Logos just released an electronic version of Shedd’s Dogmatic Theology. It is the 2003 P&R version. What follows (p. 169) is an interesting discussion on concursus and creatio ex nihilo, particularly its history amongst Rationalist philosophers. My apologies to Terry if he already covered this.
Spinoza’s definition of “substance” was intended to exclude the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. He defines substance as “that which exists of itself, that is, the conception of which does not require the conception of anything else” (Ethics 1.3). But the conception of a creature is the conception of a substance that requires another substance to account for it. A created substance, consequently, is precluded by Spinoza’s definition of substance. There cannot be any such thing. Descartes had previously defined the absolute and primary substance as “that which so exists that it needs nothing else for its existence”; and Aquinas (1.29.2) so defines a trinitarian subsistence or person. But Descartes added a definition of created or secondary substance as “that which requires the concurrence (concursus) of God, for its existence.” Spinoza in his early life made an abstract of Descartes’s philosophy for the use of a pupil (Concerning the Principles of Rene Descartes’ Philosophy).13 His editor, De Meyer, remarks that Spinoza must not be understood to agree with Descartes and mentions that he rejected Descartes’s distinction between intellect and will, but says nothing about the distinction between primary and secondary substance (Bruder’s Spinoza 1.89). Subsequently, when Spinoza published his own system, he rejected the distinction between primary and secondary substance and gave no definition of any substance but the “one and only substance,”14 of which everything is a modification. By this begging the question15 or postulate of one substance only, he excludes created substance and lays the foundation of pantheism.16 This theory of the universe energetically rejects creation ex nihilo and maintains emanation. Fichte says that “the assumption of a creation is the fundamental error of all false metaphysics and philosophy.” Hegel explains the universe of matter and spirit as an immanent process of God, a material efflux out from the absolute which is retracted again as immaterial spirit. Strauss expresses the same idea in the statement that “Trinity and creation are, speculatively considered, one and the same thing; only the former is the rational, and the latter the empirical aspect.”Kant, on the contrary, asserts that “the proposition that God, as the universal first cause, is the cause of the existence of substance can never be given up without at the same time giving up the notion of God as the being of all beings and thereby giving up his all sufficiency, on which everything in theology depends” (Practical Reason, 279 [trans. Abbott]). (See supplement 3.7.2.)
13. De principiis philosophiae Renati Descartes.
14. substantia una et unica
15. petitio principii
16. WS: A similar petitio principii is seen in von Baer’s definition of evolution, adopted by Spencer, as the “transformation [transmutation] of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous.” That a homogeneous substance (say, vegetable) can be transmuted into a heterogeneous substance (say, animal or mineral) is the point in dispute, but is quietly assumed in the definition. And, in order to give plausibility to this petitio, a false definition of the “homogeneous” is introduced. It is defined as “that which is without organs,” the heterogeneous being “that which has organs” (Carpenter, Physiology, 888). But the presence or absence of organs is not a mark of a difference in substance, which is what is requisite in order to heterogeneity. Vegetable protoplasm before the differentiation into organs begins is as really vegetable substance as afterward. Animal protoplasm is as really animal matter before the organs appear as after. There is nothing heterogeneous in either instance. Another petitio principii of the same kind appears in the agnostic definition of knowledge as “classification.” According to this definition, nothing can be known unless it can be brought under a class; and a class implies several individuals of the same species. “The first cause, the infinite, in order to be known must be classed,” says Spencer (First Principles, 81). But as the infinite is the only one of the species, he cannot be put into a class, and therefore he is utterly unknowable. The point in dispute is whether all knowledge is classification and is quietly assumed by the agnostic in his definition of knowledge. Even in regard to those objects which can be classified, the whole of our knowledge does not consist merely in knowing the class to which they belong. Classification is only one of several elements in cognition.
3.7.2 (see p. 369). Spinoza, often and with emphasis, denies that substance can be created. In a letter to Oldenburg (Letter 2) he says: “In the universe there cannot exist two substances without their differing utterly in essence. Substance cannot be created. All substance must be infinite or supremely perfect.” The assertion that “there cannot be two substances without their differing utterly in essence” is true. One must be infinite, and the other finite. But as Spinoza assumes that the postulate upon which his whole system depends, namely, that there is only one substance and that infinite, is axiomatic and needs no proof, it follows from his assumption that there cannot be two substances. Two infinites are impossible.
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13. De principiis philosophiae Renati Descartes.
14. substantia una et unica
15. petitio principii
16. WS: A similar petitio principii is seen in von Baer’s definition of evolution, adopted by Spencer, as the “transformation [transmutation] of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous.” That a homogeneous substance (say, vegetable) can be transmuted into a heterogeneous substance (say, animal or mineral) is the point in dispute, but is quietly assumed in the definition. And, in order to give plausibility to this petitio, a false definition of the “homogeneous” is introduced. It is defined as “that which is without organs,” the heterogeneous being “that which has organs” (Carpenter, Physiology, 888). But the presence or absence of organs is not a mark of a difference in substance, which is what is requisite in order to heterogeneity. Vegetable protoplasm before the differentiation into organs begins is as really vegetable substance as afterward. Animal protoplasm is as really animal matter before the organs appear as after. There is nothing heterogeneous in either instance. Another petitio principii of the same kind appears in the agnostic definition of knowledge as “classification.” According to this definition, nothing can be known unless it can be brought under a class; and a class implies several individuals of the same species. “The first cause, the infinite, in order to be known must be classed,” says Spencer (First Principles, 81). But as the infinite is the only one of the species, he cannot be put into a class, and therefore he is utterly unknowable. The point in dispute is whether all knowledge is classification and is quietly assumed by the agnostic in his definition of knowledge. Even in regard to those objects which can be classified, the whole of our knowledge does not consist merely in knowing the class to which they belong. Classification is only one of several elements in cognition.
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