Howard has quoted David Griffin's definition of God, which at first glance
sounds like it is consistent with Howard's own idea of God "gifting" the
creation with certain creaturely capacities, but I very much doubt this.
Griffin rejects entirely the notion of a God who can or does act
"supernaturally," whereas some type of "supernatural" activity certainly
seems (to me, at least) to be required of a creator who can determine the
nature of nature. For Griffin, God (like Plato's demiurge) is coeval with
matter/energy, the properties of which God did not determine. (I think this
is accurate--it certainly describes much of what passes for process
theology. If Griffin actually says otherwise, I invite correction.) I rest
my case.
Ted Davis
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