Peter Ruest wrote:
> george murphy wrote:
> >
> > Peter Ruest wrote:
> ... snip some ...
> > > If you come to these conclusions, I have used the concept of a "hidden
> > > variable" in the wrong way. What I meant was to suggest that God may
> > > have decreed genuine chance outcomes for most elementary events, yet
> > > reserve for himself the liberty of making a selection among all possible
> > > outcomes for certain events he deems of particular importance for a
> > > certain goal. In this way, the whole system would not be deterministic,
> > > and God's selective acts would not constitute any "miraculous"
> > > interventions violating any of his laws (they could not be detected by
> > > science).
> >
> > In interpretations of QM, "hidden variables" refers to the idea that there is
> > some kind of sub-quantum mechanism of an essentially classical nature that actually
> > determines precise trajectories of particles &c. The statistical character of QM is
> > then understood to be like that of classical statistical mechanics - i.e., we deal
> > with probabilities because it's not possible in practice to have all the data needed
> > for a precise classical description of the system, not because such a precise
> > description is impossible in principle. E.g., there is some sort of concealed
> > "clockwork" in a particle that determines when it will decay.
> > If this isn't what you mean then we're back to the problem I stated to begin
> > with: The results of some quantum measurements "just happen" for no reason, while a
> > few biologically significant ones happen because God wants them to happen as they
> > do. As I said, this is "vaguely troubling."
> > But we can go farther. If there are no hidden variables, no mechanism that
> > causes measurements to have the results they do, then there is no secondary cause for
> > God to cooperate with in bringing about the results God wants. All these
> > biologically significant results then must be due to direct and unmediated divine
> > action. In other words, they are miracles in the sense in which Aquinas, e.g., would
> > have used the term - phenomena which are completely beyond the capacity of creatures,
> > even with divine cooperation. Perhaps so - but then we need to be explicit about it.
>
> Why should it be troubling if God specified genuine randomness for some
> sets of events? If he decreed such systems and possibilities, such a
> quantum measurement would not "just happen for no reason", but because
> God wanted it to not be individually specified beforehand, apart from
> being an element of a previously circumscribed set. Why should one try
> to limit God in such a way?
Suppose that we have an experiment with two possible outcomes, like a single photon
being sent through a Michelson interferometer. There is a 50% chance of it being found
along arm A and 50% along B. God is active in the temporal evolution of the wave function
that specifies those probabilities. But if the photon is found along arm A, there seems to
be no reason for the result of that specific observation to have turned out that way
instead of the photon being found along B. The question "Why A and not B?" is not answered
by say, "Well, it could have turned out either way."
I've said before that it may be necessary to abandon the Principle of Sufficient
Reason. If that's the case then we should admit that we are doing so. It is not an
explanation of specific outcomes of specific measurements to say that God decides that the
measurements of the whole set of such measurements will be random.
> And why should we require that there _always_ be a "secondary cause for
> God to cooperate with in bringing about the results he wants"? I don't
> see a reason for accepting "the critical assumption of a kenotic view of
> divine action", to which you refer in your parallel post to Bob Dehaan,
> as inescapable for _all_ of God's acts. The primary importance of divine
> kenosis is in Christ's "emptying himself", although I also see parallels
> in biblical Revelation and in Creation, as I indicated in my 1992 PSCF
> paper. But I don't think this necessarily requires that God _always_
> acts in cooperation with creatures only. In the Bible I see him as fully
> sovereign in his decisions and acts, free to do something with or
> without creaturely secondary causes, without being inconsistent. Of
> course, in the usual operation of the creation, I expect him to work
> through creaturely secondary causes. But he certainly is not forced to
> do so always, and he may have his reasons occasionally not to do so. In
> Christ's resurrection, he hardly just cooperated with creaturely action!
If the cross reveals the character of God then kenosis is a fundamental aspect of
that character.
God is indeed free to do anything that isn't self-contradictory, but kenosis means that God
limits his action to what is within the capacities of created agents - and not just when
(so to speak) it's convenient for God to do so. See my article in PSCF this past March for
more on this.
I do not think that it is necessary to insist that the resurrection of Christ did
not involve divine cooperation with natural processes. But in any case there is no
justification for appealing to that unique event in order to introduce a multitude of
small-scale direct divine interventions.
> As you can see in my parallel post to Burgy, I can accept the
> designation "miraculous" for God's "hidden options", but only in the
> sense of God's introducing some new information, and certainly not in
> the sense of Aquinas which you indicate. The hidden options are
> certainly not "beyond the capacity of creatures", as every one of these
> events represents a specific selection from a set of physically possible
> events. And how could something be impossible "even with divine
> cooperation"? How Aquinas could get such an idea is completely
> incomprehensible for me.
I did not say (& certainly Thomas didn't) that these events are impossible even
with divine cooperation but that they "are completely beyond the capacity of creatures,
even with divine cooperation." I.e., they are possible but only by direct & unmediated
divine action. Or in other words, creatures are unable to cooperate in bringing about
these events.
Shalom,
George
George L. Murphy
http://web.raex.com/~gmurphy/
"The Science-Theology Interface"
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