From: John Burgeson (burgythree@hotmail.com)
Date: Thu Mar 20 2003 - 12:19:38 EST
Thnaks, Howard, for responding as you did to my four precepts. Here I will
address #1.
I wrote : 1. If there is observational data, a theory based on
methodological naturalism must be constructed.
You: "Your choice of the word "must" puzzles me. It cannot mean that there
is some moral rule obligating a scientist, in the presence of observational
data, to construct a theory based on natural phenomena only."
No moral rule implied. The word "must" simply means that there is a natural
tendency for a scientist, when faced with new and unexplained data, to
formulate an explanation. For many people, that tendency does not exist;
they see strange data and are content to not seek an explanation -- for many
reasons.
"I presume it means instead that if any scientific theory is going to be
formulated to account for some collection of observational data, then that
scientific theory will, because of the character of contemporary natural
science, deal with natural causes only. This approach, often labeled
methodological naturalism (MN), maintains a stance of agnosticism regarding
the reality of non-natural causes. For example, MN does not explicitly
reject or accept divine action -- whether of the supernatural (coercive) or
the non-coercive variety -- it simply excludes divine action (and any other
form of non-natural action) from scientific theorizing."
All that is very true, and I concur. It goes beyond what I was including in
my precept #1, but that's OK.
"David Ray Griffin, with whose work you are very familiar, makes a somewhat
stronger metaphysical statement when he proposes that science ought to be
done on the assumption that minimal naturalism applies (where minimal
naturalism explicitly rejects supernatural action but maintains a stance of
agnosticism relative to the possibility of non-coercive divine action)."
Having read Griffin's book several times, and also corresponded with him
several times, I see his "minimal naturalism" as an exact metaphysical
equivalent of my own pragmatic "methodological naturalism." In that sense, I
see the two claims as functionally equivalent.
"Because it chooses to deal explicitly with non-natural causes as actual
possibilities, ID science (the topic of this thread) rejects both
methodological naturalism and minimal naturalism, right?"
Yes and no.
(1) It does not HAVE to use non-natural causation as an explanatory device,
and some of the ID writings allude to this from time to time.
(2) It is evident that sometimes it does exactly what you say.
(3) Del Ratzsch and Al Plantigna offer arguments why MN ought to be -- in
some cases -- discarded. Plantigna's arguments (2 or 3 years ago in ARN in
an issue where my own ID evaluation appeared) were not persuasive (to me).
Del's arguments in his most recent book might be -- so far I have only
skimmed it and returned it to the library.
In any event, there is no monarch of science dictating that "MN must be used
or the stake." Science is what scientists do. when a scientist "experiments"
with the supernatural in his or her work, that does not make him or her a
non-scientist -- it may well make him or her a bad scientist, of course. But
if fruitful results should bloom from the work of such, I suggest we would
all be interested in them.
A Gedanken experiment might be helpful here. Suppose an ID scientist, let's
call him Dr. X, working from ID concepts and such, predicts some sort of
"force field" which is (a) inexpensive to set up, (b) does no damage to
anything, and (c) inhibits atomic reactions. For $10,000 (say), any large
city in the world can be protected forever from an atomic explosion.
Would you vote Dr. X. the Nobel peace prize? Or not? On what basis?
Burgy
www.burgy.50megs.com
>From: "Howard J. Van Till" <hvantill@chartermi.net>
>To: John Burgeson <burgythree@hotmail.com>
>CC: asA@calvin.edu
>Subject: Re: ID science (subtopic 1)
>Date: Fri, 14 Mar 2003 09:28:03 -0500
>
>Hi Burgy,
>
>Before dealing with your question, "What must the ID folks show to convince
>the world of science they are to be taken seriously?" I'd like to reflect a
>bit on your characterization of science. You said:
>
> > There appear to be at least four precepts scientists take for a priori
> > granted:
>
>For starters, let's work only on the first "precept" on your list.
>
> > 1. If there is observational data, a theory based on
> > methodological naturalism must be constructed.
>
>Your choice of the word "must" puzzles me. It cannot mean that there is
>some
>moral rule obligating a scientist, in the presence of observational data,
>to
>construct a theory based on natural phenomena only.
>
>I presume it means instead that if any scientific theory is going to be
>formulated to account for some collection of observational data, then that
>scientific theory will, because of the character of contemporary natural
>science, deal with natural causes only. This approach, often labeled
>methodological naturalism (MN), maintains a stance of agnosticism regarding
>the reality of non-natural causes. For example, MN does not explicitly
>reject or accept divine action -- whether of the supernatural (coercive) or
>the non-coercive variety -- it simply excludes divine action (and any other
>form of non-natural action) from scientific theorizing.
>
>David Ray Griffin, with whose work you are very familiar, makes a somewhat
>stronger metaphysical statement when he proposes that science ought to be
>done on the assumption that minimal naturalism applies (where minimal
>naturalism explicitly rejects supernatural action but maintains a stance of
>agnosticism relative to the possibility of non-coercive divine action).
>
>Because it chooses to deal explicitly with non-natural causes as actual
>possibilities, ID science (the topic of this thread) rejects both
>methodological naturalism and minimal naturalism, right?
>
>If I have caught the spirit of your #1, let's proceed to #2. Let me know.
>
>Howard Van Till
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