of having.>>
>
> I don't think so. In Glenn's case (and yours, I assume) the reasoning goes
> like this:
>
> Data, which cannot thus far be accounted for naturalistically (and, in fact,
> frustrates naturalistic predictions) MUST have a naturalistic answer...which
> we will patiently await even as we reject the non-naturalistic answer.
>
> That last step, rejection, is not called for or compelled by your reasoning.
> It is an ELIMINATION of explanatory possibilities, but without basis.
>
> That is usually called bias. Phil Johnson calls it "Defining to Exclude" in
> chapter 5 of Reason in the Balance:
>
> "Naturalistic rules require that theories employ only two kinds of
> forces--chance and necessity, random variation and impersonal law. The only
> debate is over details liek the relative importance of chance (mutation) and
> necessity (natural selection), or the mechanism of heredity. **The rules also
> provide that a theory retains its authority even in the teeth of a great deal
> of noncomforming evidence unless critics can provide a better theory**." [pp
> 105-6]
>
> That last sentence describes Glenn's reasoning process, and why it is biased.
> And why, I might add, I find it absolutely indistinguishable from atheistic
> Naturalism, and more harmful than not to hypothetical young minds.
That does not describe my reasoning process, and I do not believe that
describes Glenn's, either.
Here is how I would characterize a typical theistic evolutionist reasoning
process: We know from areas outside evolutionary biology that sometimes
we should propose supernatural mechanisms, and other times we should
refrain from proposing them and instead work on naturalistic mechanisms.
In our opinion, the explanatory scope of macroevolution is broad enough,
the nonconforming evidence is not yet serious enough, the potential for
future resolution of that data seems great enough, and the
supernaturalistic hypothesis has sufficient weaknesses, that searching for
naturalistic mechanisms seems the best option.
In many of my posts, as a prelude to presenting my reasons for favoring TE
and answering objections, I have taken great pains to explain that I do
not _a_priori_ reject non-naturalistic answers in biological history.
Well, it's very tiring to continually do this. Glenn usually skips that
step.
Loren Haarsma