I had said:
Griffin's position is (1) that God's action is never coercive/overpowering
(he rejects supernaturalism because it demands a violation of the very
nature of God and the God/world relationship), and (2) that God's action can
nonetheless be variable, within the limits of (1). Hence, God responds to
prayer, but not with action in the category of supernatural (coercive
overpowering) intervention. I believe that his position is also that
non-coercive divine action is an essential element in everything that
happens.
George replied:
But can God _withhold_ the non-coercive action so that something
_doesn't_ happen? Could he have kept the powder from detonating in Oswald's
gun, not by inserting a supernatural thumb between the firing pin & the
primer but by not "persuading" the necessary chemical reactions to take
place?
No, I think not.
If so, then God seems no less culpable than in traditional doctrines of
providence: He could have kept JFK from being killed but didn't. If not,
then God doesn't seem to have much choice in what happens in the world.
Limited choice only. The action of the world that is in relationship to God
must be authentic, not controlled by an external power.
In correspondence with a process theologian recently I commented: "As I
understand you, you're saying: (1) love is essential to God, (2) freedom is
essential to creatures, (3) relationship to creatures is essential to God,
and (4) God's relationship to creatures, therefore, is necessarily
characterized by kenotic love that will not violate any creaturely freedom."
He responded that I had correctly understood his position. That's the one
I'm exploring here.
Howard
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