> From: george murphy <gmurphy@raex.com>
> To: "Howard J. Van Till" <hvantill@novagate.com>
> Subject: Re: What does the creation lack?
> Date: Mon, Oct 29, 2001, 8:02 AM
>
> "Howard J. Van Till" wrote:
>
> From: george murphy <gmurphy@raex.com>
>
>
>
> In the approach of
> process theology (P), that
> limitation is due to the very
> nature of God and God's
> relationship with the world.
> A more traditional kenotic
> approach (K) sees God as
> indeed able to do all things,
> including miraculous
> intervention that violates the
> usual pattern of nature, but
> as voluntarily limiting divine
> action to what can be
> accomplished through natural
> processes. This is the
> scholastic distinction between
> God's "absolute power" and
> God's "ordinate power." The
> latter is limited while the
> former is not (except by the
> requirement of
> non-contradiction.) The
> process view, OTOH, amounts to
> the claim that even God's
> "absolute power" is limited.
>
>
> I think that's a correct representation
> of process theology, in which
> supernatural intervention is absent as a
> consequence of the very nature of God
> and the God/world relationship. God is
> "supreme in power," but not omnipotent.
>
>
> Both of these
> approaches are consistent with
> the ideas of creation's
> functional integrity and from
> the standpoint of the natural
> sciences may be
> indistinguishable. But there
> are some important theological
> differences. In K, God's not
> superseding natural laws is
> due to the fact that God does
> not choose to do so, while
> with P it's due to the fact
> that God can't do so. K is a
> view of divine action that is
> modelled on the Incarnation
> and cross, in which Christ
> "emptied" himself, while with
> P Incarnation and cross are
> examples of a general pattern:
> It's a difference in starting
> points.
>
> I'm not sure about the "examples of a
> general pattern" comment, but it
> certainly is true that K and P represent
> two quite different concepts of God,
> fundamental concepts on which one's
> theology is constructed.
>
> What I mean by the "general pattern"
> statement is that in P the limitation of God - &
> also God's participation in the suffering of the
> world - are general truths, of which Christ, &
> especially his cross, is one exemplar. He may be
> a very important example, & for some P theologians
> even the motivation for a process approach, but
> the whole system can be presented logically with
> no reference to Christ. One can be a Christian
> process theologian, but one can also be a Jewish
> one (cf. Kushner) or a philosophical one like
> Whitehead. One important difference between K & P
> is that in the former Christ can't be dispensed
> with & in P he can be (thpough he doesn't have to
> be).
This makes it clear that P is not an option for Christians. Peter
> P does not have to
> answer the question "Why does
> God so limit divine action?"
> because he must in the nature
> of things. K can of course
> simply fall back on "Because
> he wants to," but can also
> argue that limitation of
> divine action to what is in
> accord with rational laws of
> nature makes it possible for
> creatures to understand & have
> some control over their world.
> It is seldom noted, OTOH, that
> P does not really explain why
> there is a rational pattern
> for what takes place in the
> world.
>
>
> I presume the answer lies in the
> metaphysics on which process thought is
> founded. Perhaps it might also be argued
> that K does not really demonstrate that
> this particular form of divine
> self-limitation is morally optimal.
>
> I'm not sure that there's anything in P
> metaphysics that implies this: God can't force
> rationality on the world anymore than God can
> force anything else.
> I haven't tried to demonstrate that the K
> claim is "morally optimal", but only that it
> presents some reason for rationality.
>
> It may seem that P has
> the edge when dealing with the
> theodicy question: To put it
> crudely, bad things happen to
> good people because God can't
> help it. God can't intervene
> miraculously to keep cancer
> cells from multiplying, &c. K,
> OTOH, has to say that God
> could intervene but chooses
> not to. That may not seem a
> very attractive answer. This
> impression may be mitigated,
> however, by (a) the argument
> that this is the price that
> has to be paid for a rational
> world and (b) the claim that
> not only creatures but also
> God pays this price on the
> cross.
>
> One of my reasons for suggesting that P
> deserves a sympathetic consideration is
> its handling of the theodicy issue.
> Given traditional supernaturalism's
> difficulty with this matter, I still
> think some exploration of other
> theological systems is in order.
>
> Granted that "traditional supernaturalism"
> (TS) hasn't done a very good job with that. But
> that is due at least in part to the fact that in
> trying to deal with theodicy, TS has usually
> functioned as philosophical theism & has not based
> its arguments on the Incarnation and the cross. I
> am not saying that those considerations
> immediately solve all the problems, but K, like P,
> differs in important ways from TS.
Is this TS bound to hypercalvinistic double predestination? This would
certainly cause insurmountable problems of theodicy. If so, I suggest to
add a healthy biblical dose of human free will. This, together with the
essential points of the incarnation and the cross which George
emphasises, would weigh in towards a biblical solution of theodicy.
Peter
> Finally, K is more
> open to the possibility of
> miraculous intervention than
> P. Howard speaks consistently
> of his view of creation as
> ruling out "form-conferring
> interventions" but what about
> other kinds (e.g., redemptive)
> interventions? I have said
> before that I don't think it's
> necessary to insist that any
> given action, up to &
> including the resurrection,
> must be of such a character.
> OTOH, I wonder if it's wise
> to adopt an approach in which
> such interventions not even
> possible.
>
>
> OK, but sympathetic exploration is not
> adoption. One can learn from views
> without adopting them.
>
> Agreed.
> Shalom, George
>
> George L. Murphy
> http://web.raex.com/~gmurphy/
> "The Science-Theology Interface"
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