On Fri, 23 Jun 1995 11:12:05 -0400 (EDT) you wrote:
CS>Just a quick note on the "God-sustained" vs "unaided nature"
>discussion: Stephen's argument has support which no one so far as I
>know has mentioned--I refer to the discussion in David Ray Griffin's
>*The Reenchantment of Science* which argues that the materialistic
>metaphysics which in fact underlies most contemporary science
>presents insuperable problems inaccounting for consciousness and
>self-consciousness.
Agreed. I seem to have missed out on some messages responding to some
of my posts. Thank you for this info.
CS>Basically the argument is that the very categories by which
>consciousness and self-consciousness are known and explicated are
>simply incompatible with any conceivable monistic materialist
>metaphysics. The distinction between "subjective" and "objective" is
>relevant here. Griffin points out that subjective experience has an
>"inside" to it, thus categories such as wish, intent, desire, hope,
>reflection, will are essential to the characterisation of the
>"subject." But materialism is founded on "objective"
>categories--categories such as based either on direct sensory
>inspection (like color, size, apparent motion) or on theoretical
>principles conceived as "explaining" the directly observable like
>mass, acceleration, "force", etc. To attempt to reduce one to the
>other is logically illicit, and has made unnecessary difficulties for
>for science.
Indeed, the very fact we have different words for "subjective" -
"objective" and "mind" - "body", would indicate they are different
aspects of reality. I realise that we have words for "fairies" too, so
this is not conclusive.
CS>Consciousness is known directly "from within", while the material
>universe is known by external inspection. Of course the body provides
>some sort of "intersection" in the case of conscious animals. Specifying
>(or denying altogether) the "some sort of intersection" has attracted a
>good deal of thought.
>
>On Tue, 20 Jun 1995, Mark Phillips wrote:
>
>
MP>Stephen argued that the atheist viewpoint is self-refuting. I
>think it is not, or at least, not in the way he suggests.
>
>Stephen wrote:
SJ>The atheists view is self-refuting. If fundamentally there is
>no personality and all is "particles", the the atheist's assertion
>itself is just "particles". How does an atheist derive personality
>from the "impersonal", intelligence from the "uinintelligent" and
>meaning from "particles"?
>
SJ>If all is matter and indeed "the brain secretes thought like the
>liver secretes bile", then what is the essential difference between
>thought and bile? Why should the atheists thought=bile be preferred
>to the theists thought=bile?
SJ>Indeed, it seems to me that if the materialist's assertion that
>"matter is all" is true, then the assertion itself is just matter.
>But then so would the opposite assertion "matter is not all" be also
>matter. However in that case an assertion and its opposite, would at
>the most fundamental level be equivalent. But if something and its
>opposite are both equivalent they must both be false. It seems the
>only way out of this dilemma is to maintain a non-material external
>category of meaning that can decide which assertion is true and which
>is false. But in that case the assertion "matter is all" is false,
>anyway.
>
SJ>Is there a philosopher in the house? <g>
>
MP>I am not a trained philosopher but I would still like to critique
>your argument.
>
MP>In your first paragraph, there is a subtle difference between the
>claim "all is particles" and the claim "at the most fundamental level,
>all is particles". I imagine many atheists would hold to the latter
>rather than the former. So they would claim: "At the most fundamental
>level, all is particles, but at a higher level, we have intelligence
>and personality"
I was not trying to make a distinction between "all is particles" and
"at the most fundamental level, all is particles". I mean "all is
matter", ie. even intelligence and personality.
In any event, the atheist would have to explain how "At the most
fundamental level, all is matter, but at a higher level, we have
intelligence and personality". It must follow that "intelligence and
personality" are themselves "matter".
Presumably they would say that "intelligence and personality" are more
complex "matter", but in the final analysis they would still be
matter.
MP>Secondly, you seem to suggest that it is ludicrous to
>think that personality and intelligence be derived from the
>impersonal and unintelligent. It is not clear to me why it should
>be thought ludicrous. Vinegar is not bubbly. Bicarbonate of Soda
>is not bubbly. Yet when you put them together, you get bubbles.
>It is not clear to me that you could not obtain intelligence from
>unintelligent subcomponents.
I presume this is from Mark? I don't recall using the word
"ludicrous". As far as I can see, all you would get is more complex
and higher organised matter. If you wanted to call this "intelligence"
then you could. It is not clear to me where assigning meaning comes
from in a materialistic system
My other point was that the materialists statement "all is matter" is
self-refuting, because if it is true, then its opposite "all is not
matter" would be equally true?
[..]
MP>I don't know the precise nature of materialist's claims. Certainly
>if "matter is all" is true in a strict sense, then it can't _be_true_
>because the whole notion of truth is a non-material one and hence
>denyed the status of existence. However, perhaps materialists don't
>believe "matter is all" in the strict sense, but rather, in the sense
>of "all that is has matter as its foundation".
Gould defined "philosophical materialism" as "the postulate that
matter is the stuff of all existence and that all mental and spiritual
phenomena are its by-products." (Gould S.J., "Ever Since Darwin",
1977, Pelican, p24)
MP>For example, they might
>believe that truth, though non-material, has existence - but this is only
>because there is a material world out there. Take away the material and
>you are left with nothing, not even logic. I'm not sure I agree with
>this view, but I think it is more defendable than the picture you
>described.
Well this was my point. That matter cannot be all.
God bless.
Stephen