From: John Burgeson (burgythree@hotmail.com)
Date: Sat Mar 22 2003 - 11:39:11 EST
I had written: "I see his (Griffin's) "minimal naturalism" as an exact
metaphysical equivalent of my own pragmatic "methodological naturalism." In
that sense, I see the two claims as functionally equivalent."
Howard commented: "I take "methodological naturalism" to be the choice not
to use supernatural action (coercive divine action) as an element in any
scientific explanation. It does not explicitly deny the possibility of such
action, but it excludes it from the arena science. In essence, it limits the
methodology of science to include natural phenomena only.
As I understand Griffin's definition of "minimal naturalism" it constitutes
more than a choice to limit scientific explanations to natural causes only;
it specifically denies even the possibility of supernatural action -- at any
time, at any place. It is a fairly strong metaphysical statement that, as I
see it, goes beyond methodological naturalism."
Yes, we are in full agreement on this much. I used the words "functional
equivalent" in my post very deliberately. To the person doing science, it
does not make any difference which forms the basis of his work. To the
person as a theist it makes a lot of difference; in this sense I suppose I
would agree it "goes beyond methodological naturalism." But I'm trying very
hard to keep the discussions, from my end at least, away from the
theoloical/religious and focused on the scientific.
Burgy
www.burgy.50megs.com
>From: "Howard J. Van Till" <hvantill@chartermi.net>
>To: John Burgeson <burgythree@hotmail.com>
>CC: asA@calvin.edu
>Subject: Re: ID science (subtopic 1)
>Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2003 12:23:00 -0500
>
>Burgy,
>
>Thanks for the interaction. With limited time let me comment only on one
>point. You say:
>
> > Having read Griffin's book several times, and also corresponded with him
> > several times, I see his "minimal naturalism" as an exact metaphysical
> > equivalent of my own pragmatic "methodological naturalism." In that
>sense, I
> > see the two claims as functionally equivalent.
>
>I take "methodological naturalism" to be the choice not to use supernatural
>action (coercive divine action) as an element in any scientific
>explanation.
>It does not explicitly deny the possibility of such action, but it excludes
>it from the arena science. In essence, it limits the methodology of science
>to include natural phenomena only.
>
>As I understand Griffin's definition of "minimal naturalism" it constitutes
>more than a choice to limit scientific explanations to natural causes only;
>it specifically denies even the possibility of supernatural action -- at
>any
>time, at any place. It is a fairly strong metaphysical statement that, as I
>see it, goes beyond methodological naturalism.
>
>Howard
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